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Errata to thesis of H.Coddipily 
The entries in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 on pages 2.44 and 2.45 respectively 
should be: 
Sector Gini Coefficient Population Proportion 
Urban 0.377 0.1908 
Rural 0.340 0.7091 
Estate 0.314 0.1001 
All Island 0.356 1.000 
On page 4.1., line 9, the Gini Coefficient should be 0.36 
On page 2.48., line 6, the figure 0.299 should be 0.314 
Chapter 1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
Chapter 2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
(iii) 
CONT};NTS 
Acknowledgements 
Summary 
Declaration 
Introduction 
The Nature and Scope of the Study 
Distributive Considerations 
Economic Growth and Income Inequality 
Plan of this Study 
A Note on Numbering Systems, 
Abbreviations and Symbols used 
Income Distribution in Sri Lanka 
General Features of the Country 
The Economy 
Income Distribution: a Preliminary 
Description 
Income Distribution: some Numerical 
Summaries 
Sur.unary 
xvii 
xix 
xx 
1 
- 1 
1 
- 1 
1 
- 7 
1 - 11 
1 
- 14 
1 
- 18 
2 - 1 
2 - 1 
2 
- 5 
2 - 17 
2 
- 32 
2 
- 52 
(iv) 
Chapter 3 A Review of Redistributive Policies 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 The Food Subsidy 
3.3 Health Services 
3.4 The Educational System 
3.5 Other Welfare Measures 
3.6 Agricultural Development 
3.7 Summary 
Chapter 4 A }1odel for Redistribution 'ilith Growth 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 General Features of the }lodel 
4.3 The Iilodel 
4.4 Static Considerations 
4.5 Dynamic ConSiderations 
4.6 Growth without Further Redistributive 
r.1easures 
4.7 Tests for Validity of the Model 
4.8 Gro"Tth with Further Redistributive 
I·1easures 
4.9 Redistribution of Consumption 
4.10 Consequences of Population Increase 
4.11 Summary 
Page 
3 - 1 
3 - 1 
3 - 4 
3 - 7 
3 - 11 
3 - 14 
3 - 18 
3 - 24 
4 - 1 
4 - 1 
4 - 8 
4 - 12 
4 - 16 
4 - 20 
4 - 23 
4 - 34 
4 - 44 
4 - 55 
4 - 69 
4 - 76 
a 
tu 
Chapter 5 
(v) 
A Model for Redistribution with Growth: 
Some Elaborations 
5.1 An Extension of the f.1odel 
5.2 The Static Case 
5.3 Dynamic Considerations 
5.4 Summary 
Chapter 6 The Incentive Effect 
Chapter 7 
6.1 Introduction 
6.2 An Extension of the Nodel 
6.3 Dynamic Considerations 
Considerations of Optimal Growth 
7.1 Introduction 
7.2 The Hodel 
7.3 1'he Optimisation Problem 
7.4 The Solution 
7.5 .An Extension 
7.6 SUID.I:lary 
5 - 1 
5 - 1 
5 - 8 
5 - 12 
5 - 27 
6 - 1 
6 - 1 
6 - 2 
6 - 7 
7 - 1 
7 - 1 
7 
- 3 
7 - 6 
7 - 11 
7 - 28 
7 - 33 
(vi) 
Page 
Chapter 8 A Disaggregated Approach 8 - 1 
8. t Introduction 8 - 1 
8.2 The I'lodel 8 - 4 
8.3 The Data Framework 8 - 1 1 
8.4 Results 8 - 19 
8.5 Summary 8 - 31 
Chapter 9 Policy Implications 9 - 1 
9.1 Formulation of Economic Policy 9 - 1 
9.2 Capital for Self Employment 9 - 3 
9.3 Subsidies 9 - 5 
9.4 Redistribution of Consumption 9 - 6 
9.5 The Role of the J.!odern (Private)Sector 9 - 8 
9.6 The Role of Foreign Aid 9 - 10 
9.7 Population Policies 9 - 11 
9.8 The Incentive Effect 9 - 12 
9.9 Allocation of resources 9 - 13 
Chapter 10 Concluding Remarks 10 - 1 
Bibliography B 1 
... 
(vli) 
Appendix I Sectoral Composition of Gross National 
Product at Constant (1959) Factor 
Cost Prices - 1977 
Appendix II Composition of Exports and Imports 
1973 - 75 
Appendix III A note on the Consumption Patterns 
in Urban, Rural and Estate Sectors 
and the Changes in the Distribution 
of Income 
Appendix IV Solutions to Equations (4.20) 
Appendix V Notes wld Explanations regarding 
the Estimation of Paramaters 
Appendix VI Solutions to Equations (4.52) 
Appendix VII Solutions to Equations (5.21) 
I - t 
II - t 
III - t 
IV - 1 
V - 1 
VI - 1 
VII - 1 
• 
(viii) 
Appendix VIII Explanatory Note No. 1 to Chapter 7 
Appendix IX Explanatory Note No. 2 to Chapter 7 
Appendix X Explanatory Note no. 3 to Chapter 7 
Page 
VIII - 1 
IX -1 
x - 1 
... 
(ix) 
LIST 01" TABLES IN THE TEXT 
'. 
Table No. Title 
2.6 
2.1 Distribution of Spending Units by 
Income Groups, All Island (1973) 
2.2 Percentage of Total Income Received 
by each Ten per cent of Ranked 
Spendine Units 
2.3 An Inter-country Comparison of Income 
Distribution . 
2.4 J.1ean Income and Shares of Income by 
Sector - 1973 
2.5 Percentages of Income received by the 
bottom 40 per cent, middle 40 per 
cent and top 20 per cent in Urban, 
Rural and Estate Sectors (1963 and 
1973) 
Income inequality amongst Spending 
Units Classified by Sector - 19'73 
2 - 21 
2 - 23 
2 - 25 
2 - 27 
2 - 31 
2 - 44 
(x) 
Table Ho. Title 
2.7 Changes in Income Inequality amongst 
Spending Units classified by Sector 
I I,~-
2 - 4:> 
2.8 Income Inequality amongst Income Receivers 
classified by Sector, 1963 and 1973 2 - 48 
2.9 The AtkinsonIndex in respect of Urban, 
Rural and Estate Sectors - 1973 2 - 49 
3.1 Subsidies as percentages of total 
income of Spending Units 3 - 7 
3.2 An Inter-country comparison of I',redical 
Facilities 3 - 9 
3.3 Expenditure on Education as a percentage 
of the Gross National Product 3 - 13 
4.1 Growth rates of the Gross National Product 
at constant (1959) Factor Prices. 4 - 2 
4.2 Changes in values of Y1 and Y2 over 
time (Set 1) 4 - 40 
(xi) 
Table No. 
4.3 Changes in the values of Y1 and Y2 
over time (Set 2) 
Coefficients of Equation 4.43 
4.5 Values of Y1' Y2' (Y1+Y2)' (Y1/Y2) 
at t = 10 
(Section 4.8) 
4.6 Values of Y1, Y2 (Y1+Y2)' (Y1/Y2) at 
t = 10 
(Section 4.9) 
4.7 Changes in the values of xl and x2 
over time - Variant I 
4.8 Changes in the values of x1 and x2 
over time - Variant II 
4.9 Changes in the values of xl and x2 
over time - Variant III 
. 5.1 Summary of Results of Variants I-IV 
8.1 Objective Functions 
4 - 43 
4 -' 52 
4 - 53 
4 - 66 
4 - 73 
4 - 73 
4 - 74 
5 - 25 
8 - 13 
(xii) 
Table Uo. Title 
8.2 Coefficients of the Blldget and ~"oreign 
Exchanee Constraints 
8.3 Coefficients of the Interdependency 
Constraints 
8.4 Supply and r'larket Constraints 
8.5 Variant I - The Growth Objective, 
. 8.6 
8.7 
Optimal Solution 
Variant II - The Redistribut1ve 
Objective i, Optimal Solution 
Variant III - Employment Objective 
Optimal Solution 
8.8 Variant IV - Urban, \lelfare Obj ective, 
Optimal Solution 
8.9 Variant V - Rural 1velfure Objective 
Optimal Solution 
8.10 Variant VI - E~tate Welfare Objective 
Optimal Solution 
8 - 15 
8 - 17 
8 - 18 
8 - 21 
8 - 2? 
8 - 25 
8 - 27 
8 - 29 
8 - 30 
(xiii). 
LIST OF TABLES IN TIn: AEPmruIcEs 
Table Ho. Title 
A I - 1 Sectoral Composition of Gross national 
Product at Constant (1959) Factor Cost 
Prices - 1977 
A 11 - 1 Composition of 1xports and Imports 
1975 - 77 
A III - 1 Average Quantities of Food Consumed Per 
Head for Two r·lon the in 1 973 
A III - 2 Averaee Expenditure per Spendine Unit 
Per Nonth on Clothine and Footwear 
A III - 3 Floor Space per Person and Number of 
Peraons per Room - 1971 
AlII - 4 Housing Units classified by Structural 
type and basic amenities - 1971 
A III - 5 Chanees in Inter Sectoral Distribution 
of Income 1963 - 73 
1-1 
II - 2 
III - 2 
III - 4 
III - 5 
III - 6 
III - 10 
Table Ho. 
A III - 7 
(xiv) 
Title 
Income Distribution - Urban, Rural 
and Estate Sectors (1973) 
A III - 8 Percentaee of Total Income received 
by each quintile of Ranked Spending 
Units in Urban, Rural and Bstate 
Dectors (1963 and 1973) 
A III - 9 Distribution of Heal Income in 1963 
A III - 10 Distribution of Real Income in 1973 
A V - 1 Estimation of G.D.e.F. at Constant Prices 
A V - 2 Estimation of Capital - Output Ratio 
Page 
III - 13 
III - 14 
III - 16 
III - 17 
v - 3 
V - 4 
(xv) 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Fieure No. Title 
2.1 Lorenz Curves 2 - 41 
2.2 Lorenz Curves for Spending Units 
- All Island, 1963 and 1973 2 - 46 
2.3 Lorenz Curves for Spending Units 
- Urban Sector, 1963 and 1973 2-- 46 
2.4 Lore~ Curves for Spending Units 
- Rural Sector, 1963 and 1973 2 - 47 
2.5 Lorenz Curves for Spending Units 
- Estate Sector, 1963 and 1973 2 - 47 
4.1 Behavior of V 4 - 33 
4.2 Behavior Yt/Y2 4 - 37 
4.3 Behavior of Y1 and Y2 , ,d th respect to A 4 - 53 
4.4 Behavior of (Y1+Y2) with respect to A 4 - 54 
4.5 Behavior of Y1/Y2 \vith respect to A 4 - 54 
4.6 Behavior of Y1 and Y2 with reopect to A. 4 - 66 
4.7 Behavior of (Y1+Y2) ,,11th respect to A 4 - 67 
4 
7.1 
7.20 
(xvi) 
Behavior of (Y1/Y2) with respect to A 
Choice Set for A andfl 
Behavior of ql with respect to time 
4 - 67 
7 - 12 
7 - 20 
(xvii) 
ACKNOi'lLEDGEr'1ENTS 
In presenting this thesis, I wish to express my gratitude 
first of all to my supervisor Alan R. Roe. His co~ents on 
each of the draft chapters, particularly in a situation of 
having to carry out this study as an external candidate over 
the last four years, and his guidance and supervision during 
my period of residence at the University of Warwick are 
gratefully acknowledged. 
My sincere thanks are also due to Graham P,yatt of the 
Development Research Cent er, World Bank for introducing me 
into the subject area of Income Distribution and for offering 
. 
valuable advice at the commencement of this study. I also 
owe a debt of eratitude to my initial supervisor S.K. Nath of 
the University of \varwick ''1ho gave me valuable advice on the 
outline of this study and the much needed encouragement to 
proceed. 
The computer facilities afforded by the University of Warwick 
and the financial assistance to travel to the United Kingdom 
provided by the Social Science Research Council, United 
Kit:lgdom are gratefully acknowledged. By residence period at 
the University of Warwick during 1911 went a long way in 
improving this study, particularly thro1~h the very stimulating 
(xviii) 
discuDsions "lith members of the staff of the Economics 
Department. In particular I ac indebted to ~rofessor A.K. 
Dixit for his valuable suggestions in developing Chapter 7 
of this study. HOHever, I wish to add that the vim'ls 
expressed in this study are mine and that I am alone respon-
sible for any errors that remain. 
Finally, I would like to expreso m;/ sincere thanks to m.v 
oioter 1-1i08 Shiranee Codippily and to I·aGo l"rer:1a Ba:.nayake 
for typing the initial drafts, to Hrs. I:Iarie Fernando for 
her patience and care in the tedioUD task of typing the 
final draft and to my \'life 3heilo. "lho helped [!le in several 
"rays to complete this study. 
(xix) 
The principal aim of this study is to explore the interrela-
tionships that could exist between the processes of erowth and 
redistribution of incomes by means of a formal model representative 
of Sri Lanka, and to assess quantitatively the effects of alter-
native policy options available. The model is based on the 
Chenery-Ahluwalia model for distribution lli th growth {1974} and 
retains some of its original features such as a dualistic pattern 
of production, differential savings rates and linkaces amongst 
major socio-economic croups through employment. But in many 
respects this study goes beyond theirs by incorporating the 
government as a separate entity participating in a growth cum 
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CHAPl' ER I 
I1J'l'HODUCT ION 
"The enhancement of hwnan 
dignity and the consequent 
capacity to lead a fuller, 
freer, more thoroughly 
human life is the ultimate 
objective of development" -
Robert S. BcNamara (Address 
to the Board of Governors of 
the World Bank, 1969) 
1.1 The Nature and Scope of the Study 
Economic growth and income redistribution have emereed 
today as two major objectives of development planning in 
most developing countries. For, the main preoccupation of 
development planning today is not only one of bringing 
about a greater availability of goods and services to a 
community as a whole but also one of trying to ensure 
that these goods and services are distributed as equitably 
as possible amongst the various segments of the community. 
It is argued that economic growth by itself cannot have 
much meaning unless the poorest seonents of the community 
are also benefited. On the other hand. it is only through 
economic gI'ovlth that there will be anything significant 
to redistribute. 1ven the very maintenance of an existing 
system of social services for a growing population 
necessitates growth of national income. 
a 
.... 
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Whilst suggestions have been made in the recent 
literature that the two objectives of economic growth 
and income redistribution are competing objectives, 
requiring some form of trade-off (see for example 
Cline ~972} ) others contend that higher rates of 
Growth need not necessarily generate greater ineq~l.ali ty 
(see Chenery et al. {1974; pp 13-14~. Some of the 
country studies presented by Chenery et al.{1974; 
pp. 253-390} do suggest that income redistribution 
could be successfully combined with economic growth. 
This area of debate is directly relevant to Sri Lanka. 
Successive Governments in Sri Lanka have carried out a 
wide ranee of social welfare policies, rcdistributive 
in character, such as the food subsidy, subsidies in 
health, education, transport. minimum waGe policies and 
price control of essential items. It has also been 
argued that agricultural development policies, 
motivated by import substitution and which are growth 
oriented in character have contributed tmoJards 
reduction of income inequality through increased 
farmer incomes (see Jayuwardena in Chenery et al.{1974; 
p.275». It is in this context that questions are being 
posed as to whether or not redistributive policies have 
had an impact upon growth of national income in Sri 
Lanka. Specificn.llY,the present climate of thouCht 
on developrnent issues, judged from recent policy 
1 - 3 
statements (for example, the Budget Speech of November, 
1977) is committed towards achieving h i_cher rates of 
economic growth vlhilst maintaining and further 
improving social welfare measures. It is therefore 
relevant to inquire into the nature of interdependencies 
that cO·l.ld exist between growth and redistributive 
policies in Sri Lanka. 
The principal aim of this study is to explore the 
interrelationships that could exist betlleen the processes 
of grovlth and redistribution of incomes by means of a 
formal model vlith special reference to Sri Lanka. 
Admittedly no codel could possibly capture the manifold 
complexities of re~lity. In the basic model and its 
variants developed in this study, we shall take into 
accoll.nt only the more important elements connected 't"li th 
ero1'lth and redistribution of incor:1es and shall 
concentrate on gaining insicht into some of the lending 
issues involved und their policy implications. 
The general approach of this study draws its 
inspirC!.tion frO!!l the nodel for distribution . "i th CrO .... 1th 
presented by Chenery and Ahluvl8,lia (sce Chenery et al. 
t1974; Ch. XI}) and retains a number of its oriGinal 
features '·7hich characterize a developing economy. 
These include the dualistic oodes of production i.e. a 
1 - 4 
modern sector which uses hired labour and a traditional 
sector based on self employment, concentration in the 
ownership of capital, differential access of socio-
economic groups to employment possibilities, differential 
savings behaviour, and differential rates of population 
growth. The basic theme of their model is one of 
interdependent gro"Vlth: that is a situation where growth 
of income of one seement of a community depends upon 
another throueh employment linkaGes. This may be regarded 
as a major step in the development of an integrated theory 
of growth and distribution. For, the respective socio-
economic groups are not autonomous entities but are 
connected through employment linkages. Therefore the growth 
of incomes of one croup ''loll.ld depend upon those of other 
groups. Such interdependencies must necessarily be taken 
account of in developing a theory of growth with distri-
bution. 
In many respects the model developed in this study coes 
beyond the Chenery - Ahluwalia model, l!'irstly, the 
government is represented as a separate entity 
participating in a growth cum redistribution process. 
Secondly, the roles of financial institutions, direct 
taxes, indirect taxes, subsidies and of foreign aid are 
explicitly introduced into the model. Thirdly, the 
model is extended to take account of incentive losses 
1 - 5 
and gains arisine from redistributive measures. Another 
major aim of this study is to incorporate considerations 
of optimality into a growth cum redistribution process 
with a view to inquiring into the nature of interrelation-
ships that could exist under conditions of optimality. 
The central question posed is, how can the weIfare of the 
poor be optimised within a Growth cum redistribution 
process, over a limited time horizon by usine policy 
instruments available to covernment? An attempt will also 
be made in the latter po.rt of this stUdy to discuss the 
implications of erovTth,redistribution and employment 
objectives upon individual sectors of the economy. 
The cethodoloeY used in this study also differs from that 
used in the Chenery - J.Jllmw.lia study. The dynamic 
properties of the Chenery Ahlmmlia model are e:·:amined in 
terms of simulation techniques rather than by analytical 
techniques. Al thour)l Cl mention is r'.ade that their model 
can be "lri tten in the form of t:. set of difference 
problems 
equations, yet in ~:.nticipn.tion of certo.in ana.lyticaJL they 
had opted to use simulation techni~ues. In this study we 
shall neither use simulation techniques nor difference 
equations. Instead the model ,viII be developed in terms 
of a set of simultaneous differential equations. 
The scope of this study as outlined above also Goes 
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beyond the ground covered by other studies concerning 
Growth and income redistribution in Sri LruU{a. Yor 
example, the Narga study {19741 on welfare and erowth in 
Sri Lanka traces the historical developIT.ent of social 
welfare policies durine the post war years, identifies 
the shifto in eophasis bet\V'een welfare and [,T01'lth at 
different points of time, and discusses some of the areas 
of conflict. Objectives, priorities und policies 
relatine to development issuen are dincussed aGainst a 
sweep of economic, social and political chance over a 
quarter century. But the entire treatment is qualitative 
in character, as D. result of iihich it is difficult to 
derive the quantitative effects of the interaction of one 
element of the economy upon another or to derive a r8nge 
of alternative paths in a crOi'lth CUJl1 redistribution 
process. The study by Codippily{1974} attempts to dis 
cuss at a theoretical level the poosible trade-off between 
welfare and ero\<;th, advocates redistribution of consumption 
rather than income and examines incentive losses and gains 
arisine out of redistributive measures but does not 
develop the model into one of interdependent erowth of the 
Chenery - Ahlmvalia type. Although a short chapter is 
devoted to income distribution in Sri Lanka, a growth cum 
redistribution model in the Sri Lankan context is not 
developed. Karunatilake {1975} examines each major 
welfare measure in detail, evaluates the costs ascociated 
with each measure, with a view to assessinG the total 
1 - 7 
impact of' \'lelfare measures and advocates a shift to a growth 
oriented strategy by means of a ceiling on social service 
expenditure. But the diccussions are descriptive in 
character and cannot be readily incorporated into an 
analytical framework. Nevertheless these as well as other 
studies contain valuable insights and we shall come back to 
these studies later. 
1.2 Distributive Considerations 
Although questions relating to political equality and social 
equality have been discussed by political and social thinkers 
throuehout the aees, the ideal of economic equality hardly 
found adequate treatment in classical economics. Economists 
like Adam Smith, Ricardo, John Stuart Eill and others, with 
the exception of Pareto were mainly concerned \,1i th the 
distribution of income betvleen the factors of production 
namely labour and capital, than with the distribution of 
personal income by size. One explanation for this limitation 
could be that questions concerning distribution of income 
by size do involve social and ethical considerations and 
explicit value jUdgements, for which one would have to go 
beyond the territory of economics. Several political and 
social thinkers have in fact gone beyond the territory of 
economics and examined questions relating to the historical 
evolution of societies, economic inequality in society, 
1 - 8 
reforms desirable etc. It is in such ''lorks, as those of 
Rousseau, Saint- Simon and Karl Narx, that we come across 
serious discussions of economic inequality. However what 
they advocated was not complete economic equality (like 
political equality) but equity in the distribution of 
incomes. For exaople, Saint-Simon advocated equity 
rather than equality as a guideline for distribution: "to 
each accordine to his work" (see T)nukert {1973 j p.98}) and 
1'1arx advocated "from each accordine to his ability and to 
each accordine to his needs" at the latter stages of 
developmentofa.society. (see Sen {197g j p.89}). Par et 0 , 
a nineteenth century Italian economist was probably the 
first to carry out empirical examination in depth in 
regard to the distribution of incomes in several countries. 
The remarkable recularity he found in the distribution of 
incomes led to the formulation of Pareto's Law, estimation 
of the Pareto constant, and to the implication in Samuelson's 
~'lords (quoted in Paukert {1973 ; p.101}) "that in all places 
and all times the distribution of incomes remain the same. 
Neither institutional chanees nor eealitarian taxation can 
alter this fundamental constant of social sciences". 
With the development of welfare economics in the early 
part of this century, distributive considerations were 
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beginning to be seen from newer perspectives. Pigou, who 
might be considered to be the founder of welfare economics 
based his arguments on five main assumptions (see lhth 
t1973 pp 13-14}) and derived the proposition. 
"it is evident that any transference of income 
from a relatively rich man to a relatively 
poor man of similar temperament, since it 
enables core intense wants to be satisfied at 
the expense of less intense \-rants, must 
increase the aggregate sum of satisfaction". 
But the criticism by Robbins and the aftermath led to a 
fruitless search for a 'more-or-less ethics-free' theory of 
welfare. As such, welfare economics concentrated on issues 
that did not involve conflict between different individuals 
or groups. If it is not possible to make someone better off 
without making so~eone else \-lorse off, the situation is said 
to be Pareto optimal. Thus, in this so called 'optimal' 
situation, '\'1hatev()r the disparity betvleen the rich and the 
poor may be, the criterion of Pareto optimality will not 
advocate any change. Sen 097g ; pp. 6-7} comoents that 
,-:<1., 
"much of. modern welfare economics is concerned with 
with precisely thut set of questions which avoid 
judgecents in illCOrle distribution altogether ••• 
The concept of Pureto optimnlity was evolved 
precisely to cut out the need for distributive 
judgements ••• The almost single minded concern 
of modern uelfare economics ''1i th Pareto opti-
. mnlity does not make that engac;ing branch of 
study particularly suitable for investigating 
problems of inequality" 
1- 10 
As an attempt to eo beyond this impasse, a school of thought 
developed with the outlook that if questions of income distri-
bution are to be settled, value judgements are inevitable, and 
that welfare economics should indicate prescriptions for social 
policy which can lead to decisions. In the words of Nath {1973 
p. 13}: 
""lclfare economists cannot take decisions 
on behalf of SOCiety, but they can, and 
they do make preDcriptions for social 
policy, which mayor may not become 
decisions". 
One of the earliest attempts to go beyond Bareto-optimality 
was the Bergson-~arnuelson social welfare function (s\'lF) 
1 
approach. A Sl'/F is a relationship which expresses the social 
welfare of a society in terms of certain relevant variables. 
A miF can even be taken to mean a statement of objectives of 
a society with some implicit relative weights. The variables 
may include per capita income, income distribution, employment, 
environment etc. 
Apart from distributive considerationo, it beco~es evident 
from the work of Sen {1973 p. 3}. Atkinson {1970} and others, 
that even in the very measurement of income inequality, that 
value judGements are inevituble. 2 It would thus appear that 
1 
2 
In fact, the phrase "social l'lelfare function" was first 
introduced by BcrgSon in 1938. 
These measures will be diDcussed in Chapter 2. 
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the entire question of income diotribution 1'1111 have to be 
discussed in terms of vE',lue judl,;enents al1d ethical 
considerations. 
1.3 Economic Grmvth and Income Inequality 
Perhaps the first serious attempt to hypothesize on the 
relationships that could exist between income inequality and 
economic groi'lth wan th2.t of Kuznctn' {19SS}. He posed the 
questions "Does inequality in the distribution of income 
increase or decrease in the course of a country's econo~ic 
grmvth? \'lhut factors deteroine the seculCl:' level and trends 
of income inequa.lity?" He adv~ced the ceneral propo::::ition 
that as a 1011 incoL1e country developn, the extent of income 
inequality tends to increase at first, then become stable 
before it beGins to decrea.se. l·:uch luter, Paukert {1973} set 
out to te::::t I(uznets' hypothesis and his conclusions indicated 
that there ~as er:.pirico.l evidence to support I:uznets' hypothesis. 
lIe found thQ.t there ill n tendency for income ineq.uali ty to 
increo.ne l?S countries pro{:reas froIl1 beloi-l the per capi tu 
income level of UJ ~ 100 to the DD ~ 101-200 lovel, the pcak 
of income iuequali ty beine reached bchreen the levels of 
US $ 200 and US 3 500. 
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Since Paulcert's study is an inter-country study a question may 
be posed as to whether a historical trend in a country should 
necessarily follow a pattern thrown up by, a' cross. section study 
However, the ,,,,ork of Soltow in respect of Gt. Britain and 
Norway points towards a clear lone term trend towards equality 
despite periods of stability or even short term reversals (see 
Paukert {1973 ; pp. 102, 103, 120}). 
f10re recently, similar results have been obtained by Ahluwalia 
in "Redistribution with Growth" by Chenery, Ahluwalia et.al. 
{1974 : Ch. 1, p.17}. He finds that the predicted share of the 
lowest 40 per cent declines sharply up to per capita income 
levels of $ 400 and then flattens out, rising steadily after per 
capita GNP passes the * 1,,200 level. In parallel with such a 
movement, the share of the top 20 per cent increases steadily to 
reach a peak around the $ 300 - $ 400 per capita income level and 
thereafter to decline gradually. Thus, the superposition of these 
two movecents will eive rise to an overall pattern in which income 
inequality will tend to increase at first up to a level of $ 400 
then flatten out and decrease gradually with higher levels of per 
capita incomes. In other words, the puttern predicted aerees 
,,11th the Kuznets' hypothesis. 
An interesting point has been made very recently by 
Lydall{1977} in an attempt to understand the Kuznets' 
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pattern. lIe arGues that economic [,Tmlth is primarily a 
process of adopting better technoloGies with higher out-
put per men and that if in the enrly staces of development 
in a country there are shifts in labour from lower to 
higher technologies, then there would be tendency for 
income inequality to widen in the early stages of economic 
growth and decline in the later stages. 
The other important empirical study we should take note- -of 
is the one carried out by Adelman and Norris {1971}. 
Althoueh it mieht appear at first sight that their results 
are at variance with the Kuznets hypothesis, it will be 
argued in Chapter 4 that this is not really the case. 
The above studies sugGest that there could well be a 
'natural' path that a developinG country will on the 
average tend to follow. Even if th:ts were true, it need 
not preclude a country from attemptine to deviate from such 
a tp~th'. Furthermore, the behaviour pattern of a 
specific country could he entirely different. It follows 
therefore that if \'le ilish to develop the outline for a 
rcdistri but ion cum er01o.lth : Iroc;raL"l1l1e for a opecific 
country, ~Ie should 1001: more dce'T)ly into the trends in 
income distribution pattern and econor:lic CI'01"th of such 
country and attempt to study the interrelu.tionships 
bet'1een income distribu.tion und economic c;rmlth of the 
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country.' .A maj or aim of th i.n study is to develop the 
outlines of such a strateBY in respect of 3ri Lanka. 
1.4 Plan of this Utudy 
Ue shall begin this study 'Hi th un asaecsment of the extent 
of income inequality in the country as a whole as well as 
in urban, rural and estate areas, based on the latest 
available information, namely the 1973 Survey of Consluner 
Finances. The changes in the puttern of distribution of 
income Hill then he stud.ied. ~lhereafter an atteMpt will 
be made to analyse these results in terms of recent 
theoretical developments and methods of analyois. 
International comparisons v1111 be made and other aspects 
of economic inec!uality such as disparities in earninG 
levels of various professions. This assesGment will form 
the contents of Chapter 2. 
The aim of Cl~apter 3 will be to identify and dincuss some 
of the factors that could have contributed towards ch[l.llges 
in income distribution. Besides taxes and nubsidies many 
redistributive measures have been eiven effect to in recent 
times, such as rural development, agricultural production, 
subsidised health, education and transport serVices, 
minimum wace policy and price control of essential items. 
Each of these policies will be briefly' .. rcviewed so as to 
complement the results of Chapter 2. 
... 
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Chapter 4 will be the starting point of the substantive 
part of this study. The basic model for redistribution with 
growth together with estimates of parameters which reflect 
the Sri Lanka context will be developed in Chapter 4. We 
shall sho,'l how the distribution of incomes is determined by 
the distribution of capital stocks, and waees and profitability 
parameters noting in particular how the income of the poor 
are dependent upon the income of the rich and government 
income through employment linkages. The model will be used 
in its static form to discuss the relative merits and 
demerits of nationalisation and of using capital for self 
employment. Thereafte~ we shall explore the dynamic 
properties of the model and examine ',.;hether the model is 
capable of Generating the behaviour pattern hypothesised by 
Kuznets, described briefly in the previous section. The 
interrelationships betVleen considerationsof redistribution 
and of groVlth 11111 be discussed in detail within the 
context of three processes. These are (a) growth without 
specific redistributive measures, (b) growth with spec'ific 
redistributive measures and (c) redistribution of consump-
tion. Policy implications will be derived "lherever 
possible. 
As mentioned earlier, the model developed in this study 
goes beyond the Chenery - Ahluwalia model in many respects. 
Chapte~ 5 contains three major extensions, namely (a) direct 
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and indirect taxes and subsidies, (b) the role of financial 
institutions and (c) foreign aid. This chapter will set 
out the manner in which the extended model behaves over 
time with respect to several variants determined by 
selected values of parameters. In particular we shall 
examine the impact of subsidies upon the system and ~ssens 
the results of alternative measureo. that could raise the 
incomes of the poor. 
Redistributive policies are bound to alter the relative 
income levels of skilled manpouer consisting of SCientists, 
engineers, doctors, economists, planners, accountants, 
managers , and other professionals and consequently incentive 
losses are bound to arise. Although the process of trading 
off leisure for work has been discussed by Codippily {19741, 
one major inadequacy was thut production functions were not 
explicitly used to demonstrate analytically the manner in 
which economic {70wth could slow down. An attempt will be 
made in Chapter 6 to incorporate skilled manpower as a 
factor of production into the model already developed and 
to discuss in analytical terms the effect of incentive 
losses. 
Another major aim of this study is to inquire into the 
nature of interrelationships that could exist within a 
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growth cum distribution process under conditions of 
optimality, by considering the questlon of optimising the 
income of the poor over a limited time horizon. Chapter 7 
which deals with this question may be regarded as a logical 
extension of the work of Hamada{1967}-concerning the optimal 
transfer of income in a growing economy. But he has 
discussed only the limited case where workers do not save 
at all and only one policy instrument is available. The 
main contribution of Chapter 7 will be to incorporate the 
Hamada approach into the model already developed and 
discuss the more general case where the re c.1 pient class 
also save, government is treated as an explicit entity in a 
growth cum redistribution process and where there is more 
than one policy instrument available to government. 
Chapter 8 will make a significant departure from the 
"aeeregative" character of the discussions and attempt to 
examine the implications of erm'lth, redistributive and 
employment objectives in relation to individual sectors of 
the economy. The central theme of this chapter will be 
that of inquiring into optimal patterns of resource 
allocation in relation to alternative social objectives. 
In Chapter 9 we shall bring together the various policy 
implications derived in the earlier chapters. An atteMpt 
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will be made to synthesize these into a few major policy guide-
lines which could be of some use in the formulation of national 
plans and policies. 
Concluding remarks will be in Chapter 10. 
1.5 A Note on Numberig systems, Abbreviations and Symbols used. 
The chapters are numbered serially according to HOIDan numerals. 
The pages in each chapter are given an independent series of 
numerals prefixed by the order of the chapter. Thus 4 - 3 denotes 
Chapter 4, page 3. A similar system is adopted for the appendices 
~d accordingly III - 7 would denote Appendix Ill, paee 7. The 
bibliography would have a seperate oystem of paee numbering 
prefixed by the letter B. 
Sections in each chapter are Given an independent series of 
numerals prefixed by the order of the chapter. Thus 4.1 would 
denote Chapter 4 Section 1. The same system is followed in the 
nunberinc of equations, tables, figures und maps. But in the 
case of the appendices, the table numberinc is prefixed by the 
letter A. For example, Table .A III - 2 \v-ould denote Appendix III 
Table 2. Equations in each appendix are Given an independent 
series of arabic numerals. 
All references are indicated by the name of author and the year 
of publication of the work cited within double brackets { }. 
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Where reference is made to several works by the same author 
in a given year, the letters a, b, c ••• are used to distinguish 
between the respective works. Foot_notes appearing on a given . 
page are assigned an independent series of numerals. 
In general abbreviations used in the text are defined wherever 
they are introduced for the first time. The common ones are 
listed below. 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNP Gross Uational Product 
CFS Survey of Consumer Finances 
SES Socio - Economic Survey 
un United Nations 
SlJ!l Social Accounting l1atrix 
Rs. Rupees (Sri Lanka) 
m million 
Th. Thousand 
c.i.f. Cost, insurance and freight 
f.o.b Free on board 
All symbols are denoted by English or Greek letters and are 
defined when introduced for the first time. A vector x will be 
denoted by ! and its diagonalised form by %. I;!atrices, Hamiltonian~ 
and the Laplace transform are denoted by capital letters. 
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CHAPTB.H 2 
INCOHE DISTRIBUTION IN SRI LANKA 
"The outstanding faults 
of the economic society 
in which we live are its 
failure to provide full 
employment and its 
arbitrary and inequitable 
distribution of wealth and 
incomes" - J.M. Keynes 
(General Theory, page 372) 
2.1 General Features of. the Country 
The Republic of Sri Lanka, known as Ceylon prior to 
1972 is an island situated in the Indian Ocean towards 
the south-east of the southern extremity of India. The 
island is separated from the Indian sub-continent by a 
narrow strip of shallow sea of about 20 miles in breadtlL 
The greatest length of the islan~ North to South is 270 
miles and the greatest breadth is 140 miles. The land 
area is 25,332 square miles - a little over one fourth 
size of the United Kingdom. 
The south-central part of the country is mountainous 
and ranges in elevation from about 3000 feet above sea 
level to 7000 feet, with a few summits reaching beyond 
the latter limit. The mountainous regions are 
surrounded by an upland belt,about 1000 to 3000 feet above 
sea level 
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while the coastal plain occupying the rest of the 
country is narrower on the \~est and South but broadens 
into a vast tract in the North. 
The mean annual temperature in the lowlands rances 
o 0 between 80 F to 82 F but falls steadily with higher 
elevations. For example, the mean temperature in 
o Colombo , the country's capital is about 81 F, but at 
Kandy, 1600 feet above sea level it is 770F and at 
Nuwara Eliya, 6200 feet above sea level, it 1s 60oF. 
The seasonal variation in the mean monthly temperature 
is relatively small in "many parts of the country. 
The annual average rainfall varies from below 40 inches 
in the driest zones in the North West and South East 
of the country to over 200 inches at certain south-
western slopes of the hills. On the basis of climatic 
differences, the country may be divided into 3 zones: 
the wet zone which is the south-western region of the 
country, the dry zone which ~ainly consists of the 
northern and north-western sections of the country and 
an intermediate zone (see map 2-1). 
Sri Lanka's population today is about 14 million. 
Nearly three fourths of the population live in the wet 
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and intermediate zones, and the country's capital city of 
Colombo has a population of the order of 600,000. The 
major ethnic groups in the country are the Sinhalese 
(72. O"~), C eylon Tamils (11. 2/~), the Indian Tamils (9. 7~~) , 
the Noors(6.7%) and other races such as Burghers, Eurasians, 
1~lays and others accounting for less than 1 per cent. 
Buddhism is the religion of the majority of the Sinhalese 
and Hinduism that of the Tamils. The Christians, the 
majority of whom are Roman Catholic, are of all ethnic 
groups. Buddhists constitute 67.4 per cent of the 
population, Hindus 17.6 per cent, Christians 7.8 per cent 
1 
and Huslims 7.1 per cent. 
The rate of erowth of population showed a marked increase 
during the post-war years. The Growth rate which was 
1.5 per cent during the period 1931-46 increased sharply 
to 2.8 per cent in the period 1946-53. It continued to 
be high at 2.7 per cent during the period 1953-63, 
dropped to 2.3 per cent during the period 1963-71 and 
dropped further to 1.6 per cent in 1974. The rapid 
increase in population during the post-war years has been 
primarily due to the extensive development of health 
services. Some of the noteworthy results were, (a) the 
death rate which stood at 20.2 per thousand in 1946 
declined to 7.9 per thousand in 1972,1 (b) infant 
1 Source: Dept. of Census and StatistiCS, "Population 
of Sri Lanka, t1974, p.5.} 
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mortality fell from 141 per thousand live births in 1946 to 
50 per thousand in 1968, and (c) the expectation of life at 
birth increased from 44 for males and 42 for females in 1946 
to 65 and 67 respectively in 1968. 1 The malaria eradication 
campaien of the 1940s is considered to be one of the special 
factors behind the sharp fall in the death rate. The birth 
rates which stood at 36.6 in 1960 declined to 29.4 in 1972, 
and this decline has been one of the principal factors which 
reduced the population Growth rate during the last few years. 
The rate of literacy in Sri Lanka is much above the levels 
prevailing in most developing countries. Amone the males, 
85.2 per cent were literate and amonG the females, 70.7 per 
cent \-Tere literate in 1971. }'urthcr in 1971, from the 
population of persons 15 years and over 30.3 per cent had 
received an education up to primary level 34.1 per cent beyond 
primary level, 8.2 per eent up to GCE (Ordinary Level) and 1.5 
per cent had passed the GCB (A.L) or hieher examinations. The 
, 
balance 25.9 per cent had no formal schooling.2 These 
attainments have resulted from a number of 
1See Govt. of Sri Lanka, Five Year Plan 1972-76, p. 113. 
2source: Dept. of Census and Statistics, Op.cit.p.53. 
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measures adopted in the educational field, such as the 
introduction of Free Education, adoption of the mother 
tongue as the medium of instruction and the overall 
expansion of educational facilities. 
2.2 The Economy 
From the ancient times1, aGriculture was the mainstay of 
the Sri Lankan economy. During the reien of a long series 
of Sinhalese Kines, a great deal of attention was paid to 
the development of a vast network of tanks (reservoirs) 
and irrigation works in order to support domestic agriculture, 
particularly the cultivation of paddy. The country reached 
a high level of prosperity particularly in the twelfth 
century durine the reign of King J:iarakrama Bahu I, who is 
considered to have been perhaps the L~eatest builder of 
tanks, irrigation networks and daf,obas in ancient times. 
historical records show that the country had oizeable 
surpluses of rice for export after meetine the requirements 
of a large population. Economic activity was however 
interrupted from time to tioe durine the earlier periods, 
by foreign invasiono, particularly from the Indian sub-
continent. 
1 The Nahu"'aIlSa records the history of t he country from 
543 B.C., when an Aryan prince by the na.me of Vijaya 
arrived ,,11th about 700 men from Northern India. 
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The country had greatly declined in prosperity, mainly 
through internal divisions and rivalries, at the time 
of the Portugese arrival in 1505. The economic interests 
of the Portugese who had settled in certain maritime 
parts of the island were those of erowing cinnamon and 
other spices, of shipping these to Lisbon and of assuming 
general control over the spice trade. The Portugese were 
expelled by the Dutch in the middle of the 17th century. 
Having settled down in certain parts of the island, the 
Dutch too assumed control over the spice trade. The 
Dutch in turn were expelled by the British in 1776. With 
the fall of the Kingdom of Kandy in 1815 and the 
Proclamation in 1818, the entire country came under 
British rule. 
The early part of the British period saw the beginnings 
of a dual economy. Tea, which replaced coffee in the 
1870s and rubber and Coconut plantations which were export 
oriented were steadily developed. Although paddy 
cultivation and other forms of subsistence aericulture 
continued to co-exist, their decline was inevitable. 
The repair of tanks and irrigation works carried out from 
time to time, by itself, failed to produce significant 
results. Thus a country which had once exported large 
quantities of rice began to import rice. Meanwhile the 
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expansion of tea, rubber and coconut plantations 
brought about steady increases in export earnings. Tea 
plantations were pioneered by the British Companies and 
they controlled the largest number of the bigger estates, 
which produced the country's best tea. The estates were 
efficiently managed through a number of Agency Houses, 
and were in a position to provide attractive dividends. 
The labour for these estates was obtained from South 
India since local workers we~e unwilling to work in 
plantations. In order to support the plantations sector, 
large scale development of infrastructure and services 
were also initiated by the British. Most noteworthy 
amongst these were the network of roads, railways, postal 
and telecommunication systems, transport, manufacturing 
activities for processing of plantation products, the 
spread of English education and the setting up of import-
export trading establishments. These, together with the 
development of a colonial administration led to the 
formation of a modern sector. The overall pattern that 
emerged was the classic dual economy with a large 
traditional rural SUbsistence economy side by side with 
1 
a small but powerful modern sector. The impact of the 
plantation sector was so great that as much as 98 
1 A fuller discussion of the pre-Independence period is 
provided by H.N.S. Karunatilake {1971: pp.1-26} 
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per cent of the export earnings came from tea, rubber 
1 
and coconut at the time of Independence in 1948. 
The post-Independence period saw a co~certed effort to 
make the country less dependent on imports for her 
requirements of food and other consumer items. The 
ancient tanks and irrigation works were restored, large 
scale irrigation works such as the Gal Oya Project were 
initiated, vast acreages of jungle land were cleared, a 
large number of colonists were settled in the various 
colonization schemes and a range of supporting services 
such as subsidies on fertilizer and agricultural 
implements, agricultural credit, guaranteed price 
Land schemes, agricultural research, agricultural extension 
services were introduced. These efforts resulted in 
significant increases in paddy production. For example, 
paddy production rose from 31.3 million bushels in 1951 
to 10.0 million bushels in 1910. 
The process of industrialization which had already 
commenced during the pre-Independence period received a 
great stimulus. State Industrial Corporations were set 
1 ··Karunntilake {1911; 
. . 
p. 14} 
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up during the period 1944-1956 for the manufacture of 
plywood, cement, leather products, oils and ~ats, paper, 
caustic soda, chlorine and ilmenite. With the formation 
of a government in 1956 committed to the principles of 
democratic socialism, plans were formulated for the 
further development of state industry. The Ten Year Plan 
1959-68, the country's first comprehensive development 
plan laid heavy emphasis on the need to create a sizeable 
industrial sector. Amongst the many industries that were 
set up or developed during the post-1956 period, were the 
steel, hardware, tyre and flour milling plants installed 
with assistance from socialist countries. The early 1960s 
saw a steady deterioration in the terms of trade. Conse-
quently, import restrictions were placed on a wide range 
of consumer items, which in turn provided an opportunity 
for setting up local industry. This situation together 
with the governments policy for supporting industrial 
ventures through a number of tax incentives gave rise to 
a significant growth of import substituting private 
sector industries. The other major thrust of economic 
activity during the post-Independence period was the 
development of large scale hydro-power projects, with a 
view to meeting the requirements of industry. 
The system of education which had hitherto produced 
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clerks and civil servants for a colonial administration 
also underwent a radical change. Reforms were introduced 
so as to produce a greater number of scientists, 
engineers, doctors, accountants and other professional 
personnel. In schools/the medium of instruction was 
changed from English to the national languages. The post-
Independence period also saw the revival of traditional 
arts and cultural and religious practices. From the 
point of view of social welfare, sienificant developments 
during the post-Independence period were a system of free 
education up to University level and subsidies on food 
and health services. The nature and the implications of 
these measures will be discussed later. 
Agriculture is still the dominant sector of the Sri Lankan 
economy todaYJemploying over half the working population. 
The share of Aericul ture, Forestry, Hunting and Fishing in 
the GNP at constant factor cost prices stood at 32.0 per 
cent in 1977. The other major sectors are Nanufacturing 
(12. 6~~), llholesale and Retail Trade (13.6%) and Services 
(14.3~~).1 The dominance of Agriculture is even more 
explicit in the case of export earnings. In the composition 
1 See Appendix I 
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of total earnings from domestic exports during 1977, 
Tea accounted for 53 per cent, Rubber for 14 per cent, 
·coconut products for 5 per cent, their joint contribu-
tion coming to as much as 72 per cent. These three 
traditional exports had in fact accounted for larger 
shares in earlier years. As noted previously, they had 
accounted for 98 per cent of the export earnings in 1948. 
In more recent years as for example in 1971, they 
accounted for 89 per cent of export earnings and for 88 
per cent in 1972. The decline in their share in recent 
years is chiefly due to the expansion in the export of 
other products such as precious stones, bakery products, 
fruit juices, garments, leather products, naptha, and 
marine bunkering. 
Throughout the 19600 export earnings showed a steady 
decline. In.fact,per capita exports declined from a 
level of US $ 38 in 1960 to us $ 26 in 1969.1 The 
decline is mainly attributable to the steady fall in 
price of tea and to some extent due to the unfavourable 
price trends for rubber and coconut. This trend when 
compounded with rising import prices resulted in a 
steady deterioration of the terms of trade from 148 
in 1960 to 62 in 1976.2 
1 Gamani Corea {1971: p.. 24} 
2Central Bank of Ceylon, Annual Report 1977, Table 16. 
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Export earnings have however shown a notable increase 
over the last few years: total earnings rose from Rs.2,617 
million in 1973 to Rs.3,933 million in 1975 and to 
1 Rs.6,638 in 1977. This increase came largely from 
favourable prices for most commodities and to some extent 
from the increase in volume of non traditional products. 
However, the increase in export earnings was more than 
negated by a much higher rise in the import bill. The 
value of imports increased sharply from a level of 
Rs.2,715 million in 1973 to Rs.5,251 million in 1975 
attributable entirely to increases in import prices. As 
a result a large balance of payments deficit of Rs.1,318 
million vlas recorded in t 975. However, after a long 
series of deficits, the balance of payments improved 
strongly in 1976 and by 1977 a surplus of Rs.1,259 
in the current account vlaS recorded. This recovery was 
principally due to the rise in tea export earnings. 
Large balance of payments deficits in recent years 
resulted mainly from efforts to keep certain minimum 
levels of imports for consumption and for meeting the 
requirements of crude oil, fertilizer and industrial raw 
material,without which economic activity would have 
1See Appendix II 
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drastically declined. Successive deficits have been met 
mainly from drawings from the I.M.F.,OilFacility, short 
term credits and suppliers credits. These measures have 
no doubt placed a heavy debt servicing problem upon the 
country. The debt service ratio which stood at 23.0 per 
cent-_in1973 declined to 17.8 per cent in 1974 but rose 
to 22.9 per cent in 1975. However, it-declined to 20.1 
per cent by 1976 and to 18.5 per cent by 1977. 
Since Food and Drink account for a high proportion of 
1 import bill , it is clear that much of the efforts in 
improving the balance of payments position would lie in 
stepping up domestic food production. At present, the 
government's development efforts are directed towards 
this end. Substantial gains are expected from the 
largest ever irrigation cum power project undertaken by 
the country namely the l-lahaweli Project. The diversion 
of Hahaweli waters to a number of large tanks in the dry 
zone and the additional irrigation facilities obtained 
therefrom will enable a large number of farmers to grow 
two crops per year instead of one. 
As in the case of many developing countries, unemployment 
has remained a major problem for the past two decades or 
1 In 1977, Food and Drink had accounted for 36 per cent 
of the import Bill. 
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so. The population "explosion" in the 19406 and 1950s 
referred to earlier led to an upsurge in the youth 
population in the 1960s. With the growth of the economy 
being inadequate to keep pace with the entry of youth 
into the labour market, a serious unemployment problem 
became inevitable. 1 
One of the foremost objectives of the Ten Year Plan as 
well as subsequent development plans was that of reducing 
the levels of unemployment and under-employment and of 
providing employment for increases in the work force. But 
employment creation was impeded on the one hand by con-
straints on capital investment and on the other hand by 
the shortage of foreign exchange for import of raw material 
and essential plant and machinery. Investible resources 
were constrained to a great extent by luree outlays on 
welfare expenditure, mainly in the form of subsidies on 
food, education and health services. 2 Further, in the 
1 According to the Labour Force Participation Survey 
carried out bv the Central Bank in 1973, 17.4 per cent 
of the labour force was unemployed. As much as 77 per 
cent of the unemployed were in the rural sector. 
2 The magnitude of welfare expenditure by government was 
such that over the last two decades it not only ranged 
between 35-45 per cent of recurrent expenditure. but it 
also exceeded capital exoenditure (see Karunatilake, 
t1975; Table 1, p. 23}) 
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context of a scarcity of capital and shortage of foreign 
exchange, there was no concerted effort to carry through 
development programmes based on labour intensive technology 
and local resources on a sufficient~v large scale. It was 
only much late~imtte1970s that the imnortance of a develop-
ment strategy based on labour intensive technology and 
local raw materials began to be recoenised. This approach 
received much emphasis in the Five Year Plan (1972-76) and 
specific areas of industry were clearly identified. These 
included textiles. wood products. mining and quarrying, 
light engineering, paper products and structural clay 
products, one of the noteworthy nrobTammes initiated by 
government was the Divisional Development Council Programme 
(DDC programme). In contrast to capital-labour ratios 
ranging from Rs.25,000 to Rs.150,000 in large scale 
canital intensive projects, the capital-labour ratios were 
as low as Rs.2,000 on the averaGe in the case of the DDC 
projects. Since these projects were based on local raw 
materials and locally fabricated machinery to a great 
extent, the gestation periods were as low as 2 - 3 months. 
As at the end of 1976, nearly 2,000 such small scale 
labour intensive projects, set up under a co-operative 
form of ownership were in operation, providing employment 
to over 31,000 persons. 1 
1 See Gunasekera II.A. de S and Codippily H.M.A{1977} for 
a further discussion. 
" 
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Although the Five Year Plan (1972-76) had envisaged a 
growth rate of 6 per cent as the minimum desirable rate 
of growth, the actual growth rate achieved during the 
period 1972-75 was of the order of 3.4 per cent. The 
reasons for the short fall were more than one. Firstly, 
droughts in three successive years had devasting effects 
on the paddy production and on other crops. Secondly, 
the increase in the price of crude oil had a serious 
effect upon the economy in more than one way. The price 
increase of oil added further burdens to the import bill. 
Further,the high price of oil raised the price of fertilizer 
to a level beyond the reach of most farmers and the import 
price of manufactured articles registered a sharp increase. 
The Plan period 1972-76 also saw a number of other develop-
ments in the economy. From the point of view of improving 
the balance of payments situation the most noteworthy 
amongst these were the phenomenal growth of the minin~ 
and export of gems (precious stones), rapid expansion of 
tourism. the building up of a fleet of merchant ships, and 
an expansion of marine bunkering activities, all of which 
brought in substantial foreign exchange gains. Reforms 
a 
were also introduced to bring aboutLmore egalitarian form 
of asset ownership. The moot important amongst these were 
the introduction of ceilingpon the ownership of housing 
property, land reform and the nqtionalization of foreign 
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owned estates. 
2.3 Income Distribution: a Preliminary Description 
The principal sources of information regarding income 
distribution in Sri Lanka are the periodic sample surveys 
conducted by the Central Bank of Ceylon and the Department 
of Census and Statistics. In this study, we shall use data 
from the three Surveys of Consumer Finances (CFS) conducted 
by the Central Bank in the years 1953, 1963 and 1973, and 
the Socio Economic Survey (SES) conducted by the Department 
of Census and Statistics in the year 1969/70. 
The CFS 1973 was based on a stratified two stage sample 
design and the survey sample comprised 28,587 persons in 5088 
households. The average household consisted of 5.62 persons. 
Amongst other information, the survey recorded data relating 
to income receivers' income for the two month and six month 
periods immediately preceding the first day of the interview 
of each income receiver. The two month and six month 
reference period was not the same all over the island as 
the field work of the surv~y had been staggered over a 
period of two months starting on 3rd January, 1973. As 
mentioned in their report, the staggering of the reference 
period would have caught up to some extent the monthly 
variation in expenditure. 
2 - 18 
Data on income comprised 'money income' as well as 'income 
", 
in kind'. Noney income included cash receipts as well as 
the value o~ produce such as rice and other major cereals. 
Income in kind formed the imputed value of goods and 
services enjoyed as part payment in employment. gifts, and 
other transfer payments together with the imputed value of 
own garden produce consumed at home. Some o~ the items 
that contributed to income in kind were the free rice 
ration distributed by the government, meals, uniforms, 
railway warrants, free accommodation enjoyed by employees 
and home consumed own garden produce and animal husbandry 
products. Income in kind ''las valued at ''lhat could be 
ascertained as the market price of these Goods and 
services in the immediate vicinity. However the value of 
other ~ree government facilities such as educational and 
medical facilities could not be estimated objectively and 
were therefore excluded from income in the CFS 1973 ( see 
p. 53). 
Let us briefly note the ot~er concepts and definitions 
used in the CFS. 
Household: A household is a person living alone or a Group 
of persons livine toeether in a housing unit 
and having common cooking arrangements. The 
members of a household need not be blood 
• 4 
\ 
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relations: a household can include boarders and 
servants. In caoes where the number of boarders 
exceeded three, the household was considered to 
be running a commercial boarding house and all 
boarders were accordingly excluded from the 
household. 
Spending Unit: Within households, there are smaller groups 
which act as more or less independent units 
for spending purposes. For instance. the 
families of two brothers can form a house-
hold, but one brother's spending can be 
independent of the other's. A spending 
unit is defined to consist of one or more 
persons who are members of the same house-
hold, and share major items of expenditure. 
Servants and boarders will form separate 
spending units. A person dependent on more 
than onc spending unit within the household 
,·ras included in the spending unit on which 
he/she Has most dependent. 
Income Receiver: A person who has received an income during 
the six months immediately prior to the 
survey was referred to as an income 
receiver. 
i i 
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The definitions of a household, spending unit, income 
receiver used in the CFS 1963 were essentially the same as 
above. 
The CFS 1973 revealed that the number of spending units 
per household increased with size of household until the 
13 member household was reached and declined thereafter. 
The average number of income receivers per household 
showed an increasing trend with the size of household. 
Some of the general results in regard to households that 
emerged from the 1973 CFS were as follows:-
(1) The average size of a household was 5.63; 
(ii) The mode in the distribution of household 
size was 4; 
(lil) The average number of spending unit per 
household was 1.05; 
(iv) The average number of income receivers 
per household was 1.44; 
(v) The averaee number of dependents per 
household was 4.18. 
The CFS 1973 presents income distribution both in respect 
of income receivers as well as in reopect of spending 
unlts. 
In this study we shall be mainly concerned about the 
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welfare of households and therefore, in the first instance 
examine the results relating to spending units - a closer 
entity to households than income receivers. Income 
distribution with respect to income receivers will also be 
discussed in the latter part of this chapter. 
According to the CFS 1973, the mean monthly income of a 
spending unit was estimated to be Rs.311 and the median 
monthly income to be Rs.250. The pattern of income 
distribution was as shown in Table 2.1 below. 
Table 2.1 
Distribution of Spending Units by Income Groups 
All Island (1973) 
Percent ace Percentage 
Income Group of spendinG of Two month 
(Monthly Income) Units Income 
Less than Rs.l00 6.90 1.64 
Rs.101 
-
Rs.200 27.33 13.67 
Rs.201 - Rs.400 45.48 41.33 
Rs.401 
-
Rs.600 12.75 19.65 
Rs .601 
-
Rs.800 3.90 8.58 
Rs.801 - Rs.1000 1.64 4.66 
Rs.l000 - and. 1 2.00 10.47 over 
Total 100.00 100.00 
PercentaRe 
of Six month 
Income 
1.70 
13.61 
41.21 
19.86 
8.70 
4.63 
10.29 
100.00 
Source: Derived from Table 43, Central Bank 
CFS (1973) Part I. 
1 Includes a wide range of incomes such as those of managers 
in the public sector or in the private sector, self-employed 
professionals and private entrepreneurs. 
------------------------'-
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It would appear from the above table that nearly 80 per 
cent of the spending units in Sri Lanka receive incomes 
of Rs.400 per month or less. Only 3.64 per cent of the 
spending units receive incomes of Rs.800 per month and 
over. Those in the group of over Rs.1,OOO per month 
constitute 2 per cent of the Spending Units, but receive 
over 10 per cent of total income. One cannot immediately 
comment on what exactly these income levels mean in terms 
of a standard of living or more specifically in terms of 
a basket of goods. For, a given income level, say for 
example Rs.400 per month can reflect widely differing 
Lof standards of livine in terms urban. rural and estate life. 
Such differences are due to differences in purchasing 
pO\,Ter of a rupee as betvleen urban, rural and estate 
sectors. But before discussine such questions, let us 
get back to the overall patternLUcome distribution in 
the country as a whole and inquire whether there have been 
any significant changes over time. This cannot be done 
in terms of tables such as 2.1 on account of chances in 
the purchasing power of the rupee over time. Instead, 
spending units have to be ranked and changes in the 
respective shares have to be examined. The CFS 1973 
has already done this and the results obtained are 
reproduced below. 
.. 
, . 
. . 
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Table 2.2 
'. 
Percentage of Total Income Received by each 
Ten per cent of Ranked Spending Units 
Decile of spending Share ot Total Income Received 
Units in 1953 in 1963 
Lowest 1.90 1.50 
Second 3.30 3.95 
Third 4.10 4.00 
Fourth 5.20 5.21 
Fifth 6.40 6.27 
Sixth 6.90 7.54 
Seventh 8.30 9.00 
Eight 10.10 111 .22 
Ninth 13.20 15.54 
Highest 40.60 36.77 
Total 100.00 100.00 
Source: Central Bank, CFS (1973) 
Part I Table 45 (p.60) 
The most significant features in the above table are: 
(a) the marked decline in the share of 
income of the highest decile from a 
level of 40.60 per cent in 1953 to 
28.03 per cent in 1973, and 
(b) the improvement in the share of 
income of the lowest dec1le from 
levels of 1.90 per cent in 1953 and 
1.50 in 1963 to 2.79 in 1973 • 
in 1973 
2.79 
4.38 
5.60 
6.52 
7.45 
8.75 
9.91 
11.65 
14.92' 
28.03 
100.00 
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Improvements are also seen in the case of all other deciles, 
with more accentuated increases being evident in the lower 
deciles. These improvements are considered to have come 
about partly as a result of conscious redistribut1ve policies 
and partly as a result of certain import sUbstitution 
programmes, particularly the food production proerammes 
carried out by successive eovernments over the last two 
decades or so. The more important aspects of these policies 
and programmes will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
It would appear from Table 2.2 that notable progress has 
been made in Sri Lanka in achieving a more equitable 
distribution of income in a relatively short period of time. 
A point of immediate interest io to inquire as to hmy the 
results achieved compare with those of other countries. 
A broad international comparison is given in Table 2.3. 
The noteworthy features in Table 2.3 are th~t the bottom 
forty per cent of the households in Srl JJanka enjoyed a 
relatively high share of total income amone countries 
listed in the table and that the top twenty per cent of 
the households received a relative share of income less than 
those prevailing in the other countries. An element of 
caution is however necessary since the distribution within 
the group of poorest hou.seholds are not broueht out in such 
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broad comparisons. 
Table 2.3 
An Inter-country Compartson of Income Distribution 
(A selection of Developing Countries based on 
availability of recent information) 
Country 
A,rgentine 
Brazil 
India 
Ivory Coast. 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Peru 
Philippines 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Uganda 
Sources: 
Percentage of Total Income received by the 
Lowest 4a;~ Niddle 40/~ Top 20% 
of households 
(1970) 16.5 36.1 
(1970 ) 10.0 28.4 
(1964/65 ) 18.6 33.9 
(1970) 10.8 32.1 
(1970 ) 18.0 37.0 
(1970) 11 .6 32.4 
( 1971 ) 6.5 33.5 
(1971 ) 11 .6 34.6 
(1973 ) 19.2 37.8 
(1969/70) 17.5 39.4 
(1970 ) 17.0 37.5 
(1970 ) 17.1 35.8 
IIRedistribution with Growth" (1974) 
Chenery, H., Ahluwalia, N.S., et·al. 
Central Brulic of Ceylon Survey of 3ri 
Lanka,' s Consumer Finances 1973" Part I. 
47.4 
61.5 
47.5 
57.1 
45.0 
56.0 
60.0 
53.8 
43.0 
43.1 
45.5 
47.1 
Department of Census and Stutistics, 
Socio Economic Survey (1969/70). 
Pranab, K. Bardan, liThe Pattern of 
Income Distribution in India, A Revievl 11 
In Poverty ann Income Distribution in 
India ed. T.N. :::3" rini vasan and P.R. 
Bardhan. 
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For purposes of broad comparison it is also interesting to 
note that the average income share of the lowest forty per 
cent in all developing countries taken as a group is 
estimated at only 12.5 per cent and the corresponding figure 
for developed capitalist countries is estimated at 16 per 
cent. Whilst both estimates are exceeded by the Sri Lanka 
figure, it should however be noted that the latter falls 
short of the figure for socialist countries estimated at 
about 25 per cent. The low decree of income inequality in 
socialist countries is largely attributed to the fact that 
income from ownership of capital does not accrue as income to 
individuals. (see Chenery, Ahluwalia et al {1974 :p.7». 
We have discussed so far only Borue aspects of the pattern of 
income distribution in the country as a whole. In order to 
proceed with the inquiry into the more detailed aspects of 
income inequality, one must necessarily examine the subject 
in terms of type of household and by geographical rec,ions. 
Households or spending units may be divided into three types 
namely by their location in urban, rural and estate sectors. 
These types are defined as follo,4s:-
Urban - Households/Spending units in Nunicipal, 
Urban and Town Council areao. 
Estate - Households/Spending units in tea and 
rubber estates of over 20 acres and 
with more than 10 resident workers. 
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Rural- Households/Spending units not classified 
as urban or estate. 
To proceed with the discussion, two aspects ought to be 
examined separately: 
(a) the distribution of total income between sectors; 
(b) the distribution of income within each sector. 
Inequalities in income distribution between sectors could be 
seen both in terms of mean incomes as well as in terms of 
shares of total incomes received. Results of computations 
made from Tables 580-583 of the CFS are given in the table 
below:-. 
Table 2.:1 
Mean Income and Shares of Income by Sector - 1973 
Sector Mean Income Percentage Percentage 
per Sp. Unit 0:( of total 
per month Spending Units 2 month 
income 
Urban Rs. 397 19.08 24.39 
Rural 291 70.91 66.41 
Estate 285 10.01 9.20 
All Island 311 100.00 100.00 
It would appear from the above table that the mean income of 
an urban spending un! t is 36 per cent higher than that of a 
rural spending unit. But this is a comparison made purely 
in money terms and could grossly understate rural income in 
real terms. For, rural prices of several essential commodities, 
chiefly food items, are significantly lower than urban prices, 
and therefore one would have to make an adjustment for the 
, 
i 
1 
I 
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difference in price levels, in order to make a meaningful 
comparison. This could be done by the use of a price index 
which could be constructed in terms of a comparable basket 
of goods and a set of reliable prices of commodities in 
urban and rural areas. Bu.t the absence of a reliable set 
of prices of a representative character in urban and rural 
areas precludes such a comparison. On the other hand one 
could get a general idea of the disparities in real ~come 
as between urban, rural and estate households by comparing 
the actual basket of goods an average household is able to 
purchase in each case. Such a comparison is attempted in 
Appendix III and the main results are summarised below: 
The general conclusion that emerees in regard to food items 
consumed per head is that except in the case of meat, fish, 
eegs and milk, there do not seem to be marked disparities 
in consumption per capita as between urban, rural and estate 
households. This disparity is perhaps partly offset by the 
higher consumption of vegetables and fruit in rural areas and 
high consumption of protein rich pulses in estate areas. 
In the case of clothing and footwear, Table A III - 2 shows 
that the average expenditure by an estate spending unit is 
compar.able with that of an urban spending unit. A possible 
explanation is that estate areas are mainly located in the 
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hill country where the climate is relatively cold; this 
necessitates greater expenditure by estate households. But 
the averaee expenditure per rural spending unit is signifi-
cantly below that of an urban spending unit. However, one 
cannot immediately conclude that the rural spending unit is 
worse off in regard to clothing since neither climatic 
conditions in most areas nor the rural life styles nor rural 
occupations such as paddy cultivation necessitate high 
expenditure on clothing. 
As regards housing, the fairly obvious result that emerees 
from the comparative study (see Table A III - 3) is the 
relatively unsatisfactory nature of estate housine conditions. 
Due to wide vuriationsin circumstances it is difficult to 
make any other meanineful comparisons. 
Two other disparities emerge from the comparative study. 
Firstly, the expenditure on and the ownership of durable 
consumer goods are relatively higher in urban areas. Secondly, 
expenditure on education by spending units in eotate areas is 
found to be significantly below those of their urba.n and 
rural counterparts. 
The comparative study in Appendix III also shows that economic 
changes have diot'1nctly moved in favour of the non-urban 
community during the period 1963 to 1973. It is estimated 
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that the non-urban population (80.9j~ of total) had received 
71.7 per cent of total income in 1963, whereas by 1973 the 
non-urban population (77.6?~) had received 75.6 per cent of 
total income. Real income per urban spending unit had 
declined by 1.5 per cent per annum during this period whereas 
real income per rural and estate spending units had increased 
at rates of 1.7 and 0.9 per cent per annum over the 'same 
period. 
Let us now examine the second aspect ''le set out to discuss, 
namely, the distribution of i~come within each sector. The 
shares of income received by each quintile of ranked spending 
units in the urban rural and estate sectors for the years 
1963 and 1973 are shown in Table A III - 7 of Appendix III. 
This table clearly ShO\,lS a marked improvement in the shares 
of income accruing to the lowest quintiles both in the urban 
and rural areas. A significant decline in the share of 
income received by the top quintile both in the urban and 
rural areas is also seen. The rcsnlts in this table are 
further swmnarised in the table below, to show how the shares 
of income of the lowest 40 per cent, middle 40 per cent and 
top 20 per cent have changed in the respective sectors. 
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Table 2.5 
Percentages of income received by the bottom 
40 per cent, middle 40 per cent and top 20 
per cent in Urban, Rural and Estate Sectors 
(1963 and 1973) 
Class of Spending Unit Urban Rural Estate 
Share of total income received 
1963 1973 1963 1973 1963 1973 
Bottom 40 per cent 10.7 17.4 14.3 20.0 22.4 21.6 
Niddle 40 per cent 32.1 37.4 36.2 38.5 38.8 37.9 
Top 20 per cent 57.2 45.2 49.5 41.5 38.8 40.5 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Derived from Table A 111-7 
The results in the above table indicate that during the period 
1963-73 income inequality had reduced only in the urban and 
rural sectors j it is perhaps mainly in theoe terms that one could' 
1 
explain the overall reduction in income inequality in the country 
as a whole during the period 1963-73 (see Table 2.2). 
The analysis in Appendix III also shows that total real income 
had increased by 51.1 per cent over the period 1963-73 (see 
Tables A III - 9 and AlII - 10). Since the relative shares of 
income of the lower income bTOUPS in the urban and rural sectors 
had improved over the same period, it would follow that the 
increase in total income has been distri.buted in favour of the 
11n ~ene"CaJ pcpu.latiofl .f.)hlft~ also aH~ct il\come in!?qu.d1ity 
, .. ", 
= 
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lower income groups in urban and rural areas. A little less 
than a third of the total increase in reul income had reached the 
two lowest quintiles in the urban, rural and estate sectors. 
2.4 Income Distribution: some Numerical Summaries 
A wide range of measures of income inequality has been recently 
discussed in the literature. These measures fall into two 
categories, namely, positive measures and normative measures. 
The aim in using a positive measure is to assess objectively the 
extent of income inequality by employing a purely statistical 
measure of relative variation of income1• On the other hand 
normative measureD are Da~ed on ex,licit concpets of social 
welfare. But as argued by Sen {1973 ; p.3}, the distinction 
between them is not so clear cut. Out interest in measuring 
income inequality is related to our normative concern with it. 
Conversely, normative considerations are inevitable in judging 
the relative merits of various measures of income inequality. 
As shown later, a normative interpretation c01lld be given to the 
so called 'positive' measures. It ohould also be noted that a 
normative measure may not capture the totality of our ethical 
evaluation. In empirical ''lork, as in the case of this study , it 
is perhaps convenient to use positive measures of income inequa-
lity. But since welfare considerations are an integral part of 
this study we shall also use one normative measure. As noted 
earlier, if que3tions relatine to income distribution are to 
1 See Sen {1973 ; p.2} 
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be' discussed, value judgements based on some concepts of 
social welfare are inevitable. 
Amongst a number of measures of ineQuality that have been 
widely discussed in the literature and used extensively 
in empirical "lark, the more important ones are:-
(1) The Coefficient of Variation 
which is defined by -
C =, fCYi :~' )2/r 
"There y = income of individual i 
n = number of individuals 
/v'\= mean income 
(2) The ~ltruldard Deviat ion of Loc;ari thms 
defined by -
H = [L (logr - log Yi)2 /nJ~' 
----- (2.1) 
----- (2.2) 
where y i' F ' and n are defined as in (2. t ) 
above. (See Sel'l. {I'I73 j p. 2.9) 
(3) The Gini Coefficient 
which may 
0=1 
-
21" n2 
be defined by -
n n 
.2: .r \Yi - Yj ! 
1"1 1-1 
the notations beine tree same as in (2.1) 
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(4) .. The Atkinson Index 
which may be defined by -
1 f± J,-E 1 ~ 
- lij~il(Yi)_ I = 1 (2.4) 
where y f and}-, retain the same definition and 
E denotes the "degree of inequality aversion", 
Md f(Yi) = PYCpo-ctjc.n. of l'0pulation W'ith incoro.Q Yi • 
(5) Sen's Hcasure of Povert.;l 
defined by -
2 n 
* 
2 
P = L (y - y.)(q- i + 1 ) (2.5) 
.)to 2 1 
Y n i-1 
* where y represents the poverty line, 
Yi are a-crange~ monctonicalli, a(\~{ 
q= PTCpo1tion. of popu.lation. b~low y. 
The somewhat lesser Im01·m and perhaps the less important 
measures of inequality are:-
( 6 ) The pro port ion by vlhich the Gcomet ic Nean falls 
short of the Arithmetic Nean, 
(7) The proportion by which the Harmonic Nean falls 
short of the Arithmetic r·ieun, 
(8) The }lareto constant 
1Atkinson {1970 : p.253} 
2Srinivusan, Baruan et al. {1974 p.80 ~ 
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(9) Tho Helative I'Ioan deviation, 
(10) Theil's Entropy measure, 
(11) Dalton's meanure of inequality, 
(12) Sen's (generalised) Index. 
In the choice of suitable measures of inequality for purposes 
of this study, it is relatively easy to exclude measures (6) 
- (12). For, measures (6) and (7) are no more than special 
cases of the Atkinson Index) For example, by setting E= - 1 
in the Atkinson Index, we cet 
I = 1 - (~2: (~irr for the 
:::d.rnpler case of an array of values y 1 to y 2 
i.e. 1 
i.e. r.~easure (7) 
Although the Pareto constant and Pureto's 'lmi' of income 
distribution were the earliest to be proposed, their 
limitations were well known. Por, Parcto's law yields 
1See Champernowne {1974 pp. 787 - 816} 
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satisfac>tory re~3Ults only in reopect of the upper income 
groups in an income distribution and not for the distribution 
as a whole. &\n interesting discussion of Pareto's law is 
found in Pen {197 J ; pp.234-6.} The rrlain difficulty with the 
relative mean deviation is that it is not at all sensitive 
to transfers from the poorer person to a richer person as 
long as both lie on the same side of the mean. For, as 
illustrated by Sen {1973 : p.26}, £1 transferred from the 
poorest man to some one more rich but having less than the 
mean income would produce equal and opposite results so as 
to leave the measure unchanged. 
Dalton's index of inequality 
D = iY U(y )f(y )dy 
U(f-) 
may be expressed by 
(2.6) 
The first problem encountered here is that of specifying 
the form of the utility function U(y). The main difficulty, 
as pointed out by Atkinson {1970: p. 249} is that D is 
not invariant v7ith respect to linear transformation of the 
function U(y). lIe illustrates this by taking the case of 
the logarithmic utility function. In this c~ise, although 
two people miGht aeree that the oocial '"elfare function 
should be lOGarithmic, their measures of inequality would 
coincide only if they also agree on the constant term in 
the loe function. 
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Sents (generalised) Index (12) may be regarded as a 
generalization o~ the Atkinson Index. Sen's Index is based 
on social weltare tunction: 
w = w (y, •••••• yn ), (2.7) 
If the generalised equally distributed equivalent income y£ 
is detined as that level ot per capita income which it 
shared by all will produce the same W as the value of W 
generated by the actual distribution ot income, then 
Sen's Index N = 1 -(~t) (2.8) 
Sen has pointed out that this measure reduces to the same as 
the Atkinson Index if W is specified as 
n 
W = LU (Yi) (2.9) 
i-1 
The main difficulty associated with this measure is one ot 
specifying the form of the welfare ~unction. As would be 
seen shortly, there is a much simpler way of specifying our 
notion of welfare in the case ot the Atkinson Index. 
Theil's entropy measure is given by 
n 
T = L x· log nx· i=1 1. 1 
where xi:: shale of in.ccme of petso\1. i . 
(see Sen {1973 ; p.35}) 
(2.10) 
Although this measure ot inequality has a useful analogy 
with the notion of the inexorable trend towards entropy in 
thermodynamics, yet as pointed out by Sen {1973 ; p.36}the 
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, 
torm of the function in Theils tormula does not quite corres 
pond to our intuitive notions of utility. 
The range tor selection thus gets limited to measures (1) -
(5). Although measure (1) i.e C is one ot the Simplest 
measures which captures total variation, it has a number of 
drawbacks. For example, the squaring procedure is somewhat 
arbitrary, and so is the selection of the mean tor measuring 
ot deviations. The main drawback is that all income transfers 
are given equal weightage irrespective ot whether they are 
taking place at the upper end or lower end. 
Sen's measure ot Poverty is ot great relevance to inequality 
measurement in developing countries, where elimination ot 
poverty is a major objective. However, on account ot certain 
ditficulties in selecting a poverty line, we shall avoid the 
use ot this index. Instead, we shall brietly note some of 
the results already obtained in respect ot Sri Lanka by 
application ot this measure. We are thus lett with measures 
(2), (3) and (4) tor which there are several arguments in 
tavour. Although measure (2) is also characterised by an 
arbitrary squaring procedure and ditterencesare taken trom 
the logarithm of the mean, yet it is frequently used because 
of one important feature. That is, it we wish to attach 
greater importance to income transfers at the lower end, then 
we should select a transtormation ot incomes that staggers 
-.~ 
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the income levels. One such transformation is the logarithmic 
transformation (see Sen {1973 ; pp.28-29}). Although this 
measure is claimed to be a positive measure (there is no 
explicit welfare consideration), its frequent selection 
supports our earlier point about the distinction between 
positive and normative measures being not so clear cut. For, 
its frequent selection is based on a welfare consideration 
implicit in it, namely the weightage given to income transfers 
at the lower end. 
The Gini Coefficient is perhaps the best known and most 
popular. amongst measures of income inequality. Its popularity 
is due to several reasons. Firstly, the arbitrary squaring 
procedure is avoided. Secondly, differences are taken between 
every pair ot incomes. More importantly, it has a well known 
interpretation in terms of the Lorenz curve. It could be shown 
to be equal to the area between the line of equal distribution 
and the Lorenz curve divided by the area ot one of the triangles 
of the square separated by the diagonal. But as in the case ot 
the previo~ measure, although the Gini Coefficient Is supposed 
to be a positive measure ot inequality, it has a weltare consi-
deration implicit in it. 
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As shown by Sen {1973 ; pp.31-331, the Gini Coefficient G 
could be written as 
G = 1 + 1 - 2 (Y1 + 2Y2 + ------- + n Yn ) Xi fln2. 
----- qy n 
Thus, there is a weltare consideration implicit in G because 
the third term on the right has a weighted sum ot incomes, the 
weights being determined by the rank order ot the people with 
these incomes. 
The Gini Coefficient and the Lorenz curves, apart from being 
usetul in empirical work, have also stimulated a considerable 
amount ot theoretical interest. Atkinson has proved an 
important theorem regarding the ranking of two distributions 
according to levels ot welfare in terms ot the respective 
Lorenz curves. Let us suppose that A and B are two distribu-
tions of the same total income and that LA and LB are the 
respective Lorenz curves. Let us also suppose that LA is 
wholly inside LB. Then, Atkinson {1973 ; pp. 245-247} has 
proved that the level of weltare associated with LA . IS 
greater than that associated with LB subject only to the 
assumption that utility as a function ot income is concave 
i.e. U' (y» 0 , U'·(Y) <0 • 
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LORENZ CURVES 
Cumulative Percentage of Population 100 
Figure 2.1 
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In proving this theore'm_ it was shown that there was no 
necessity to assume any particular torm ot the weltare tunction. 
But it two Lorenz curves intersect as in the case ot ~ and LC' 
no conclusion could be reached as to which distribution would 
have a higher level ot weltare, without an explicit weltare 
assumption. That is, the areas between the LB and the diagonal 
and LC and the diagonal may be equal i.e the Gini Coetticients 
may be equal, but yet the two distributions could represent two 
levels ot weltare. This is in tact one ot the shortcomings ot 
it 
the Gini Coetticient, andLpoints out to the inevitability ot 
normative considerations. 
The Atkinson Index is based on the concept ot an "equal distri-
buted equavalent income" (Yede) which is the level ot per capita 
income which it shared equally will give the same level ot social 
weltare as given distribution. Denoting income by y, trequency 
by t (y) and utility trom income byU(y), Yede is detined 
implicitly (see Atkinson {1970 • p. 2 50}) , 
U (Yede) 
"9 J t(Y)dy = 
o 
(2.11) 
The Atkinson index is then detined as 
I = 1 - Yede , where 
f'-
f = mean income. (2.12) 
. ..-
, ~', . 
~ ... 
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As in the case of the Gini Coefficient, I = 0 implies complete 
equality and I = 1 implies complete inequality. Assuming I 
to be invariant with respect to proportional shifts in income, 
it could be proved (see Codippily 11974 ; p.12-141 ) that 
I = 1 -H~rE f (Yi11~' (2.13) 
The main advantage ot the Atkinson Index is that our welfare 
considerations could be narrowed down to assigning a value 
to £. A higher value for E implies a greater weightage to 
transters ot income at the lower end and a lower value of ~ 
implies lower weightage. The parameter € is thus a measure ot 
the degree of inequality aversion. Once a decision is made 
about the value that could be assigned, then ambiguities do 
not arise as in the case ot the Gini Coefticient. 
We have thus chosen three measures of income inequality namely 
the standard deviation of logarithm, the Gini Coetficient and 
the Atkinson Index. It is interesting to note that all three 
measures satisfy the criteria for good indices set out by 
Champernowne {1974; pp. 787-816} , namely: 
(a) Familiarity and convenience tor computation 
trom statistics readily available; 
(b) Impartiality between persons; 
(c) Invariance with respect to the number of 
persons, i.e. being unaffected so long 
as proportions of distribution between 
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groups are unaffected; 
(d) Invariance with respect to uniform increase; 
(e) The Pigou-Dalton criterion i.e if a distri-
bution is modified by altering two incomes 
so as to leave the total the same, then the 
index of inequality must be increased, un-
changed or decreased according as the absolute 
difference is increased unchanged or decreased. 
(f) Range from 0 to 1; and 
(g) Suitability for type of inequality discussed. 
All three measures discussed above have been used in evaluating 
the extent ot inequality in each sector as well as in the island 
as a whole. 1 The results obtained by using the first two 
measures were as follows: 
Table 2.9 
Income inequality amongst Spending Units 
classified by Sector - 1973 
Sector Std. Dev. of Gini Coefficient 
Logarithm 
Urban 0.743 0.375 
Rural 0.643 0.332 
Estate 0.572 0.299 
All Island 0.648 0.350 
Both measures indicate that income inequality is lowest in the 
estate sector, and highest in the urban sector. An 
1The calculations were done with the assistance of a computer 
programme made available to me by Mr. Anthony Flegg. 
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immediate point ot interest is to inquire as to how income 
inequality could have changed over the ten year period 1963-
73. The extent to which income inequality has changed over 
this period could be seen trom the table below: 
Table 2.7 
Changes in Income Inequality amongst Spending 
Units classified by sector 
Sector c}1ni Coett. Gini Coet:!. 
1963 1973 
Urban 0.481 0.373 
Rural 0.424 0.332 
Estate 0.301 0.299 
All Island 0.450 0.350 
Results in the above table are in general agr~ement 
with those ot Table 2.5. That is, substantial reductions 
in inequality are witnessed in the urban and rural sector. 
But there has been no appreciable change in the case ot the 
estate sector. These changes could be seen more clearly 
in terms ot Lorenz curves appearing in Figures 2.2 to 2.5. 
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LORENZ CURVES FOR SPENDING UNITS - ALL ISLAND,I963 81973 
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Figures 2.2 to 2.4 express in visual terms the manner in which 
income inequality has declined in the urban sector, rural sector· 
and the island as a whole. But in the case ot the estate sector l 
Fig. 2-5 does not indicate any clear cut change in income 
inequality; the movement of the Gini Coefficient from 0.301 in 
196' to 0.299 in 1973 is insignificant. This example indicates 
the limitations of the Gini Coefficient and the Lorenz curve 
and points out to the inevitability of a welfare assumption. 
Particularly in view of the slight improvement ot the share of 
the lowest quintil~ it will be of interest to calculate the 
explicit 
change in inequality in terms of an index which ls based on aD~ 
welfare consideration, such as for example the Atkinson Index. 
But betore we proceed to do so, we should briefly note the 
results obtained in respect of the changes in the Ginl 
Coefficient of Income receivers. Aa reported by Karunatllake 
{1974 ; p.10S} the changes in income inequality amongst income 
receivers could be seen from the table below: 
Table 2.8, 
Income Inequality amongst Income Receivers 
classitied by Sector 1963 & 1973 
SECTOR Gini Coef!. Gin1 Coetf. 
1963 1973 
Urban 0.49 0.40 
Rural 0.44 0.37 
Estate 0.27 0.37 
All Island 0.49 0.41 
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Whilst the results in the above table in respect of the urban 
sector, rural sector and the island as a whole are in agree-
$"ectot 
ment with those of Table 2.7, income inequality in the estateA 
has shown a marked increase. In contrast, when spending units 
are considered, no such deterioration is seen. A possible 
explanation for this disparity could be the changes in the 
number of income receivers per spending unit particularly in 
the lower income groups. There is no clear cut way of testing 
this hypothesis. Although information regarding the number of 
income receivers per spending unit classified by income groups 
could be derived from CFS 1973, the CFS 1963 does not lend 
itself to such an analysis. 
Let us now proceed to the results obtained in regard to income 
inequality by the application ot Atkinson's Index. The results 
obtained are presented in the table below: 
Sector 
Urban 
Rural 
Estate 
All Island 
Table 2.9 
The Atkinson Index in respect ot Urban 
Rural & Estate Sectors-1973 
Atkinson Index E= 1.0 E:~ 1.5 E.~ 2.0 
0.216 0.309 0.403 
0.11'3 0.249 0.324 
0.144 0.208 0.272 
0.174 0.251 0.330 
for 
E = 2.5 
0.513 
0.405 
0.342 
0.416 
Following Atkinson's procedure {1970 p.258} if we rank 
t $j a , 
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income distributions independent of mean income levels, then 
the above table shows that the rankings of inequality as 
between the urban, rural and estate sectors are the same as 
those obtained by the Gini Coefficient and the standard 
deviation of the logarithms. But the advantage of using the 
Atkinson Index is that it helps us to clarify the case of the 
intersecting Lorenz curves shown in Fig. 2.5. If our concern 
towards the poor is high and we assign a value of 2 to the 
'measure of inequality aversion' € , then the Atkinson Index 
for the Estate Sector (in 1963) works out to 0.312. The 1973 
index is 0.272 (from the above table) and thus a decline in 
inequality is shown. It should be noted that this result is 
based upon our subjective notion of welfare, which attaches 
importance to income transfers at the lower income levels. By 
assigning a high value of € = 2, the effect produced is that of 
magnifying the increase in the share of income obtained by the 
bottom 30 per cent or so. 
An interesting application of Sen's Poverty Index on Sri Lanka 
data has been carried out by Radhakrishnan {1976}. By assuming 
a poverty line of Rs.100 per month,per capita at 1974 prices, 
he showed that the Poverty Index declined from 0.24 in 1963 
to 0.11 in 1973 indicating a substantial improvement in the 
standard of living of the poorer sections of the population. 
• 
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~/hilst attention has been focussed in the above discussion on 
inequality within each sector, the latter part of the previous 
section dealt with income inequality between sectors. An interes-
ting approach to discuss both these aspects of income inequality 
in'terms of a disaggregated Gini Coefficient has been made by 
P,yatt U976}. Although a similar approach had been made by 
Bhattacharya and I1ahalanobis ( as reported in Pyatt t1976}), yet 
the main appeal in Pyatt's approach is that of providing simpler 
proofs and interpretations in terms of statistical game theory. 
Having expressed the Gini Coefficient as 
f\ f\ 
G = (1/rt) 1: 2: I: 1 ; .. 1 • • • 
" (1/n) L 
.. -t 
Yi 
it is shown that the Gini Coefficient is the average gain to be 
expected if each individual has the choice of being himself or 
some other oember of the population drawn at random, expressed as 
a proportion of the averaGe level of income. This earne theory 
interpretation is extended in an interesting manner to the case 
where a population is divided into a number of groups, and in 
this case, 
k k 
averaGe expected gain = L. L: E (gain/i-+j )Pr(i~j) 
~·1 j=1 
where "i~ j " refers to an individual being in the 
population croup i and drawing a member of croup j to compare 
himself with in the hypothetical game. E ( gain / i~j ) 
is the average gain if they draw a member of group j for 
, . 
, , 
, I 
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comparison. The results are combined in terms of the matrix 
'. 
equation 
-1 
G = (m'p) 
- -
where p and ~ are both k - element column vectors, 
-
and ith element of p = population proportion p. 
1 
ith element of m = average income of individuals 
in population group i. 
By means of the main theoretical result obtained (see Pyatt 
{1976 ; p.249,equation (21)}, Pyatt shows that G could be 
represented in two parts:·,.the first arising from variation 
within groups and the second depending entirely on differences 
between group means. In an empirical exercise concerning 
income inequality amongst income receivers in Sri Lanka in 
1973, Pyatt ~976 ; p.24S}shows that the latter component (i.e 
relating to differences between groups) contributes only 0.12 
to the aggregate Gini Coefficient of 0.41. 
2.5 Summary 
To sum up, the main conclusion of the discussions in this 
chapter is that significant progress has been made in moving 
towards a more equitable distribution of incomes in Sri Lanka 
over the period 1963-73. The share of income of the highest 
decile declined sharply from 40.60 per cent in 1963 to 28.03 
per cent in 1973, whilst the share of the lowest decile 
improved significantly from 1.50 per cent in 1963 to 2.79 per 
• 
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cent in 1973. In the case of the other lower deciles too, 
significant improvements in the shares of income have taken 
place. The analysis of the patterns of income distribution in 
urban, rural and estate sectors shows that the overall reduction 
in income inequality had come about mainly from reduction of 
income inequalities in the urban and rural sectors. There 
could have been no contribution from the estate sector towards 
the reduction of income inequality. For, positive measures of 
inequality do not indicate any appreciable change in the level 
of inequality in the estate sector over the period 1963-73. 
The other interesting set of results examined were concerning 
the disparities in levels of income and consumption as between 
urban, rural and estate sectors. Noteworthy results obtained 
were those of an increase in the share of non-urban incomes 
although the proportion of non-urban population had declined. 
In real terms, non-urban incomes per spending unit have 
witnessed steady rates of growth in contrast to a decline in 
the case of urban spending units. Results indicate that 
conditions have definitely moved in favour of the non-urban 
population. As at 1973, except in the case of a few selected 
a'letagc 
items, there were no marked disparities inAconsumption as 
between urban, rural and estate spending units. The items in 
respect of which disparities exist~d were the relatively higher 
level of consumption of protein foods in the urban 
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sector, inadequate housing facilities in the estate sector, 
low expenditure on education by estate spending units, and 
the relatively higher expenditure on durable consumer goods 
by the urban spending units. 
An attempt was also made in this chapter to look at how the 
absolute levels of income accruing to the various income groups 
have changed over time. It was noted that real income had 
increased by 51.1 per cent over the period 1963-73. When this 
change was disaggregated, it was evident that results of growth 
had reached the lower income groups - a little less than a 
absolute 
third of the tota1Aincrease in real income had reached the 
two lowest qUintiles in the urban, rural and estate sectors. 
That is, there has been a growth and redistribution of incomes. 
Inter-country comparisons made in this chapter have shown that 
the pattern of income distribution in Sri Lanka in 1973 had 
been very favourable in relatien to those prevailing in other 
countries. One aspect that was not covered in this chapter 
was the situation after 1973. The impact of the global 
recession, the oil crisis and three successive droughts could 
have not only worsened the real incomes of certain income groups 
but could have also had the effect of increasing income inequalil) 
The fixed income earners, the self employed, and the urban poor 
are probably the worst affected by the rise in domestic prices 
arising from these unforseen developments. However, no survey 
• 
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results are available in respect of the post 1973 period. 
A survey of household expenditure patterns is just being 
initiated and the results are likely to be available by 
mid 1979. The results of this survey could throw some light 
on the changes after 1973. 
The pattern of income distribution that prevailed in 1973 
has been brought about through a number of consdous policy 
measures by successive governments. A review of these 
policy measures will be the main theme of the next chapter • 
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", CHAPI'ER 3 
A REVIE\v OF REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES 
" ••••• economic welfare is 
best promoted by a minimum 
standard raised to such a 
level that the direct good 
resulting from the trans-
ference of the marginal pound 
transferred to the poor just 
balances the indirect evil 
brought about by the consequent 
reduction of the dividend" -
A.C. Pigou (The Economics of 
\,1 elfare, page 761). 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to complement the results 
of the preceding chapter by identifying and discussing 
some of the factors that could have contributed to the 
reduction of income inequality in recent years. Dis-
cussions in this chapter are to a large extent based 
on existing surveys on the subject. Attempts will be 
made wherever possible to isolate the redistributive 
character of these factors. 
We noted in Chapter 2 how the country's plantation 
sector beGan to evolve during the British period. The 
development of the plantation sector together with its 
infrastructure and supportine services had led to the 
formation of a dual economy of the classic type - a 
large rural subsistence sector side by side with a 
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small but '. powerful modern sector based on export 
oriented plantation activities. This dual economy, as 
described by the Marga study {1974 } "had produced a dual 
society which was separated by languaee, attire, ways of 
living and outlook". The modern sector had given rise 
to a relatively affluent, English educated urban elite 
who occupied the more privileBed positions in society. In 
contrast, the vast majority of the "common" folk who were 
mostly rural, were dependent upon the traditional sector 
for employment and were at a subsistence level. They had 
little or no access to the privileges enjoyed by the urban 
elite1• 
One of the first measures which sought to rectify this 
imbalance was the introduction of free education in 1945 
and adoption of the mother tongue as the medium of 
instruction in schools. The main objective was to provide 
greater equality of opportunity to the various seements of 
society to pursue their aspirations. The other important 
welfare measures introduced in the 1940s were the food 
subsidy, free health services, minimum ''laGe policies and 
subsidised public transport. These measures were further 
strengthened after Independence in 1948 by the government 
which had by then assumed the role of a benefactor. Short 
1 See Harga Study {1974j pp.3 - 7} for a fuller discussion 
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term political objectives were closely interwoven with 
welfare policy during the post Independence period. 
Welfarism became part and parcel of the political 
philosophy of the major political parties, and was seen 
as a means of winning or maintaining power over the 
electorate. Expenditure on welfare services tended to 
increase with each successive government, so that by the 
mid 1960s, welfare expenditure amounted to as much as 
57.6 per cent of government expenditure. During the 
same period, e.g 1962-65, the corresponding figures in 
the neighbouring countries were 24.6 percent for Thailand, 
24.4 percent for Ivlalaysia and 18.1 percent for India (see 
Lotz {1970}). 
Another major factor that is considered to have contributed 
towards reduction of income inequality in recent years is 
the proeramme of agricultural development carried through-
during the post-Independence period. l':otivatated by 
import substitution, large scale agricultural development 
schemes were initiated during the post-Independence period. 
Increased farmer incomes 1'lhich was a concorni tant of these 
developments is considered to have contributed towards 
reduction in income inequality, particularly in the rural 
sector. 
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3.2 The Food Subsidy 
The origins of the present food subsidy could be traced 
back to the time of the Second vlorld I'lar when a rice 
ration had been introduced at a subsidised price. This 
had been done in order to Cllshion the consumer from price 
fluctuations arising from the shortages of food supplies 
due to the war. The food subsidy thus initiated continued 
into the post-war period and even into times during which 
(early 1950s) there were no major food scarcities. In 
view of the increasing strains that were being placed 
upon the government budget, attempts were made from time 
to time to reduce the subsidy. But these attempts were 
met with strong political oPPosition as for instance the 
agitation and unrest of the working class 'hnrtal' in 1952. 
Since then the major political parties have been committed 
to the continurrtion of the rice subsidy, subject to certain 
modifications from time to time. 
The rice subsidy is the major element in the total food 
subsidy. For example in 1975, the rice subsidy constituted 
64 percent of the gross food Stlbsidy while flour and sugar 
subsidies accounted for 18 and 17 percent respectively1 
and the subsidy on infant milk represented less than 1 
1 Source: Central Bank of Ceylon, Review of the Economy 
1975, p.158. 
• 
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percent. In the past, certain items, notably flour and 
sugar were sold at a profit so as to reduce the total 
subsidy and to yield a net subsidy which was sliehtly less 
than the gross subsidy. But in the years 1974 and 1975 . 
these two items were subsidised rather than beingsold at a 
profit following the sugar crisis and the rise in price of 
flour. 
The rice subsidy, in its history of 35 years or so, under-
went several modifications from time to time. In the mid 
1960s the subsidy took the form of providing each person 
~e1' week 
with 2 measures of rice" (1 measure = 2 pounds) at a 
subsidised price. In 1966 a significant change took place, 
namely,that one measure was provided free of cost and the 
other at market prices. With the change of government in 
1970, the second measure was restored at a subsidised price 
on ration and the free measure was continued, (see 
T'lahalingasivam {1978}). But in 1972 the supply of free rice 
to tax payers was stopped. On account of the worsening 
balance of payments situation that arose in 1973 due to the 
OPEC price increase for crude oil, the free measure had to 
be halved; each person in a non-tax paying household 
received per week, half a measure of rice (one pound) free 
and one measure of rice at a price of Rs.2.00 which was 
slightly below the market price. With the change of 
a 
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government in July, 1977, a major shift away from consumer 
subsidies was seen. This was announced categorically in 
the Budget Speech of November, 1977 as; 
"the country has for much too long relied 
on a proliferation of subsidies of one 
kind or another which by pre-emptine 
resources for consumption have severely 
limited progress towards development and 
employment". 
Specifically, the proposal was to remove the rice subsidy from 
households receiving an income of over Rs.300 per month in 
money terms. This scheme is operative at present. 
In the case of sugar, it had long been an item sold at a 
profit so as to reduce the food subsidy at least marginally. 
But, followine the sugar crisis in 1973/74, a subsidy was 
introduced so as to provide a basic minimum at a subsidised 
price. One pound of sUGar was provided on ration per person 
per week at 72 cents and the balance at a market price of 
Us.S per pound. As proposed in the 1977 Budget, this 
subsidy too has been removed. Sucar is now sold in the 
open market at Rs.) per pound. Flour too is subsidised and 
is supplied throueh the consumer co-operatives and other 
outlets at Rs.1.0S per pound. The present subsidy on flour 
Is approximately 70 cents per pound. 
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Table 3.1 
'. 
Subsidies as percentages of total 
inco'me of Spending Units 
Income Group Subsidies as a Eercentaee of 
(Monthly Income) Rice Flour Sugar 
Less than Rs.25 9.63 4.68 2.73 
Rs.26 
-
Rs.50 10.60 1.92 3.48 
Rs.51 - Rs.100 8.35 2.07 2.13 
Re.100 - Rs.200 8.84 2.70 2.12 
Rs.201 - Rs.400 6.85 2.07 1.70 
Rs.401 - Rs.800 4.05 1.00 1.13 
Rs.801 - Rs.1000 1.64 0.65 0.56 
Rs.l001 Rs.1500 0.81 0.31 0.36 
Over Rs.1500 0.31 0.17 0.20 
Total 5.49 1.60 1.40 
Total Income 
Total 
17.04 
16.00 
12.55 
13".66 
10.62 
6.21 
~2~85 
1.48 
0.68 
8.44 
Source: Derived from CFS 1973 Table 84 ~. 99. 
As seen from the above table, the food subsidy has accounted 
16 - 17 percent of the incomes of the lowest income groups and 
would have contributed positively towards reduction of income 
inequality. 
3.3 Health Services 
The development of an extensive system of health services has 
been an important component of social welfare policy during the 
pa~t 30 years or so. In the 1940s, it took the form of an 
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Anti-malaria campaign, establishment of rural hoopitals, 
development of the Colombo Medical College and other 
institutions, improvement of existing hospital facilities 
and the establishment of a wide ranee of other services. 
For example, as a result of one such oervice, today nearly 
all births are professionally supervised. 1 As at 1972, 
there '\'lere 2,253 western type government hospitals, 
dispensaries and institutions, 218 indigenous "Ayurveda" 
hospitals and dispensaries, 787 western type private 
nursing homes, hospitals and practitioners and nearly 
20,000 private Ayurveda and other practitioners, making 
') 
a total of a little over 23,000 "institutions" in all.4: 
The health services in Sri Lanka today ranks amongst 
the best in Asia. Table 3.2 attempts to present the 
comparative.position regardine basic facilities. 
1 See Joneo and ~3elvaratnam{ 1972; Table 12.} In 1966, 99 
per cent of births were -professionally sllpervised as 
compared 1'1'1 th Singapore (99), Hong [one (95), Jamaica (70), Venezuela (61), U.li..R (35), Ghana (33), Peru (28), 
Nalaysia (28), Philippines (23), and Thailand (16). 
2Source: Vlorld Health Organisat ion. Better Health 
for Sri Lanka, Report on a Health f:anpower Study by 
Dr. L.A. Simeonov (SEA/PHA/149) p.8, 1975; 
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Tllble 3.2 
", 
An Inter- country comp8.rison of f:ledicn.l Facilities 
Population per Population per 
Countrv Year Hosnital Bed Year }Jhvsician 
1 • Bangladesh 1972 6,946 1973 9,345 
2. ",.~ India 1968 1 , 571 1973 4,162 
3. Japan 1972 78 1973 868 
4. Republic of Korea 1973 1 , 651 1974 2,571 
5. Nalaysia (Sabah) 1973 348 1973 8,941 
6~ I1alaysia Olest) 1972 276 1971 630 
6. I'akistan 1973 1,853 1973 4,049 
7. Philippines 1969 822 1970 2,639 
8. Singapore 1973 269 1973 1,399 
9. Sri Lanka 1973 333 1972 4,007 
10. Thailand 1973 774 1973 n.a 
Source: U.N. Statistical Year Book 1975. Table 208 p.841. 
Efforts in developing health cervices have produced Si@lificunt 
results. ~"or, the death rate \'lhich stood at 20.2 per thousand in 
1946 declined to 7.9 per thousund in 1972; infant mortality declined 
from 141 per thousand live births in 1946 to 50 per thousand in 1968 
the expectation of life at birth incr(~n.sed from 44 for males and 42 
for females in 1946 to 65 and 67 respectively in 1968. 1 • The expec-
tation of life at birth, particularly in reeard to males, comes 
close to the corresponding figures in developed countries. For 
example, around 1973/74, the corresponding fi{~e for males was 67.4 
lSe~ Chapter 2,Section 2.1 
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years in.U.S.A, 67.8 years in U.K, 72.1 years in Sweden 
and 70.5 years in Japan.'" 
Unlike in the case of the food subsidy, there is no 
quantitative information which will enable us to assess 
the extent to which each income group has benefited from 
the health services. But it is well known that it is 
because free medical services were available that the 
lower income groups had access to modern medical facilities. 
The benefits are two fold. Firstly, the value of these 
services must necessarily be regarded as a part of the 
real income of those receivine medical facilities and 
secondly better health l'lould have contributed in some 
measure towards raising the level of productivity and 
income of the low income workers. In regard to the former, 
the total government expenditure during 1973 had been 
Rs.298.3 million. 2 which averages to Rs.110.3 per spending 
unit per annum. ~ven if we assume that both rich and poor 
spending units have received this benefit equally on the 
average, it is clear that such an addition to income would 
have reduced income disparity, in some small measure. 
However, it is more likely that the lower income groups 
1 Source: U.N. Statistical Year Book 1975, Table 19. 
2 See U.N. Statistical Year Book 1975, Table 201, p.789. 
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would have benefited more, in which case, the argument is 
.. 
further strengthened. This possibility could be supported 
by an assessment made in the WHO study {1975}. As shown in 
this study, in 1969/70, households receiving incomes less 
than ns.200 per month were able to spend on an average of 
Rs.2.05 per month on private health services. In contrast, 
households receiving over Rs.1000 per month had spent an 
average of Ro.20.02 per month on private health oervices. 
In these circumstances, lm-r income households \-lould have 
had to rely more on state medical services. 
3.4 The Educational System 
The third major component of social "Telfare policy in Sri 
Lanka during the past 30 year period '\-TaS the Educational 
System adopted. In 1945, three years before Independence, 
a free education policy 'tolaS adopted to provide free 
education from the Kindergarten to the University level, 
and by 1951 this policy had been fully implemented. In 
the Preliminary Survey of Education prepared by the ~1orld 
Bank in 1966, Sri Lanka's educational system "TaS described 
as follows: 
"To judge from its educational pyramid alone 
it might be said that Ceylon, after Japan, 
hnd the best developed education system in 
Asia. A very high proportion of children 
attend school, the wasta~e rates are 
relatively low, the numbers of girls are little 
lower than of boys; schools at secondary level 
are well attended and very large numbers take 
a 
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the school certificate examination at the end 
of the tenth year. It is true that enrolments 
in pre-university classes and at the 
universities are low and the output of 
graduates small, but even here enrolrnents have 
recently increased greatly. 1'.1oreover, Ceylon 
has provided this education free at all levels, 
so that it is not surprising that the propor-
tion of the Gnp spent on education is almost 
5 per cent and the highest in Asia". 
As at 1973, the total student enrolments stood at 1.539 
million at primary level, 1.150 million at secondary level 
and a little over 19,000 at tertiary level. Thus, total 
enrolments in 1973 represented 20.5 per cent of the 
population. The total teaching staff in 1973 exceeded 
100,000. 
In the 1970s, the percentage of Gl'lP spent on education bad 
been somewhat lower, as for example 4.3 per cent in 1973. 
Nevertheless Sri Lanka still ranks amongst the highest in 
Asia, in terms of percentage of Gnp spent on education as 
could be seen from the Table 3.4. 
Government expenditure on education has shown a steady 
increase over time. From a level of Rs.602.0 million in 
1973 it increased to Rs.622.8 million in 1974 and to 
Hs.718.3 million in 1975. However as a percentaee of 
total eovernment expenditure, it has declined from 12.7 
per cent in 1973 to 11.3 per cent in 1974 and to 10.9 
per cent in 1975. 
., 
. 
3 - 13 
Table 3.} 
Expenditure on Education as a percentage of the 
Gross National Product 
1 • 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Expenditure of 
Education as 
Country Year of GNP 
Burma 1971 3.4 
India 1972 2.5 
Japan 1972 4.3 
Korea 1973 3.0 
I,1alaysia (\Vest) 1971 5.1 
Pakistan 1973 2.0 
Philippines 1972 2.0 
Sineapore 1973 2.7 
Sri Lanka 1973 4.1 
Thailand 1973 ).0 
Source: U.N. Statistical Year Book 1975, 
Table 210. 
The results of these efforts have today taken the form of 
a hiGh rate of literacy and a relatively wide spread of 
basic education. As noted in the previous chapter the 
literacy rates among males and females in 1971 were 85.2 
and 70.7 respectively. Further, from the population of 
persons over 15 years, 30.3 per cent had received an 
education up to GCE (O.L) and 1.5 per cent had passed the 
GCE (A.L) or higher examinations. 
• 
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It could aloo be inferred from the CFS 1973 that improve-
ment in educational standards over the period 1963 - 73 
would have contributed towards reduction in income 
ine~uality. Accordine to Table 13 of the CFS 1973, during 
the period 1963-73, the Index of Education attained1 had 
changed from 5.15 to 5.40 in the case of the urban sector, 
3.94 to 4.60 in the case of the rural sector, and 2.09 to 
2.31 in the case of the estate sector. Again, Table 60 of 
CFS 1973 shows how mean and median incomes increase with 
increasing educational levels. It would therefore appear 
that the relatively high increases in the Index of 
Education attained in the case of the rural sector could 
have contributed towards, raising rural incomes. This in 
turn could have contributed towards reducine the urban-
rural income disparities. 
3.5 Other VI elfare Jlleasures 
Several other welfare measures were also implemented 
during the past 30 year period. Vlithout going into detail, 
we may briefly note some of the salient features of the 
more important ones, namely minimum wage policy, subsidies 
on public tr~sport and price control. 
1 
The"Index of Education Attained" had been computed by 
weighting each educational standard achieved (e.g. No 
schoolin~,· li terate, I-'rimary, Secondary, Passed GCE/ 
SSC etc.) by the minimum number of years necessary to 
attain it, and obtaining the weiGhted averaC;e. A detailed 
explanation is provided in CF3 1963 Table 10. 
sa 
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The present minimum waGe policies originated from the Waees 
Board Ordinance of 1941. This Ordinance, together with its 
nine subsequent amendments provide the legal framework for 
fixing minimum wages for the various trades. In each "lages 
Board set up under this Ordinance there are an equal number 
of representatives from the employers and employees and a 
maximum of three members nominated by the Government. Each 
Board fixes the minimum wage applicable to the particular 
trade they are concerned with. At present there are 32 
1 trades covered by minimtm wage legislation. It is also 
estimated that nearly one and a half million workers are 
covered by minimum wage legislation, representing 67 per 
cent of those contributing to the Employees Provident Fund 
or nearly 40 per cent of the total employed. 
Likewise, in the case of those working in shops and offices, 
the Shop and Office Employees Act No. 19 of 1954 sought to 
regulate their terms of minimum remuneration and the erant 
of Public Holidays. This Act made provision for the 
determination of remuneration by the Commissioner of Labour 
where employers and employees consent to such determination 
and for the setting of Remuneration ~.lribunals for the 
determination of remuneration in specified shops and offices 
(see \'Teerakoon {1976} ). 
1A fuller discussion is provided by G. UGerakoon in the 
Sri Lanka Labour Gazette of January, 1976. 
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One would ,expect the results of minimum wage policy 
toeether with the trade union movement to be reflected in 
a reduction of income disparities as between professions 
over the period 1963-73. But this unfortunately is a 
comparison we cannot make on account of major differences 
in the classifications of professions as between the CFS 
1963 and the CFS 1973. 1 
The lower income groups are also considered to have benefited 
from subsidised public transport. Public transport in Sri 
Lanka is provided by the Ceylon Government Railways (C.G.R.) 
and the Ceylon Transport Board (C.T.D.) which operate the 
bus services. The C.T.D. carries 12 times as many passengers 
as the C.G.R although the avera~e passenger journey' 
the formerL±gss than one third of the latter. The C.T.B 
operates a fleet of over 7,100 buses throuGhout the country 
and employs nearly 60,000 persons. The extent of the benefit 
to the lmo[er income GI'OUpS could be appreciated from the fact 
that the bus fares had remained at 3.75 cts. per mile for a 
2 period of 22 years covering rouchly 10 yoars of private 
ownership and 12 years of public ownership after the 
nationalisation in 1958. The fares were revised in 1971 the 
effect of which was to charge 20 cents for the first section 
1 ~he only profession that remains unchanged is the "clerical 
and allied" category 
2See Jones and 3elvaratnam 11972; p. 158J 
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and 5 cents per additional section. The net rCf:)ult is that 
'. 
a four mile journey'today will cost about 30 cents or 
roughly 7.5 cents per mile, which is low by any standards. l . 
Since the revision of fares the C.T.B has been either 
breaking even or operating at a small profit. But in 1975 
a loss of about Rs.9.4 million was incurred and this should 
be regarded as a subsidy to the commuter. Likewise, the 
C.G.R. too operates its services ut subsidised fares. In 
1974, the C.G.R. incurred a loss of Hs.42.0 million and in 
1975 a loss of Rs.49.2 million. 
Apart from benefits to the commuters, cheap transport has 
also brouGht about social gains to the cOlmtry as a whole. 
As pointed out by Karunatilake {1975}, it is because of the 
availability of cheap transport that large number of city 
workers travel from far off places rather than crowding in 
the city of Colombo or its suburbs. 
There are a number of other eoods and services provided at 
subsidised rates. For example Eilk is one item which is 
subsidised to a level of about Hs.SO.O million per annum. 
Housing for the low income groups is another important 
service that is subsidised. Hent control laws have also 
1 In comparison, the use of ones own car would cost about 
Hs.1.00 per mile and the use of a taxi about Rs.3.00 
per mile. 
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offered relief to those in the lower middle, and middle 
~. 
income groups, dependent upon rental accommodation. 
3.6 Agricultural Development 
There is evidence to support the view that agricultural developmcl 
primarily aimed at domestic production of essential food 
items has contributed a great deal towards the reduction of 
income disparities via increases in farmer incomes. We shall 
take note of the important steps taken in regard to aericul-
tural policy, particularly some of the major legal enactments 
to which recent developments owe a great deal for providing 
the basic framework. 
The Land Development Ordinance of 1935 could be regarded as 
the first major step taken towards increasing aGricultural 
production during this century. This Ordinance introduced 
for the first time, the prinCiple of Government initiative 
in alienating land und reflected an increasine concern for 
food production and for improving the position of the 
peasant cultivator (see Ellman, Ratnai-leera et al. {1976} ). 
In each district, the Government Agent was in churge of 
selecting applicants and allocating Crown Land. In terms 
of this Ordinance, large numbers of local villagers as well 
as middle class Ceylonese i'lere able to obtain Crown Land for 
purposes of cultivation. The next important legal enactment 
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was the Irrigation Ordinance of 1946, concerning the 
operation of irrieation facilities. This Ordinance spelt 
out clearly the division of responsibilities betwe~n the 
Irrigation Department and the cultivators: the Irrigation 
Department was responsible for maintaining the tanks and 
major channels and for controlling water-issues from the 
tanks,whilst the cultivators were required to pay an annual 
irrigation rate, and to maintain field channels, fences etc. 
This ordinance also included provision for summoning a 
meeting of all cultivators of a particular tract to be 
presided by the Government Aeent for purposes of deciding 
upon the cultivation proeramme i.e. the extent of land to 
be sown, the varieties of paddy to be used, the time-table 
for planting, issue of water etc. (see Ellman, Ranaweera 
et al. t1976; p.19}). The cultivators were thus able to 
participate in the formulation of the programme although 
the eovernment officials had the final say. 
Althoueh these two enactments provided the basic framework 
for agricLutural development. yet there was no legal frame-
work to safeb~ard the interests of the tenant cultivators 
(as opposed to owner cultivators) who formed the majority of 
cultivators. It is with this end in view that the Paddy Lands 
Act was introduced in 1958. It sought to increase the 
security of tenure of tenant cultivators of paddy lands and 
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to regulate rents paid to landlords. 
'. 
Whilst the above legal enactments provided the basic frame-
work, a number of other measures were taken with a view to 
increasing agricultural production. The first important 
step taken after Independence was the introduction of a 
guaranteed price for paddy, fixed initially at ns.8.00 per 
bushel. This was later changed to Rs.9.00 in 1950/51 to 
Rs.12.00 in 1951/52. It remained at the level till' 
1965 when it was changed to Rs.14.00 and later in 1973 to 
Rs.18.00. With effect from the latter part of 1974, the 
euaranteed price was revised to Rs.33.00. The next 
important step was that of introducing a Fertilizer Subsidy 
Scheme. A subsidy of as much as 50 per cent was eiven to 
cultivators who purchased fertilizer through tbe Department 
of Agrarian Services (see Karunatilake{1971;p.100». As at 
the end of 1962 there were 42 fertilizer stores in the 
country. Two other important developments were the spread 
of agricultural credit, particularly after the establishment 
of the People's Bank in 1961, and the introduction of Crop 
Insurance on paddy from 1958-59 onwards. These efforts were 
further reinforced through the spread of acricultural 
extension services, intended for the diffusion of information 
regarding the sowing of high yielding varieties of paddy, 
fertilizer usage, improved afTicultural techniques etc. 
~'. 
, .' , 
= \. 
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The results of these efforts are reflected in the steady 
increase of rice production, from a level of 31.3 million 
bushels of paddy in 1957 to the present level of about 85 
million bushels. As shown by Karunatilalce {1975 ; p.214}, 
import of rice as a percentaee of total requirements had 
fallen steadily from a level of 60.75 per cent in 1950 to 
21.08 per cent in 1974. Similar advances were made in regard 
to subsidiary food crops too. The total ban on the imports 
of potatoes in 1967 and restrictions imposed on the import 
of chillies, onions, pulses and other minor items gave adequate 
protection to the local producer. 
}'rom the standpoint of income distribution, the overe,ll result 
would have been one of an income transfer to the producers of 
abTicultural commodities,namely the farmer families. However, 
the overall impact on income inequality is not as clea.r cut as 
it seems since entrepreneurs in industry too would have benefi-
ted through the ereuter availability of foreien exchange (due 
to domestic food production) for import of raw materials. 
The contribution to GDP from Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and 
Fishing rose from Rs.2,8~6.0 million in 1963 to Rs.3,419.8 in 
1973 (at constant 1959 prices), 1 representing a [7m'lth rate of 
2.2 per cent per annum. Since there had been no sienificant 
18ee Central Dank of Ceylon, ~rulual Report 1972, Appendix 11 
Table 5 [md Annual Report 1977, Appendix Ill, Table 2. 
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increases in the output of tea, rubber and coconut,1 it 
follows that the major contribution to this tTowth rate of 
2.2 per cent would have come from domestic agriculture, 
namely the cultivation of paddy and other subsidiary food 
crops. As reported by Jayawardena (see Chcncry et al. {1974 
p.275~ durine period 1963-1969/70 paddy output had grown by 
6.6 per cent, subsidiary crops by 6.5 per cent, small scale 
industry by 8 per cent, construction by 12 per cent and 
organised manufacturing by 7 per cent. These sectors had 
accounted for a little less than a third of GDP in 1970. 
The growth output of paddy and other subsidiary food crops 
may have contributed signific:".ntly towards the growth of per 
capita income in the rurnl sector. This increase in rural 
income would have contributed towards the reduction of the 
overall level of income inequality. 
Agricultural production would have also contributed towards 
the reduction in income inequality within the rural sector 
itself (the Gini coefficient had declined from 0.424 in 
1963 to 0.332 in 1973 - see Table 2.b). For, as argued by 
Jayawardena (see Chenery et al {1974 ; p.275)), paddy 
10utput of Tea had declined from 405 million lbs. in 1963 
to 466 million Ibs in 1973; output of TIubber had increased 
from 231 million Ibs. in 1963 to 340 million lbs. in 1973: 
output of coconut had declined from 2,549 million nutD in 
1963 to 1,935 million nuts in 1973. Dut the output of paddy 
increased from 49.2 million bushels in 1963 to 76.8 million 
bushels in 1974. (Source: Cent.ral Brmk Reports) 
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holdings below 5 acres accounted for 95 per cent of the 
total number of holdings and 85 per cent of the cultivated 
area. Since paddy_ incomes accrue mostly.to households in the 
income range of the bottom 40 per cent, as in the case of 
subsidiary crops and s~all induntries, increaseD in the 
output of these commodities could have contributed towards 
the reductic,n of income inequality in the rural areas. 
During the ~ast five ye~rs there were several other 
developmentD, thu effects of which are yet to be felt. The 
first was the JJand Reform Law No. 1 of 1972. Th is law fixed 
ceilings on the ownership of land on the busio of 25 acres 
per person in the case of paddy land and 50 acres per person 
in the case of other land. Under this lai'1 some 550,000 acres 
of land were taken over and vested in a number of institutions 
such as Vivisional Land Reform Authorities (32 per cent), the 
Land Commission (20 per cent), USAt-1ASAHA (16 per cent), Btute 
'plantations Corporation (6 per cent) and Co-operative organi-
sations. \{hile this law covered only privately owned landD, 
the Land Reform (Amendment) Law of 1975 extended the principle 
ceilings on land m'1nerElhip to estatro o\vned by public companies 
as well, under this law, company eBto.teo of over 50 ucres were 
taken over ,,11th compensation and vested in the state. The 
acreaee taken over totalled about 415,000 acres of hiehly 
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productive tea, rubber and coconut lands. The largest part 
of this land taken over is now managed by JA11A~IASANA, a 
state enterprise set up for the purpose of managing the 
estates. 
Other important developments were the Agricultural Producti-
vity Law No.2 of 1972 intended to ensure that the lands taken 
over are properly utilised and developed, the Agricultural 
Lands Law No .42 of 1973 which supercedcd the l)uddy Lands Act, 
and the :3ale of state Lands Law lJo.43 of 1973 to provide for 
the sale of state lands to individual cultivators and for the 
repeal of certain provisions of the Land Development Ordinance. 
The impact of these changes could be asnessed only durine; a 
f t . d 1 u ure per~o • 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter,we have attempted to isolate the important 
factors that could have contributed towards the reduction of 
income inequality in recent years. There has been no clear 
1 In an interestine discussion by Nartha de JlIelo {1978; p. 183} 
it has been pointed out that IJand reform would contribute 
positively towards reduction of income inequality but could 
lower the r.~te of capital formation (due to lower savings) 
and hence lower growth of GNP. 
. . 
• 
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cut way of quantifying the contribution from each factor. 
It is doubtful whether such an exercise could be done even at 
a future date because of the interrelationships between the 
factors involved. For exrunple, better education apart from 
being a oeparute factor could influence better standards of 
health and sanitation • 
. As could be seen from the variety of measures introduced, 
high priority had been assigned by the politicians and policy 
makers towards improving the welfare of the people in the short 
term. Although there had been at no stage any formal concept of 
a social welfare function, there appears to have been an under-
lying assumption that the welfare of the people depended upon 
better nutrition, health, education, minimum waces, transport 
facilities and a few other services. As noted previously, 
welfarism became an integral part of the political philosophy 
of major political parties and specific steps were taken by 
successive governments to provide these Goods and services to 
the broad masses. The level of expenditure on welfare services 
have come under much criticism in recent years on account of the 
heavy burden placed upon the government budget and the concomi-
tant constraints on resources for investment; public investment 
. became overly dependent upon domeGtic and foreign borrowing. 
To the extent that invest~ento are low, the production of 
Goods and services in the future will be low (technology 
\ 
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remaining constant) and would inevitably lead to a diminution of 
future welfare. Thus the level of expenditure on welfare 
services has broueht into focus the conflict between present 
and future welfare i.e present welfare versus growth. 
The present climate1 of thoueht has moved distinctly towards 
a proeramme of stable and self sustaining erowth, the major 
objectives being growth of output and employment and an 
improvement in the balance of payments. The removal of rice 
subsidy from the richer half of the population, referred to 
earlier, could be seen as a concerted effort to mobilize 
resources for development; subsidies are now restricted to the 
target group consisting of households earnlllg less than RS.300 
per month. In addition the dual exchange rate which had denied 
adequate incomes to tea und rubber producers has been abolished 
and a more realistic unified rute of exchange has been adopted ar. 
allowed to float in relation to other currencies. This change 
has made it possible to liberalise imports except for 139 
scheduled items, and \'1as intended to enable induntr1alists 
import adequate quantities of raw material and plant on the 
one hand and to satisfy consumer demand on the other. 
1 See Government of Sri Lanka {1978} - The r·Ieditun Term 
Investment Proera::.1Ille 1979-83 (rUmeo), Miniotry of Finance 
& Planning. 
= 
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The Budget of November, 1977 also made proposals to reform 
the tax structure so as to provide greater incentives for 
production by granting five year tax holidays to new 
companies which engageL~~od production, horticulture, animal 
husbandry, off-shore and deep-sea fishine and to small and 
~edium scale industrial ventures located outside Colombo. 
With a view to generating ereater savings for investment ,the 
deposit rates of one of the principal state banking institu-
tions 1.e the National Savings Bank were raiseu. from 7-8 per 
cent to 12 to18 per cent for 6 to 8 month deposits. 
However current development plans have aloo laid emphasis on 
providing equal opportunities for the variouo secments of the 
community to benefit froIn economic growth. Accordingly, 
special measures to look after the old and the needy are to 
continue whilst health and education facilities are to continue 
to be available to all. In addition, the target groups are to 
be further protected from the harsh effects of inflution through 
appropriate pricing and wage policies. Thus, in broad terms the 
overall strateGY of current development plans iD to bring about 
a higher rate of economic ermrth "lithout major sacrifices in 
l'/elfare. It is in this context that "le shall attempt to explore 
some of the issues concerning a strateGY for redistribution 
with growth in the next chapter. 
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". CHAPrm 4 
A J:10DEJJ FOH rmDI;3TRIBUTIOIT 'r'!ITJI Gnm'lTH 
"Once upon a time the Kingdom of Solvia 
uas gripped by a (;reat debate. 'This 
is a growine economy but it crm grow 
fuster', many ar~~ed. 'Suotainable 
grmvth is best', came the reply, 'and 
that can come only from natural forces'" 
- E.S. Phelps (The Golden Rule of 
Accumulation: A Fable for Growthmen) 
4.1 Introduction 
The results of Chapter 2 have indicated that significant 
prof,>Tess has been made in Sri Lanka in achieving a more 
e~uitable distribution of incomes durine the recent past; 
the share o~ income accruine to the top ten ner cent of the 
spendine units had declined from 37 per cent in 1963 to 28 
per cent in 1973, \,lhilst the share of the botom forty per 
cent rose from 14 per cent in 1963 to 19 per cent in 1973. 
Further, the Gini Coefficient in respect of spendine units 
had declined from 0.45 in 1963 to 0.35 in 1973. As seen 
earlier, theGe reGults compare very favourubly ''1ith pntterns 
of incone diotribution prevailine in other countries. A 
more equitable distribution of incomes has been nchieved in 
~Jri Lanka throueh a number of policy measures, and these 
. policy measures 'vere revievTed in the pl'eviotw chapter. 
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Having achieved this measure of success in the redistribution 
of incomes, a question may now be posed as to the nature and 
extent of emphasis that should be assicned to reaistributive 
considerations vis-n.-vis economic crmith in future develop-
ment plans. Let us first look at the backGround of e;routh 
rates achieved in the recent past. The rates of Growth of 
GNP for each of the years durine . the period 1966-1977 
. can be seen from the table belm.,,: 
1'able 4.1 
Growth rates of the Gross ITntional Product 
at constant (1959) Factor l~ices 
~ Grmvth RI1.t es 
1966 3.5 % 
1967 5.0 I'" ,0 
1968 8.4 ,.# I') 
1969 4.5 ,d ;(J 
1970 4.1 0' ,0 
1971 0.4 ~~ 
1972 3.2 e' I~ 
1973 7. 8 ,I ). I" 
1974 3.0 ~~ 
1975 2.0 ~~ 
1976 3.0 ('~ I 
1977 4.4 ~~ 
Sources: Central Bank Annual Renort 1975 - Table 1 
and Central Bank Annual Report 1977 -
Table 1. 
» 
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The growth rate of GNP for the above periOd averaees to 3.9 
per cent per annum. During th~ same period the country's 
population increased from 11.44 million in 1966 to 13.97 
million in 1971, averaeine to an increase of about 1.8 per 
per cent p8r annum. Thus, the ero\,lth rate of per capita GNP 
averaged to 2.1 per annum. The erowth rate of GNP witnessed 
during the latter part o~ this period has in fact been much 
lower than that planned for. The Five Year Plan (1972-76) 
envisaged a growth rute of 6 per cent per annum; but as seen 
from the above table, actual Growth rates have only ranGed 
from 2.8 per cent to 3.8 per cent during the period 1912 to 
1975. Thus, the inescapable conclusion thut one is led to 
is that although notable progre~s hus been made in Sri Lanka 
in achieving a more equitable dintribution of incomes, the 
grovlth of total income hus been sorue\'lhat disappointing. But 
welfare depends upon absolute levels of income1 as well and 
as noted eo.rlier it is only throueh nn increase of total 
income that there will be anythinc sicnific~t to redistribute. 
It won.ld therefore appear thctt r;roHth considerations nhould 
receive hiGh priority if total incol7lc ~mcl thereby total welfare 
is to be increased. \Jhat ,wuld seem ideal is to reGard further 
redistribution as an integral part of a erol~th cum redintri-
.bution process. 
1For example in a relatively simple c~nc, vlolfare is a function 
of consumption which is in turn a function of income. 
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The aim of this chapter is firotly to explore by means of 
a simple model the interdependencies that could exist between 
the incomes of the rich and the poor. 'l'hereafter, we shall 
explore as to how the reopective income shares ",ould behave 
as incomes groiV'. This would enable us to examine the impact 
of further redistributive measures upon income erowth and to 
explore the possibilities of redistributive measures which 
will have the least possible repercussions upon income Growth. 
The relationship bebleen economic growth and income distri-
bution is bound to be a complex one. Although the 'causes' 
of economic grol'lth such as savinGs and investment, technical 
progress, nutrition, health and education of the labour force, 
psychological, social and political factors etc., have been 
widely discussed in the literature, yet much attention does 
not seem to have been paid to the forces that shape the income 
distribution structure of a society. As noted in Chapter 1, 
discussions have n~inly centered round the distribution of 
incomes between the factors of production namely capital and 
labour and not on the distribution of income between persons. 
Perhaps the first serious atte~pt to consider the latter was 
Kuznets' classic article of 1955. lIe differentiated between 
.groups of forces that tend to increase inequality, nnmcly 
the concentration of savings in the upper income brackets 
and the process of induotrialization and urbanization and 
• 
4 - 5 
croupS of forces that tend to counteract these such as 
leeislation aimed at limiting the accumulation of property, 
the rise of more profitable industries and ne'" enterprenturs 
and the rise of oervice income in the lower brackets, accruing 
from professional and enterpreneurial pursuits. These and 
other factors such as the ownership of the factors of produc-
tion, education, trade unionism, nationalization, pricinc 
policies etc., do have a ben-rine upon the structure of 
income distribution in a country. The model developed in 
this chapter does not aim at incorporatinc all these factors; 
no model could possibly capture all the complexities of 
reality. Hather, the aim here is to ta1~e into account only 
a few relevant factors in an attempt to inveGtieate the 
relationships that could exist bchleen income distribution 
and econoI!lic LTovlth. The emphasis iD on cuinine insight into 
the interdependencies bet\,leen the eroi'lth of incomeo of the 
rich and the poor, and the resu.lts of Government participation 
in a gro'\'lth cum redi2tribution procro.mme. i'le could then 
examine as to ho1'1 such insic;hts cO'J.ld be of help in drm'1ing 
appropriate policy cor.olusions. A point of particular interest 
vlould be to examine '\'lhether the r!10del developed could explain 
or cenerate the behaviour pattern of income inequality Hith 
,respect to income crowth , hypothesised by I~uznets {1955; p.18} 
as follows: 
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"One might thus assume a lone swing in 
the incquality characterizing this 
secular income structure: widening in 
the early phases of economic [Towth 
when the transition from the pre-
industrial to the induGtrial civili-
zation was most rapid; becominG 
stabilised for a while; rmd then 
nnrrowing in the later phases ••• It 
Paukert \1973} in setting out to test this hypothesis 
concluded that: 
"The data preoented in this article 
support the hypothesis expressed bl1t 
not fully tested by Kuznets and Oshima 
that ,,11th economic development i~come 
inequality tends to increase, then 
become stable and then decrease. These 
data show clearly thQt there in an 
increase in inequality as countries 
progress from belm1 ~1 00 level to the 
~101-200 level and beyond. They 
establish that the peak of inequality 
is reached in the Groups with a per 
capita income bet"1een ~200 and ~500." 
.An attempt w'as l1k'l.de to test the l:uzncts hypotheois (see 
Codi~pily {1974} by means of n recression analysis of inter-
country data usinG four relevant variables, namely level of 
per capita income, extent of school educ['.tion, del~ee of 
dualism, and share of Govern..r.lent p.nc1 corporate savines in 
total savings. One of the ccnclusions reached \'HlS that there 
was a reasonable amount of evidence in support of the Kuznets 
. hypothesis. 
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A study "lhich at first sight appears to be at variunce \vi th 
the Kuznets hypothesis is the one carried out by Adelman and 
norris {1971}. They e;~amined the relationship between income 
distribution and 31 economic, socio-cultural und political 
factors and concluded that six factors which 'oJere most 
significant in explainine variations in income distribution 
were: (1) the rate of improvement of human resources, (2) 
abundance of natural resources, (3) extent of direct 
government economic activity, (4) extent of dualism, (5) 
potential for economic development and (6) extent of political 
participation. The level of per capita income did not emeree 
as a signific3.nt explanatory variable when taken tocether with 
all the other variables. Hmolever , it could be nrcued that the 
level of development represented by per capita income is in 
fact connected to varying extents ,d th the six fc.ctors listed 
above (i.e. for instance rate of improvement of human resources 
will tend to be higher in richer countries etc.,) and that the 
Adelman and I!orris study establishes the relationship between 
illcor:e distribution and the l~vel of development not directly, 
but throuch several of its facets. .l!'urther, as arL,'ued by 
J:aukert it would be possible for an important factor to be 
overshadowed by others if its impact is not linear. }'or these 
reasons it could be argued that the Adelman and r·iorris study is 
not at variance \'d th the Kuznets hypothesis. The ceneral 
evidence beinc in favour of the Kuznets hypothesis, as mentioned 
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earlier, a point of interest would be to examine the model 
vis-a-vis the Kuznets pattern. 
There are other interestinG directions in "lhich the model 
could be developed. For inotance, it would be possible to 
investieate as to how the model could be linked up with the 
incentive effect discussed by Codippily {1974}. In any 
redistribution pro[.TDrJIDe, there could be incentive losses to 
the rich 311d incentive gains to the poor. One '\wuld therefore 
have to consider the net effect ru1d its inpo..ct upon total 
income ",ith a view to assessine the implications upon a growth 
cum redistribution proeramme • Another important exercise 
"10uld be to investiGate how considerations of optiI:'1ality could 
be built into the model on the lines proposed by lIamuda {1967}. 
4.2 General Features of the Nodel 
The model developed here has its oriGins from the Chenery-
Ahluwalia Lodel {1974: pp.209-235} and reto..ins some of its 
general features. IIm'lever, in many reopects , it coes beyond 
the Chenery-AhlUl'lalia model. To begin ,'11th, the covernment 
'\'1ill be introduced as an explicit sector p:;l,rticipatine in a 
growth cum redistribution process. Secondly, the type of 
redistribution of consumption discussed by Codippily {19741 
will be incorporated into the model. AGain, an attempt ,\,lil1 
be made to incorporate the incentive effect discussed by 
" '.' 
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Codippily {19741, but with further elaborati.on. ~.'he role of 
financial institutions, direct taxes, indirect taxes and foreien 
aid will be introduced. Further, investieations will be made as 
to the extent to which the model could be linked up with an 
optimal [7oVlth prOL,T&":'ll!le. vIe sha.ll draw specific policy 
conclusions wherever possible and assess their effectiveness. 
The methodology adopted in this study differs from that used in 
the Chenery-Ahluwalia study. The dynamic properties of the 
Chenery-.lllilm·m.lia model are examined in their study in terms of 
simulation techniques rath~r than by nnalytical techniques. 
AlthOUGh it is stated that their model can be written in the form 
of a set of difference equations, yet in anticipation of certain 
difficulties that would arise due to the presence of cert~in 
parameters that chanGe over time, they had opted to use simu.-
lation techniques. In this study He shall neither use difference 
equations (in vim'l of analytical difficulties that may arise) 
nor use simulation techniques. Inntcad, "le shall formulat e the 
model in terPIS of a set of simultoneo:ls differential equations. 
For the purpose of th-Ls model, all spendinG units1 ,\,lill be 
divided into two groups - the higher income L,TOUp and the lower 
incorJ1C croup. 11.s in the case of the Chenery-Ahluwalia model 
1 Although it rilay be preferable to talk in terms of households, 
yet from considerations of conformity with C~apter 2, we shall 
carry out the analysis in terms of spending units. 
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{1974; p.210} vIe shall regard as "rich" those spending unito 
belonging to the top 20 per cent v/hen opending units are 
ranked by income levels. The balance 80 per cent will be 
reearded as "poor". In terms of 't.he CF:J 1973, the lntter 
catecory would approxir:lO.tely consist of those ,\'1ho received 
incomes belovl Hs .400 per month in 1973. The covernment is 
considered to be an 'impersonal' acency which effects 
redistributive policies and p:':l.r1:iCipates in a erowth cum 
redistribution process. The Government is termed 'impersonal' 
since it is assumed that total l'1elfnre is a function of only 
the utilities of the rich and the poor. The utility of the 
C;overnment as such is not assic;ned uny menninc and does not 
enter into ,<[elfare considerations. 
Admittedly it uould have been more realistic to formulate the 
model in terms of several income Croups, say four or five or 
the number of income croups used in Chapter 2. Further, one 
could take into account differences as between urban, rural 
and estate households, nnd rec;ional differences. Bat the 
consequences of such an apl)roach Hill be one of increasing 
complexity and a number of analytical results 'vlhich \-1i1l be 
intractable from the point of view of co.injng inoieht and draw-
ing policy conclusions. Given the deficiencies in the informa-
tion system and the rather shaky dnta base iie are starting vd th, 
the emphasis will be more on derivinG directions for action 
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rather than precise nagnitudes and targets. 
Following the Chenery-Ahluwalia ap~roach, we shall assume a 
dualistic pattern of ~roduction in which there are capitalistic 
modes of production based on the uoe of h-i..red labour side by 
side with traditional modes of production based on self employ-
ment und family labour. Capital owned by the rich is assumed 
.to be of two types - that which cenerates income ",lith the use 
of hired lubour, termed 'linked capital' anu thnt which generates 
income without· use of hired labour, termed 'non linked capital'. 
As in the Chenery-Ahluwalia model, we may think of this form of 
caDital as a type "lhich uses only hir:hly skilled labour or 
. -
professionals belonging to the hicher incor.le croup or capital 
invested abroad. The meaning of this form of capital will be 
enlarged when He consider financial inotitutions later 011. 
Capital owned by the poor is assuned to be only of one type and 
that it is used only for self employr:Jent. 
The production equations used ini tiall:{ are t~sswj1cd to be of 
the siI:lplest type i.e. that ,·:here output (value added) is 
reGarded as a function of capital only, and buocd upon fixed 
capital-output ratios. As often arl~ed, the justification for 
this lies in the overall scarcity of capital in the developing 
countries (in contrast to the abund~~ce of labour) as a factor 
of production. But skilled manpower is also a scarce factor, 
;a 
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and for this reason, a modified production function will be 
considered \-Then we discuss the incentive effect. ~;age and 
profitability parameters are assumed to be different for the 
tl'TO income croups. ¥li th regard to savings behaviour, a fixed 
savings rate is assumed for the rich (vlhich could be relaxed 
if necessary) and a proeressively rising savines rate for the 
poor in accordance with empirical observation: that is, a fixed 
mareinal propensity to save is assumed in respect of the poor. 
As in the case of the Chenery-Ahlm·ralia model, grmvth theory 
!!lade use of here is of the Ih.rroc1 type, and applied to the 
individual sectors. For purposes of completeness, we may note 
that the basic assumption in Harrod's approach are as follows: 
(a) the level of incoL1e is the most important 
determinant of the supply of savines; 
(b) the rate of increaoe of income is an 
importunt determinant of the demand 
for oavines; 
(c) demand for savincs equals the supply of 
savings. 
In addition it is assU!Jed tllat \'~e are in a 'one cood' '\-Torld, and 
that the capital-output ratios are const~t over the time span 
considered. Depreciation of the total c::!.pital ntock is ignored •.• 
The above are the ceneral features of the model. :'::>pccial 
features will be described wherever variations are discussed. 
4 3 The Nodel • 
The distribution of capital is aSBurned to be as fo110\'10: 
• 
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Kt 
1 = capital owned by the rich usine hired labour; 
y" \0.1 = capital mmed by the rich not using hired labour; 
RI\. 
2 = 
capital owned by the poor for self emploYI:lent; 
K~ = capital owned by c;overnment using hired labour. 
Following the Chenery-Ahlul'lt:l,lia model \Ie rJay regard K1' as ca.pital 
which employs only hiehly skilled labour from the hit~her income 
£:rOUP or as capital invested abroad or both. Vlhen financial 
institutions are introduced subsequently, the interpretation of 
K1 could be enlarged. 
The production functions are ass~uned to be of the Harrod type 
initially, and as mentioned previously the capital-output ratios 
are held constunt, durine the tir.1e opun conoidered. Then, the 
output eenerated by these stocks of capital are eiven by.the 
production equations: 
Q~ = a 1 K~ 
QI'l 
1 = b 1 
Rn 
"1 
(t ~ = b2 Kn 2 
e a r( (4.1 ) Q g = g "g ••• 
where the Q s denote the respective outputs and the a s and the 
b s are the correspondinc output-capital ratios. The subscript 
1 will denote the hiGher inCOMe Group, subscript 2 the lOi'ler 
income group and subscript g the Government • 
..~ . ''\ 
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The outputs (vulue added) so eenerated will be divided between 
wageD and profits. By virtu9 of employment in the modern sector 
both the rich and the poor will receive shares of the output Q~ 
as waGe incomes. Likewise, both the rich and poor will receive 
1'lage incomes from employment in covernment. 
Thus, wage income of the rich W1 = w11 
" " " 
where the ''I s are the Vlaec parruneters. In other ''lords w 11 is 
the proportion of Q~ accruing to the rich, w2l the proportion 
of Q~ accruing to the poor and so on. 
Likewise, the profit incomes accruille; to the rich, poor and 
government can be expressed as: 
Pl = P1 
Qf 
1 + Q"' 1 
P2 = rt ' 2 
Pe = Pe ()1 "g ••• (4.3) 
\-1here the p s are the profitability purametcrs. 
It should be noted that wace lmd profitability parameters are not 
independent of euch other an they represent shares ot' 'vaces nnd 
profits from total output. AccordinGly, they should add up so as 
'. 
• 
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to yield total output, which implies that 
w11 + "21 + P1 = 1 
and w1g + w2e + Pg = 1 (4.4) 
Adding equations (4.2) respectively to the first tvlO equations 
of (4.3) and writing the third eQuution of (4.3) separately, 
the total incomes of the rich, poor ~nd government are thus 
defined by 
Y _ Qe g - Pe g ••• 
Equations (4.1) Day nOH be nade UGC of to eliminate the Q s 
and to yield the followinG equations: 
Y1 = (w11 + P1 ) u1 K~ + b1 K; + vT le ae K,~ 
Y2 = \'121 a1 K~ + b2 K; + "12e ag K~ 
Y Tr.t g = Pg Ug l.B • • • 
These equations could also he vlri ttem in the mntrix form as 
follows 
o 
o o 
••• (4.8) 
--.. 
» 
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Thus the distribution of incomes is determined by the distribu-
tion of capitul stocks and the wace and profitability parameters. 
Or, in the languae;e of matrix algebra, the vector of incomes is 
determined by the product of the wace and profitability matrix 
and the vector of capital stockn • 
. 4.4 Static Considerations 
The picture presented by equations (4.7) is essentially 0. static 
one. nevertheless, there are certain policy implica.tions that 
could be deduced from these equations, subject to assumptions of 
validity (to be discussed later). ]?or e:~runple, vie could pose the 
question: whc.t sort of capital stoclc should be expanded in order 
to produce the ereatest ir.1Pu.ct on the incomes of the poor? 3ub.1 ect 
to thc sir.lplifying assumptions we have rrade, vIe could seek an 
answer to this Question by lockinc ut the second equation of (4.7) 
and e::amininG as to which type of capital ivhen expc.nded by a unit 
ar.:ount will brinR about the create8t impact upon the incor.r.e of 
the poor represented by Y2. l'he answer vlOuld obviously depend 
upon t:1e relative magnitude of the coefficients ",121 0.1 , b2 and W2g 
u. The coefficient b2 i:3 t}le output-co.pital ratio in self g 
employment and 0.1 is the oltput-ca.pital ratio in the modern 
sector. The coefficient i'121 < 1 by virtue of the definition of 
w21 as the proportion of waGes of the poor from the output Q~ 
1 
Suppone b2 > 't'121 0.1 ... 
-------
1 In fact b2 > w21 0.1 in the numerical examples c·onsidered later. 
" 
• 
.. f: 
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Further, it 1'10uld seem reasonable to assume that the output-
capital ratio ag in the government sector is lower than b2 in 
self employment. Even if it were not so, there is a strong 
possibility that b2 > w2g ag by virtue of w2e being less than 
one. Thus, so long as 
b2 ) w21 a1 
and b2 ) w2e ag • • • • (4.10) 
it would follO".'l that a unit expansion in K; will have a greater 
impact on the incooes of the poor than unit expansions in either 
Ki or K£. Thut is, from the standpoint of improving the incomes 1 g 
of the poor, policies which stimulate an increase of capital for 
self employment appear to be preferable to those that expand 
state capital. Capital for self employment could be ovmed either 
in co-operative form or individually. 
Another aspect we could discuss 011 the basis of equations (4.7) 
concerns nationalisation. Nationalisation involves transfer of 
capital assets from the private sector to the Government sector. 
Accordingly, let us assume that capital asoets worth I::. K~ is 
transferred from a stock of capital K~ ovmed by the rich to the 
stock of capital o'\'med by the government, namely K~. Then, from 
the oecond equation of (4.7), it follows that the change in incomeF. 
of the poor is given by 
••• (4.11) 
The change will be a positive one, i.e there "1ill be an increase 
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in the incomes of the poor as long as 
••• (4.12) 
Let us also assume that compensation paid is also of value A~ 
Then, if the rich decide to use this run01.Ult in increasing their 
stock of non linked capital, it follows from the first of 
equations (4.7) that the change in their incomes will be 
••• (4.13) 
Thus, the incomes of the rich can increase or re~ain unchanged 
or decrease according as 
••• (4.14) 
Admittedly, the above arguments have been carried out in an 
aggregative form. For illstWlce, we have assumed that the 
parameters and the output-capital ratios relutlllC to agcregate 
output hold good from activity generG.ted by A K~ • If there are 
appreciable differences in the parameters, then suitable adjust-
ments have to be made by replacing ti'lem \-/ith estinuites relevant 
to the output generated by l:l K1l • .Again caut :i.on is necessary in 
interpreting the inequality (4.12). ~lthoueh ag is generally 
less than 0.1, yet, since l'12g could be much {;reater than w21 , 
inequality (4.12) could hold. The coefficient w26 being much 
greater than w21 does not imply that '\'lorkors of a nationalised 
, ... , 
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venture will r..eceive an increase in . wages soon after nutionali-
sation. On the contrary, wage rates may be lower or at best 
remain the same. But a ereater number is likely to be employed. 
It is the share of wages of the workers including the new recruits 
that could be higher than before nationalisation. Thus a positive 
impact upon the incomes of the poor could take place through 
.. '. employment. 
A question which is difficult to answer in terms of the preceding 
analysis is \,lhether incor:le inequality ,\,lill increaoe or decrease 
after nationalisation. If inequality (4.12) holds and the incomes 
of the rich decrease according to (4.14), then obviously, income 
inequality will decrease. But according to inequalities (4.12) 
and (4.14), it is possible that incomes of both the rich and the 
poor could increase. In such a situation precise magnitudes are 
necessary in order to assess whether income inequality has increased 
or decreased. But how could both the incomes of the rich and the 
poor increane simultaneously? Such a possibility could take place 
if,after nationalisation, the sh~e of profits decrease and the 
share of waees increase, which implies a decreane in eovernment 
income. 
Before leaving the topic of nationalisation, it should be noted 
that a complete discussion cannot be carried out in terms of 0. 
simple model. The decision to nationalise a 'O:~rticular venture 
'. .! . 
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must necessarily be analysedin terms of the set of circumstances 
. peculiar to it and the related social benefits and costs. 
4.5 Dynamic Considerations 
The preceding discussions have resulted essentially from statio 
considerations of the model. \'lhat \'lould seem more important 
is to consider distributional questions over time. In order to 
do this the model must be developed into a dynamio one. The 
essential elements for this are the role of savings and capital 
aocumulation which are defined by the equations below. As 
mentioned earlier, Growth in each sector is assumed to be of 
the Harrod type. Equating investment to savings we get 
• 2 K1 = q s1 Y1 , 0 < q ~ 1 
• n (1 
- q)s1 Y1 K1 = 
· " K2 = So + s2 Y2 
• l Kg= sgY g ••• (4.15) 
where s1 = averaGe (and marginal) propensity to save of the rich, 
s2 = marginal propensity to save of the poor, 
So = constant term in savings function of the poor, 
s = averaGe (and marginal) propensity to save of, 
g government 
q = proportion of savings of the rich diverted to 
increase of K~ 
'. 
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It is further assumed that the averaee propensity to save of 
the poor does not exceed the average propensity to save of 
the rich. As in the Chenery-Ahluwalia model, it is assumed 
that once the income of the poor (in per capita terms) reaches 
the initial per capita income level of the rich (i.e. income 
at time t = 0), then the savings function of the poor will be 
'~.~, " the same as that of the rich. Such an assumption is necessary 
" 
so as to ensure that within the framework of the model, the 
savings rate of the poor does not at any time exceed the savings 
rate of the rich. 
To summarise,the main features of the model to be discussed are 
defined by the following equations, subject to the assumptions 
made in this section-
Y1 = (w11 + P1) a 1 K~ + b1 K; + w1g ag K~ 
Y2 = w21 a1 K~ + b2 K2 + w2g a Kt g g 
y = Pg a K~ • • • (4.7) g g g 
, l 
Y1 K1 = q s1 
• n 
K1 = (1-q) 8 1 Y1 
• n So + s2 Y2 K2 = 
• l Y (4.15) Kg = Sg • • • g 
• 
From the above equations, the K s could be eliminated to yield 
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a set of linear differential equations in the Y 8 so as to 
define the time paths of Y1' Y2, Ys . But before we do this, it 
is relevant to compare these equations with some of the results 
1 
of the Kaldor-Pasinetti model. For purposes of comparison, we 
should set 
get 
Y = o. g Then, by addition of equations (4.15) we 
= s1 Y1 + So + s2 (Y - ~),(Total income Y = Y1 + Y2) 
Therefore, 
and ~ 
Y 
I 
Y 
= 
= 
= 
(81 - 8 2 ) 
(s1 - s ) 2 
Y1 + So + s2 Y 
Y1 + sO+ s2 
- -Y Y 
+ 
This equation defines the distribution of income between the 
2 
rich and the poor. Equation (4.16) is the analogue of 
equation (8) in Pasinetti {1961 } 'ihich is 
Pc [3 1 ] I S = - w y -
- S Y S - S c w c w 
W'here Pc = income of capitalists, 
1 Refers to Kaldor's model of 1955 as corrected by Pasinetti 
later in 1961. 
2 If we set So = 0, then equation ' (4.16) becomes 
Y1 1 I _ 8 2 
y- = 81 - s2 Y s1 - s2 
"'hich is an exact analOgue of the Pasinetti equation. 
(4.17) 
I 
~..,-.-~~--------------------------~--------~~------------------------; , •• :~) :, './',.': ;-. ' I' ....... : ~ 1 
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S = average (and marginal) propensity to save of 
c capitalists, 
S = average (and marginal) propensity to save of workers. 
w 
Equation (4.16) is slightly more ceneral than the Pasinetti 
results since we have assumed that the rich derive income not 
only from profits but also from l'lages, and that the savings 
function of the poor is not a proportional savings function 
. but of the form specified in equation (4.15). As in Pasinetti's 
equation, the importance of the propensity to save of the poor 
in regard to the distribution of incomes is clearly demonstrated 
in equation (4.16). 
The Kaldor-Pasinetti approach also discusses the factors 
infl~encing the distribution of incomes between profits and 
wages. HO'\'lever, they did not procced to examine as to how the 
shares of income vary over time. The Chenery-Ahluwalia model . 
and this study attempt to examine distribution questions over 
time and in a sense may be considered to be extensions of the 
Kaldor-Pasinetti approach. 
4.6 (,trol'lth without flU'ther redistri but i ve meaSlU'es 
The object of this sectlon is to exnmine the time paths of 
the .incomes . Y1 ,Y2, nnd Ye as '\'lell as the relative income 
shares. The underlying assumption is that redistributive 
:-...... 
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measures have been and are operative: thus the Y s denote 
income shares that have resulted after the operat:Lon of the 
redistributive measures already introduced. But, it i8 also 
assumed that no further redistributive measures are introduced. 
We begin by differentiating the equations (4.7) to Get 
Y1 = (w11 + P1) a1 K~ + b1 i; + w1g ag K~ 
• • t Y - P a K g - egg . . . 
-t Eliminating K1, K; etc., using equattons (4.15) we get 
Y1 = [(W11 + P1 ) a1 q + (1 - q) b1J 81 Y1 + W1g ag se Yg 
. 
Y = pas Y g g g g g • •• (4.19) 
y 2 = Po + 0(2 Y 1 + fi 2 Y 2 + 12 Y g 
• •• (4.20) 
4- 25 
where 
~ = [CW11 + P1) 8 1 q + b1 (1 - q)] s1 
1'1 = w 8 s 19 g g 
C(2 = W21 a1 q s1 
Po = b2 So 
fo2 = b2 s2 
'(2 = W2 8 s g e e 
)'3 = p 8 s (4.21 ) g g g ••• 
Equations (4.20) is the set of linear simultaneous differential 
equations which represent the manner in which Y1' Y2 , Yg change 
over time; their solutions ''1ill reprenent the time paths of 
Y1' Y2 and Y{( Eut before proceedlng to solve these equations, 
there are some interesting observations that could be made. 
Let us trute the second equation of (4.20), divide throughout 
by Y2 and write it as 
/30 Y 
= + /3:2 + g( ....1. + Y2 2 Y2 
y 
..£ 
Yz 
••• (4.22) 
In the first instance, it is clear that the rate of bTowth of 
Y2 directly depends uponP2 i.e. b2 s2 indicating the importance 
of the marginal savings rates of the poor and the output per unit 
of capital ,\-1hich cO\11d be realised by their cap! tal stock, in 
" 
F . 
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the growth of their incomes. G-iven the other interdependencies 
assumed, it is obvious that the rate of growth of incomes of 
the poor depend upon the other variables as well. But the 
above equation attempts to spell out the nature of these inter-
dependencies. For example, the last term of equation (4.22) 
indicates that hieher the government income will be in relation 
to the income of the poor Y2' higher will be the growth rate of 
the income of the poor. But the impact of this term is diminished 
by the coefficient 12 i.e. 
later is much less than one. 
w2 as, which, as would be seen g g g 
The Wlderlying reason for the 
positive contribution made by this term can be traced to the wage 
income of the poor received from government activity; to the 
extent tha.t government income increases, there wO'.l.ld be an increase 
in waee income as well. Similarly, the third term ~2 :~ 
Y2 
indicates that there is a positive contribution to the growth 
rate of Y2 from the iIlcome of the rich. Once again this contri-
bution can be traced to the wage incomes received by the poor, 
by virtue of employment in establishments owned by the rich. 
The implication of this relationship is thut policy measures 
aimed at reducing Y1, without increases in Y2 or Yg (say for 
example withdrawal of certain incentives - to be di8cussed 
later), will adversely affect the growth of incomes of the poor. 
Such adverse effects could take the form of either 'holding 
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down' of waees or even lay offs. 
The above arguments should not be taken to imply that Y1 should 
Y2 
be increased in order to increase the growth rate of the income 
received by the poor. On the contrary, redistributive considera-
tions would prompt a higher Y2 in relation to Y1, i.e. a lower 
One must therefore examine the net effect on the growth 
• 
rate ~ arising out of the positive contribution due to an 
Y2 increase in Y1 and a negative contribution resulting from a 
lowering Of:1. In order to discuss such questions, the 
Y2 differential equations have to be solved in the first instance. 
Thereafter, we could trace the behaviour pattern of Y1 over time y 
and examine the consequence of further redistributive2 measures 
vis-a-vis GTowth of incomes. 
Equations (4.20) is a set of linear simultaneous differential 
equations, the solution to ",hich could be easily fOWld as (see 
Appendix IV for solution) 
Y1 = rY1 - '1'1 Ye; ] l 1'3 - (l(1 
"'It e + 
{Y1 - '5'1 Y g l, -ocl ) 
. , 
'., • T ~~ •• , 
4 - 2f3 
••• (4.23) 
The above equations represent the time paths of Y1' Y2 and Yg • 
Given the interdependencies assumed in the very formulation of 
the model, it is obvious that the ero,\>lth of income of one group 
will depend upon that of the other. But the above solution 
shows in detail the nature of the interdeT)endencies. For example 
the first equation in (4.22) can be written as 
+ '1 Yg ( el~t _ e o<.,t ) 
'3 - «1 • • • 
Thus, the income of the rich at a given point of time depends 
not only upon the parameter «1 defined by the first equation 
in (4.21) but also upon the rate of grol'lth of government income 
03' the exact functional form being shown by the above 
equation. An interesting feature is thnt irrespective of 
whether 03 is greater or less than ~1 the second term of equation 
(4.24) is ahlays positive indicatinG a positive contribution to 
Y1 from the growth of government income. Suppose '63 = 0 (i.e. 
no grO'\'lth of government income), then the second term reduces to 
~ Y lit 
1 g-
0<.1 
which is positive. The explanation for the positive contribution 
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could be traced to the wage income of the rich received from 
the government a part of which is saved and invented so as to 
increase the total income of the rich at a growth rate of ~. 
The solution (4.23) exists even when ~1 -+ 13; it is not 
undefined due to the presence of (13 - ~1) in the denominator 
of the second term. It could be shown that the second term 
~xists and is positive, as follows: 
Let Z1 ) • • • 
Let c<, = 13 + 6 , where 6 is a small positive 
quantity. 
Lt 
cS-.o 
- y~t 
Using the Hean Value Theorem, ~::, ~1 = 11 Y g e 
0< '1 (6 
(4.26) 
Thus, when ~1 approaches ~3' the solution (4.24) exists and the 
second term on the right assumes a limiting value of t ¥'1 Ye eT~t 
which is positive. Alternatively, in solving the differential 
equation in Y1, with «1 = ~3 it could be shown that t¥1 Yg e~t 
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is the particular intee;ral (see note at the end of Appendix IV). 
The above result has no special significance. For, it merely 
means that if ~1 which is the main parameter associated with 
the growth of incomes of the rich (Y1) is equal to Y, which is 
the rate of growth of government income, there will be a 
positive contribution to the growth of Y1 from the growth of 
government income. 
As in the preceding analysis, we could re-arrange terms and 
write the second equation in (4.23) as: 
+ & (e,A~t: - 1) + _rX...;;2 ___ fY1 
(32 0(1 - (.'2 \ 
... 
It is clear from the above equution that the growth of incomes 
of the poor depends in the first instance upon the parameter (32 
which as defined in equations (4.21) is the product b2 s2 where 
b2 is the output-capital ratio and s2 is the marginal savings 
rate of the poor. This Signifies the role of self reliance 
" 
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namely tha.t the poor \<Till have to save more and invest in order 
<. 
to cenerate greater output. 
Secondly, equation (4.27) shows that the growth of incomes of 
the poor also depends on the parameters ~ and 1'3. As in the 
case of the preceding analysis, it could be shown that the third 
term in the above equation is positive 1 whether or not ~ is 
bTeater than~; the same applies to the fourth term of the 
above equation. Thus,there are positive contributions accruing 
to the income of the poor from the growth of government income 
and income of the rich. Once again, these positive contributions 
could be traced to the wage increases received by the poor by 
virtue of employment in the private sector nod in government. 
Although these contributions are positive, a relevant question 
to ask at this stage is what would happen to Y2 if say ex, is 
reduced? In order to examine this question a first approximation 
has to be made, namely to i~~ore 
and ~~1 
)'3 - 0(1 
2 
°1 Ye (see 
13 - ~ 
would appear from the subsequent numerical 
is the dominrult term in {_ ~ y } 
Yl - 1 f'j 
~3 - ex, 
footnote) c 
examples that 
by virtue of which it is positive. Further,it is clear that 
2SubSequent numerical examples will show that this term is much 
smaller than 62• 
" " 
, ' /~ " . 
; 
.i.~ 1tft"rt-- .. (.~, 14t.J·il~. " 
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Subject to this approximation, the third term reduces to 
~ Y1 (e",,1: _ e,s~t) 
~ - f!>2 
Let us write 
z = •••• 
At any point of time t, the behaviour of Z in relation to the 
cpanges in ~ has to be determined in terms of the partial 
derivative 
l(~ -~) t - 1] "" t + e (\:'t 3Z = 
-a 0<.1 
= e~:a.t 
Clearly, e th t > 0 
e 
(0<1 - f3z.)2. 
[{~1 -f22) t - 1} 
(ex; - ~2)2 
(IX,-t31.)t 
e + ~ ••• (4.29) 
• Therefore the sign of az 
~ 
would depend upon the sign of the expression within square 
brackets. - \le may write this expression as 
v = (ht - 1)eht + 1 ••• 
where h = ~1 - ~2 
It could be shown that V ~ 0 for all ht as follOY1B: 
Let us denote ht by x for cOllvenience and write (4.30) as 
V=rf (x-1)+1 
••• 
\ofhen x = O,v= 0. i'herefore curve passes through origin. 
gy: = e~ + 
dx 
eX (x - 1) = xex = 0 when x ' = 0, and 
" 
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there is a t~ning pOint at x = 0 
. 
. . 
d " V = xeX + eX = 1 when :x = 0 
dx2 
The turning point at x = 0 is a minimum point • 
v ~ 0 for all x i. e. for all ht_ 
Behavior of V 
v 
------.-..:::-~------)x 
Alternatively, this result follows from a first approximation 
of (4.30) For, 
V ==(ht - 1) (1 + ht) + 1 
1. 1 
= (ht) - 1 + 1 = (ht) ~ 0 ••• (4.31) 
It should be noted that this result holds good irrespective of 
whether ht ) 0 or not i.e. irrespective of whether ~1 is greater 
or less thanfo2- Going back to equation (4.29) it follows that 
~Z > 0 and consequently that a¥1 > 0 . 
-~ a~ 
Thus an attempt to lower oc1 will result in lowering Y2. The 
parameter ~ is the main parameter associated with the growth 
of incomes of the rich and is defined in terms of several 
other parameters as shown in equations (4.21). For example 
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tt, . 
a low er inBA of could take place throueh a lowering of s1 or w11 
or P1. The policy implication of this result is that measures 
designed to curb the growth of incomes of the rich will have a 
negative impact upon the income of the poor. Since the poor 
receive an employment income from the rich, the negative impact 
could take the form of slowing down expansion of employment or 
even lay offs if ~1 is sufficiently lowered. 
4.7 Tests for Validity of the Nodel 
As mentioned earlier, the derivation of policy implications 
and related discussions have been carried out subject to 
assumptions of the validity of the model. The validity of a 
model depends upon the extent to which it can explain empirical 
reality. In the model developed herein, we have taken into 
account some of the relevant factors. Accordingly, the validity 
of the model would depend upon obtaining some form of explanation 
of empirical observations. One empirical result with which the 
model could be t 'ested is the Kuznets curve discussed 
earlier, according to. which as a low income country develops, 
inequality of income tends to increase at first, reach a maximum 
and then decrease. In other '-lords, income inequality should 
trace an inverted "U" shape over time. We should investigate as 
to whether the model developed can in general trace such a path 
- in other .words, whether in general terms such a pattern is 
implicit in the model. 
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Since we have considered on.ly two income group~, we may use the 
ratio ~ as a measure of inequality and investigate the behaviour 
Y2 
of this ratio over time. The behaviour pattern can be analysed 
by means of numerical examples. But before we do so, we could 
examine the behaviour pattern in analytical terms but subject to 
certain first approximations. 
where 
The solution (4.23) can be written as 
Y
1 
= A1 eo(lt + C1 e',3t 
A1 = {y 1 - ~1 Y c: } 
~3 -') 
~ {Y1 - ~1 Yg } ~ - (32 ~3 -~ 
B2 = Y 2 + ~ - <X2 1 'y - ~ 1 Ye J 
(32 ~ - ~2 l 1 ~ 3 - cX.1 
•••• 
•••• 
'. ". 
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As could be seen from the subsequent numorical analysis, 01 and 
. C2 are much smaller in magnitude in relation to A1 and A2 • 
dingly as a first approximation we could write Y1 and Y2 as 
Accor-
Let Y =3 A2 ecl..l'I: 
Y1 
= 
1.e . A A e-o(lt' 
. 2 0 y=----
A1 (32 A1 
For turning pOints, 
!tt 
dt 
i.e 
= 
i.e t =.J.. loge 
~2 
1 Further, U = 
dtl. 
When t = 1 Iou 
- °e ~ 
• •• (4.34) 
- A + B e"z~ 
. 0 
(32 
A eo(l't 
1 
!2 e(P:a.-OlI)t + ••• (4.35) 
A1 
+ D ( A2 0<.) (l3z-~I)t 0 2 f: - 1 e = 
A1 
• •• (4.36) 
+ B 2 ( f-2 - 0(1 ) 2 
17 
, 
", 
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> o provided fa < 0, (A" <X1 ) 0) . 
Thus,y i.e. Y2 will have a minimum point when t assumes the 
Y7 
value given by equation (4.36). That is, 
Y1 will have a maximum pOint when t 
.y 
2 
assumes this value. The path traced 
by Y1 will thus be of the inverted 
V; 
"U" shape as shown in Fig. 4.2 
o Fieure 4.2 
Therefore, we may conclude that the model is capable of 
generating the Kuznets pattern. 
The dynamic properties of the model could be best illustrated 
in numerical terms as in the case of the Chenery-Ahluwalia 
exercise. They observed that there are no country studies aB 
yet that provide estimates of all parameters required by the 
model. This is precisely the case in the present exercise -
more so in regard to the Sri Lanka situation where the data 
base suffers from numerous weakness ~s in the case of many a 
developing country. Following the Chenery-Ahluwalia approach, 
t 
a 
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there is no option but to introduce plausible values of parameters. 
However, in arriving at values ot certain parameters, income dis-
tr1bution data and related information were used as best as possible 
In instances where difficulties were encountered, the use of 
plausible values based on judgement was found to be inevitable. 
One of the specific points we wish to examine is as follows: 
Assuming that Sri Lanka is a typical developing country, what 
should be the expected pattern of change of income distribution 
over time? If this expected pattern has not in fact taken place 
in the past, we shall then have to explain the departure from the 
pattern. 
Notes and explanations regarding the estimation of the parameters 
are set out in Appendix V. Let us now consider the first set of 
values ot parameters eiven below. 
a1 = 0.30 
w11 = 0.1 
w1g= 0.2 
s1 = 0.2 
q = 0.6 
y = 38 
Set 1 
b1= 0.32 
w21 = 0.4 
w2g= 0.6 
So = -4 
b2 = 0.29 
P1 = 0.5 
Pg = 0.2 
s2 = 0.17 
Y = 10 g 
a = 0.25 
B 
Sg=0.10 
i.e Y1' Y2' Yg are expressed as percentages of total income 
Rs.11,300 (see Appendix V tor details) 
s 
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Substitution .,of these values in equations (4.21) yield 
0(1 = 0.047 't1 = 0.005 
(32 = 0.049 (30 = -1 .12 
When these values are in turn substituted in equations (4.33) 
we get 
&. = -22.9 
f!'2 
Therefore Yg = 
Ct = -1.2 
Y1 = 39.2 eO.047t -1.2 eO.005t 
Y
2 
= 22.9 + 306.9 eO.049t -274.4 eO.047t -3.4 eO.005t 
Using the first a})proxlrnations made in the preceding analysis 
y = ~ = 0.58 e-O.047t + 7.83 eO.002t -7.00 
Y1 
The condition ~ = 0 for a turning point yields 
dt 
e 0.049t = 1.738 
i.e t ~ 11.2 years 
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We may check this result with that obtained below. 
Giving values t = ',2,3 etc., the values of Y, and Y2 could be 
calculated and the behaviour of 2 and Y, over time 
Y2 Y, + Y2 
could be traced out as follows: 
Table 4.2 
Changes in values of Y1 and Y2 over time (Set ,) 
t Y, Y2 5. Y1 
Y2 Y1 + Y2 
, 39.850 54.191 0.73592 0.4239 
2 41 .851 56.501 0.74071 0.4255 
3 43.917 58.997 0.74439 0.4267 
4 46.083 61.629 0.74775 0.4278 
5 48.354 64.426 0.75054 0.4287 
6 50.734 67.397 0.75276 0.4295 
7 53.229 70.553 0.75445 0.4300 
8 55.844 73.903 0.75562 0.4304 
9 58.585 77.465 0.75628 0.4306 
10 61.459 81.245 0.75647 0.4307 
11 64.471 85.258 0.75619 0.4306 
12 67.628 89.517 0.75548 0.4306 
13 70.938 94.037 0.75436 0.4300 
14 74.407 98.834 0.75285 0.4295 
15 78.043 103.924 0.75096 0.4289 
16 81.855 109.324 0.78462 0.4282 
17 85.850 115.053 0.74618 0.4273 
18 90.037 121.218 0.74332 0.4264 
19 94.426 127.570 0.74019 0.4254 
20 99.026 134.401 0.73680 0.4242 
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As seen from Table 4.2, the turning points of ~ and 
Y2 
are reached at t = 10, which is close to the result obtained 
through a first approximation. 
In the above table (Y1 + Y2) increases from 90 at t = 0 to 
142.704 at t = 10, representing an increase of 58.56 per cent 
or an average annual growth rate of approximately 5 per cent. 
The implication of the result is that if we regard Sri ,Lanka as 
a typical developing country with a per capita income of less 
than US $200, we should expect income inequality to widen over 
ten years in reaching a maximum. 
Similar results could be obtained by assib~ing alternative values 
to the parameters. For inotance, if we assign b2 the value 0.30 
instead of 0.28 and leave all other values unchanged, ~2 changes 
to 0.51 andfo to -1.2, the turning point occurs at t = 9 years 
approximately. But certain dramatic changes can be observed as 
the difference between ~1 and ~2 widens. This result could be 
easily deduced from equation (4.36). For, the functional form 
would indicate that as (~ -«1) increases, a sharp decrease could 
be expected in t. In order to illustrate this point let us now 
consider another set of values of the parameters which differs 
from the first set only in respect of b2 and s2-
. 
'. 
Y1 = 38 
a1 = 0.30 
w11 = 0.10 
w' 19 = 0.20 
s1 = 0.20 
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Set 2 
Y2 
b1 = 0.32 
w21 = 0.4 
w2g = 0.6 
So = -4 
= 52 Ye 
b2 = 0.30 
P1 = 0.5 
P2 = 0.2 
s2 = 0.18 
= 10 
s = 0.10 g 
q = 0.6 
~ubstitution of these values in equation (4.21) yields 
~ = 0.047 
Gt2 = 0.014 
'63 = 0.005 
'(1 = 0.005 
~ = 0.054 ,80 = -1.2 
When these values are in turn substituted in equations (4.33) 
we get 
A1 = 39.2 
A2 = -78.4 
Y = 10 e 0.005t 
g 
01 = -1.2 
B2 = 111.5 
{!:Q = -22 (32 
Y1 = 39.2 eO.047t - 1.2 eO.005t 
Y2 = 221+ 111.5 eO.054t - 78.4 eO.047t _ 3.1 eO.005t 
" 
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Giving value~ t = 1,2,3 etc., the results obtained were as 
follows: 
Table 4.3 
Changes in the values of Y1 and Y2 over time 
(Get 2) 
t Y1 Y2 Y1 Y1 
-Y2 Y1 + Y2 
1 39.880 54.398 0.73312 0.4230 
2 41 .851 56.958 0.73477 0.4236 
3 43.917 59.689 0.73576 0.4236 
4 46.083 62.604 0.73610 0.4240 
5 48.354 65.713 0.73584 0.4239 
6 50.734 69.029 0.73497 0.4236 
7 53.229 72~565 0.73354 0.4231 
8 55.844 76.335 0.73156 0.4225 
9 58.585 80.353 0.72910 0.4217 
10 61.459 84.636 0.72616 0.4207 
As seen from the above table, the turning point occurs at 
t = 4. Similarly, if the exercise is repeated with s1 set at 
0.19 instead of 0.20, the turning point occurs at almost t = o. 
In other words, changes that increase «(32- "'1) tend to shorten 
the time taken to reach the turnine point; if the chnnces are 
large enoueh, the time taken may be insignificant, or may even 
take a negative value, indicating thnt the turning point has 
already taken place. In such a situation the Kuznets pattern 
,' .''?S ' 
" 
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(the inverte~ "un shape of income inequality over time) could 
become indiscernible and the dominant ~attern produced by the 
model would be one of a steady trend towards equality for the 
period under consideration. The indiscernability of the 
Kuznets pattern is also an extreme case that the model ought 
to contain. However, this special feature could be traceable 
to strong redistributive forces. Accordingly we shall in the 
next section, generalise the model a step further so as to 
accommodate strone and explicit redistributive measures. The 
object of this generalisation is to develop the model so that 
whilst it willbe capable of producing the Kuznets pattern in 
general it will also be possible to generate an extreme case 
that could correspond to the Sri Lanka context. For, income 
inequality in Sri Lanka has diminished in the recent past 
although in terms of the Kuznets pattern, income inequality 
should have increased sin.ce the per capita income in Sri I.o.nka 
was well below the US $200 level in tl, e 1960s, on the assump-
tion that the estimates of the relevant parameters are ap.proxi-
mately correct. 
4.8 Gro'-1th with further Redistributive NeaslU'es. 
As noted in section 4.3 the model hus been developed on the 
assumption that certain redistributive measures "tTere operative. 
In this section we shall introduce explicit redistributive 
measures into the model. In order to do this '\',e shall have to 
.' t. ...  r-' ..... 
", 
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go back to e~~ations (4.7) and effect the followine modifications: 
Y1 = [(w11 + P1) a Kl 1 1 + b1 K; + w1g ag K~](1 _ A) 
Y2 K~ 
n. .l 
= w21 a1 1 + b2 K1 + w2g ag Kg + 
). f(w 11 + P1) a1 Kt 1 + b1 K
n 
1 + w a X
2J 19 g g 
... 
The first tl-l0 equations represent a transfer of a proportion A 
6f the income of the rich to the poor; government income Y g 
remains unaffected. Thus Y1' Y2 , Yg now represent incomes 
resulting from this transformation. An implicit assumption 
here is that the rich and the poor do not reverse roles over 
the time span consldered. The plauoibili ty of thi.s assumption 
is shown by the results of section 4.8 and of Chapter 7. 
The capital accumulation equations are: 
• t K1 = q s1 Y1 
• t K = s Y g g g • • • 
Differentiating equations (4.37) with respect to t, eliminating 
the K s by the use of equations (4.38) and by further 
simplification, we eet: 
. ·t ,. .' . .:; .~' . ~.,:, 
" 
., 
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• 
Y1 = oc,(1 -A) Y1 + ''(1 (1 - A) Y g 
• (0(2 + ;\.0(1 ) Y2 = Y1 + (30 + (32 Y2 + (12 + A °1 ) Y g 
• y 
= °3 Yg ••• (4.39) g 
where ~, '!1' ~, (30' ~, 12 , ~3 are defined as before by 
equations (4.21 ) 
~quations (4.39) are clearly of the same form as equations 
(4.20); the only chancre relates to the ~arameters. If we 
I I I 
denote the neu parameters by ~, '(1' C)(2 and so on, then the 
changes in the parameters could be represented in matrix 
form as follows: 
, 
(1 - A ) 0( 0 0 0 0 0 0 0<. 
1 1 
¥,' 
1 0 (1-.>.)0 0 0 0 0 ~1 
~ A- 0 1 0 0 0 0 (;(2 
(3~ = 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 (30 
f3~ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 132 
"'6' 2 0 A 0 0 0 1 0 '2 
0' 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 °3 ••• (4.40) 
The presence of only two non-dineonal elements in the above 
matrix indicates that the income transfer considered here ts 
about the simplest possible. It is also clear that when we 
set A= 0, we get back the previous model as a particular 
': j • 
", 
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case. In this senee, the above model coulu be regarded as a 
generalization of the previous model by one step. 
The behaviour pattern of income inequality in Sri I,anka in 
the recent past, namely the steady trend towards equality 
could be obtained from the model by hypothesising as follows: 
Redistributive policies in Sri Lanka have been sufficiently 
strong so that A which represents their impact assumes a 
high value. As a result, 0<.; diminishes in relation to 0<.1 by 
a factor (1 -A). Therefore the factor (P2 - o<.~) increases in 
relation to (P2 - ~1). The net effect of this change is to 
advance the time taken for the turnine point so that the 
Kuznets pattern becomes indicernible during the period con-
cerned. Thus the dominant feature iD one of a steady trend 
towards equality. 
In order to test this argument in a proper manner, we should 
in the first instance obtain a satisfp.ctory esticate of A. 
Such an estimate has to take acc01Ult of several redistribu-
tive policies such as taxes, pricine of agricultural products, 
wage policies and other social welfare measures. In viel'l of 
the obvious difficulties associated with such an exercise, we 
~hall in the alternative assign a few plausible values to A 
and study the dynamic properties of the model. These values 
of will be conoidered alonG with the values of parameters in 
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Set 2 of the previous section. 
Case I A. = 0.1 
C(~ =a,(1 -~) = 0.047 x 0.9 = 0.042 
G; = ~ (1 - A) = 0.005 x o. 9 = 0.0045 
~~ = ~2 + A~1 = 0.014 + 0.047 x 0.1 - 0.019 
r; = (2 + ;U1 = 0.015 + 0.005 x 0.1 - 0.016 
~he transformation (4.40) leaves the other parameters unchaneed. 
Accordingly, 
I I I P2 = 0.054, ~O = -1.2, t3 = 0.005 
On the basis of the 1963 income distribution pattern (see Table 
2.2 in Chapter 2), the following estimates of Y1' Y2' Yg seem 
plausi.ble: 
Y = 10 g 
Using equations (4.33), we get 
From equation (4.36), the time tal~en to reach the turnine point 
is given by 
t = 1 log ~ e 
, I 
c(1 {30 
(.I.' ( 0(' - (3' ) 
fwl2 1 2 2 
= 1 loee (0.778) 
0.054 
= 1 (-0.25) = -4.6 years • • • 
0.054 
; .. , 
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The interpretation of this result is that the turning point has 
already occurred. Therefore the pattern exhibited from t = 0 
onwards will be one of a steady trend towards equality. 
Case II .A= 0.15 
I (1 -A ) Then ~= ct1 = 0.047 x 0.85 = 0.04 
'61' = 
.~ 
1 (1 - A) = 0.005 x 0.85 = 0.0043 
~ = lX2 + A~ = 0.014 + 0.047 x 0.15 = 0.021 
,,' 2 = )'2 + A t1 = 0.015 + 0.005 x 0.15 = 0.016 
I I 
,,' As before, (32 = 0.054, (30 = .;.1.2, = 0.005 3 
and Y1 = 47, Y2 = 43, Y = 10 g 
Using equations (4.33) we get 
13 2 = 96 
From equation (4.36), the time trucen to reach the turnine point 
is given by 
t = .J.. 
(3~ 
= -1-- loge (0.662) 
0.054 
= 1 ( -0.412) 
0.054 
=-7.6 years ••• 
Once again the result indicates that the turning point has already 
occUrred. As in Case I, the pattern exhibited from t = 0 onwards 
is one of a steady trend tOllards equality. 
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Similar results could be obtained by assigning other values to 
:A. 
It was shown in the previous section that the model is capable 
of predicting the empirically observed Kuznets pattern. If Sri 
Lanka was a typical developing country, in terms of the ICuznets 
pattern, income inequality should have increased in the recent 
past since the per capita income level was well below the US $ 
200 level assuming that our estimates of the relevant parameters 
are approximately correct. However, the actual pattern observed 
in the case of Sri ,Lanka is a steady trend towards reduction of 
income inequality in the recent past. This pattern has been 
achieved throueh the implementution of a number of redistributive 
measures in the recent past. On generalising the model in this 
section so as to include specific redistributive measures, it is 
found that the model is capable of eenerating the Sri Lanka 
pattern too. This takes place through an advancing of the turnine; 
point so that the behaviour predicted by the model for the period 
in question is one of decreasing ineq,uali ty. 
Let us no'" proceed to investieate a more important aspect, namely 
the behaviour of total income as defined by Y1+ Y2 with respect to 
increasing values of .A. This could be carried out by assigning 
different values toA in equation (4.39) and obtaining the respec-
PEt....... . f ' . ,;,:, 
" 
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tive solutions. But these equations are of the same form as 
equation (4.20); therefore we could use the solutions of 
equations (4.20) as defined by equations (4.32) and (4.33) 
with parameters appropriately transformed by equation (4.40). 
The general form of the basic solution is: 
Y1 = A1 e"I't: + C1 e""t: 
Y2 = A2 
<!lIt & + B2 efl2t + C2 l'3 t e - e (32 
y = y e",?;t • • • (4.43) g ,B 
Where A1, C1, A2 , B2 and 02 are defined by equations (4.33) 
in which the parameters oc" )'1' 0(2' ~O' (32' ~2 and ~ assume 
values in terms of transformation (4.40). As seen from Case I 
and II discussed above this transformation changes the values 
of ~, °1, ""'2 and r2 but leaves the values of tb, f 2 , and ~3 
Wlchanged. 
By assigningA the values of 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20 and 0.25 in 
succession, the coefficients of equation (4.43) were calculated 
and the results are shown in Table 4.4. 
'., .' 
," 
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Table 4.4 
Coefficients of Equation (4.43) 
)., Al Cl A2 B2 C2 
0( (32 1 
0.05 39.192 -1.192 39.006 -21.399 -5.607 0.04484 0.028 
0.10 39.201 -1.201 51.763 -34.350 -5.413 0.04248 0.028 
0.15 39.210 -1.210 69.491 -52.299 -5.192 0.04012 0.028 
0.20 39.221 -1.221 95,802 -78.862 -4.940 0.03776 0.028 
0 •. 25 39.234 -1.234 138.910 -122.262 -4.648 0.03540 0.028 
(Note: The values of the basic parameters used are 
the same as those of Set 1, except for 
b2 = 0.28 and B2 = 0.1. The change in value 
of the latter parameters '·lill enable us to 
Bee more clearly the consequences of appreciahle 
differences betvleen the savings rates of the rich 
and the poor). 
"3 
0.005 
0.005 
0.005 
0.005 
0.005 
Substituting the above values of the coefficients in equation 
(4.43), and setting t = 0, the respective values of Yl' Y2 (Yl + Y2 ) 
and Y1/Y2 were obtained. The results are shown in Table 4.5 and 
the corresponding gr~phs in Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. As evident 
from equation (4.43) there is no change in Y ''11th respect to g 
A. It should be noted that the results in Table 4.5 are not 
strictly comparable 'i'lith those in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 because of 
the difference in the parameter s2. In section 4.6 the values of 
B2 were taken as 0.17 and 0.18 respectively, 'l-lhereas in the 
present excercise the value was taken as 0.1 in order to demon-
strate more clearly the consequences of a wide difference between 
the savings rates of the rich and the poor. 
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, Table 4.5 
Values of Y1' Y2, (Y1 + Y2), (Y1/Y2 ) at t = 10 
A Y1 Y2 Y1 + Y2 Y1/Y2 
0.05 60.090 66.843 126.933 0.899 
0.10 58.686 68.019 126.705 0.863 
0.15 57.293 69.137 126.430 0.829 
0.20 55.931 70.216 126.147 0.797 
0.25 54.602 71.257 125.859 0.766 
Behaviour of Y 1 and Y2 with respect to A . (t- 10) 
70.0 
65.0 
60.0 
.- ~ 
--.----.... y 1 
e-.. 
55.0 . -~ 
50,0 
o 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 
Figure 4.3 
J K 
4 - 54 
.. Behaviour of (Y,+Y2) with respect to A (to 10) 
" 
126.5 
126.0 
125.5~ ____ ~ ____ ~ ______ ~ ____ ~ ____ ~ ____ ~ 
o 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 
Figure 4.4 
Behaviour of Y,/Y2 "lith respect to A.(t=10) 
0.85 
0.75 ~ ____ ~ ____ ~ ____ ~ ____ ~~ ____ ~ __ ~ 
o 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 
Fieure 4.5 
" 
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As shovTn in Figure 4.3, the behaviour of Yl with increasi.ng A-
is one of a steady decline; in contrast Y2 steadily increases. 
Figure 4.5 shows that the level of income inequality as repre-
sented by Y1/Y2 decl ·i.nee steadily as >"increas~s. Total income 
too, as repreoented by (Y1 + Y2) declines steadily with A. The 
overall relationship we obtain is one of a decline in total income 
with increasing income redistribution from the rich to the poor. 
Thus, income redistribution and growth of total income emerge 
as competing objectives. The underlying reason is the diminution 
in total savings due to the difference in the rates of savings of 
the rich and the poor. 
4.9 Redistribution of Consumption 
The system of redistribution considered in the previous section 
essentially consists of a direct transfer of income from the rich 
to the poor. One ir:lmed.iate consequence of sl.lch a transfer is 
that there would be a loss in total savines of the community. 
For, "le have assumed that the marginal savings rate of the rich 
is higher than the marginal savings rate of the poor (i.e 
sl ) s2). As a result, for every sum AY1 transferred, the loss 
in total savings \'1Ould amount to AIl (sl - 6 2). Since the 
growth processes di9.cussed in terms of our model have been 
essentially ba~ed on savings and investment, it follows that a 
loss of savir.gs will lead to a diminution in the growth of total 
income. This effect could be quantified in terms of our model 
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as would be seen subsequently. In this context a question that 
could be posed concerns the desirability or otherwise of alter-
native redistributive systems. For, it was noted at the very 
outset that considerable progress has been made in Sri Lanka in 
achieving a more equitable distribution of income and that it may 
be desirable to ensure that growth is not impaired in pursuing 
further redistributive policies. One such approach ·in this 
direction would be to consider a programme of redistribution which 
leo.ves the total savings of the community unaffected. Such a 
system of redistribution amounts to a redistribution of consump-
tion, of the type discussed by Codippily {1974}. It l~ould follow 
from the argument set out therein that there would be no loss in 
total savings if the redistributive system is such that: 
the rich loose ~Y1' 
the poor gain c 1/q 2 AY and 
the eovernment retains (1 - c 1 /c 2 ) AY1 for investment, 
whereAY1 = amount of income transferred from the rich, 
Cl = 1 - sl = marginal propensity to consume of the rich, 
" " " 
It 
" " poor. 
The entire scheme of changes in income, consumption cUld savings 
are as follows: 
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" Income 
The rich 
The poor 
The Government (1 - ~) AY1 
c2 
Consumption 
o 
Savings 
-(1 - c )flY 1 1 
(1 - C2)~6Y1 
c2 
An implicit assumption here is that there already exists a system 
of direct and indirect taxes ~d other sources of income to meet 
the recurrent expenditure of the government and that any income 
in excess of this could be completely saved and invested. This 
assumption could be somewhat relaxed as shown by Codippily {1974} 
and the general lines of the argument will be essentially the 
same if in place of the government we introduce a corporate 
sector with a high marginal propensity to save. 
It could also be shown (see Codippily {1974 ; pp. 22-231 ) that 
the above system of redistribution leads to an improvement in 
based on cons'->mption 
total l'lelfaref. as long as the marginal utility of consumption of 
the poor exceeds that of the rich. The latter condition would 
in fact hold good if the utility function is concave £lS generally 
assumed in the literature. Since a system of consumption redis-
tribution could lead to a welfare improvement and at the same time 
leave total savings unchanged, we shall, as a next step attempt to 
incorporate this system into our model. 
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Before we proceed further, there is one point that needs to 
be explained. Although a scheme of consumption redistribution 
ensures no losses in total savings, it does not follow that the 
erowth rate of total income will also remain unchanged. For, 
the output-capital ratios relntin~ to investments made by the 
rich, the poor and the government differ in general. Therefore, 
in general there would be changes in the growth of total income 
although total savings remain unchanged. 
In order to incorporate a system of connumption redistribution 
into our model we have to go back to equations (4.37) and 
modify these equations as follOvTs: 
Y1 = [(w11 + P1) a 1 K; + b1 K~ + w1g ag K:J (1 ->-.) 
1. n 2-Y2 = w21 a1 K1 + b2 K2 + w2e aB Kg 
+ .:J.A [(w11 + P1) a 1 K~ + b1 Kt + w1 g ag K~] 
c2 
Yg= Peag K:+ (1 - .=t)A [(w11 + P1 ) 0.1 K~ +b1 K~ 
c2 
. J..] 
+ w1 n K g g 6 • • • 
In view of the special condition that the amount retained by 
government goes directly into investment, the capital accumula-
tion equations have to be modified as follows: 
. : .... .. -: .. 
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• t q .. s1 y 1 K1 = 
. (1 - q) K = s1 Y1 1 
on So + s2 Y2 K2 = 
• l 
S (p a Kl) + (1 
- c1 ) A [(''111 + P1) Kt K = a 1 g g g g g 
-
1 
c2 
+ b K f\ + w a Kt] 1 1 19 g g • • • 
Using the last of equations (4.44), the factor p a K could g B g 
be e~iminated and the last of equations (4.45) could be written 
as 
• • • 
But from the first of equations (4.44), it is clear that 
( ) Kt IT n a }~l -_ 1 Y w11 + P1 a1 1 + b1 ~1 + w1g e .g 1 1 - A • •• 
(4.47) 
Therefore equation (4.46) could be written as 
it = s [Y - (1 - c 1 ) AY] + ( 1 - _c 1 ) A. Y 1 g g g - 1 c2 1 - A c2 1 -).. 
i.e i 2 = s Y + ( 1 - s ) (1 -~) g g g g A 1 - A • • • (4.48) 
Although c1 and c2 differed in the equations of the previous 
sections as l'1ell, yet this difference was not reflected in 
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equation (4.37). Therefore the particular case of c1 = c2 would 
leave equation (4.37) unaffected. If we set c1 = c2 in the 
above equations, it could be seen that we get back equations 
(4.37) and (4.38). In this sense, the above equations could be 
regarded as a further generalization of the equations (4.37) and 
• Differentiating equations (4.44), eliminating the K s by use of 
equations (4.45) and (4.48) and by further simplification we get 
y 1 = [0(;1 ( 1 -).) + 1 .A. 0'1 ] Y 1 + (1 -A)o'1 Yg 
Y 2 = [~ + ~.l 0(1 + '1. A )'2 + 
c2 1 -A 
Yl c 1 X '( ] Y 1 +130 + (32 Y 2 c
2 
( 1 _)..) 1 
[( 1 -.:t) A ot1 + 't A 6'7-c2 1 - A ;J 
+ yt)..l (1 -.J.) Y1] Y1 ••• (4.49) 
1 -A c2 
where 0(1' "'t1 , 0<.2' (30' (->2' ~2' '63 are defined as before by 
equation (4.21) and 
rt = \ ~ - 1t <:) ••• (4.50) 
Again, if set c1 = c2 , then '1. = 0, and consequently equations 
(4.49) reduce to equation (4.39) 
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Basically, the above equations are of the same form as equations 
(4.20), but as in the case of equation (4.39), the parameters 
have changed. If we denote the new parameters I by 0(1' ( 0(' l' 2 and 
so on, then the changes in the parameters could be represented 
in matrix form as follows: 
, 
~ 1-).. 'lA 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 
'(.' 0 1-~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
°1 1 
o{' .:i.A~ c1 '1)..,2. 1 0 0 'lA 0 0 ~ 2 
c2 ( 1-A) 
r:r 
c2 
I 
(30 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 130 
-
I 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 (32 (32 0 -I. 
l' 0 ,2A 0 0 0 1 0 0 
°2 2 c2 
ex' (1-~)). ~(1-,2) 0 0 0 0 1 ~A 0 3 c2 1-)" c2 1-A 
~' 3 0 ~-2)A 0 0 0 0 0 1 t3 •• (4.51 :' c2 
_I 
The matrix in the above transformation is clearly more complex 
than that of equation (4.40); the number of non diaeonal 
elements have increased from 2 to 9 ~U1d a new parameter '~3 has 
emerged. The latter presents a further difficulty as would be 
" 
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seen shortly In the solution of set of simultaneous differential 
equat ions, which were hitherto somewhat straightfor"lard. The 
above matrix reflects that redistribution of consumption is 
relatively more complex than redistribution of income and also 
indicates that the results could be appreciably different. As 
before, we could assign numerical values to the parameters and 
investigate the nature of the solutions of the respective 
differential equations. , Equations (4.49) can be written as 
follows in terms of the new parameters defined by the transfor-
mation (4.51). 
· 
, , 
Y1 = ~ Y1 + '61 Yg 
· 
, , I I 
Y2 = ~ Y1 + Po + ,(.32 Y2 + °2 Y g 
• ex' Y 
I ' 
Y = 0', Yg ••• (4.52) g 3 1 + 
In the case of equations (4.20) and (4.39) the method of 
solution was somewhat simpler since there was no term in Y1 in 
the last equation. This made it possible to solve the last 
equation to begir- with, substitute the solution of Y in the 
e 
first and obtain a solution Y1. Thereafter, the solution of Y1 
and Y were substituted in the second equation and the solution g 
for Y2 was obtained. But in the above equations the presence of 
the term in Y1 in the last equation precludes us from using such 
a procedure. In these circumstcmces the first step would be 
solve the first and the last simultaneously. Since the problem 
, " 
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is essentially an initial value problem, a convenient approach 
is to use the Laplace transform as defined ·by 
L {F(t)} = je-:t F(t)dt = f(s) 
o 
••• (4.53) 
Two of its well known properties which will be of use in solving 
equations of the type (4.52) are: 
.l {F} = sf(s) - F(O) 
1 • •• (4.54) 
s - a 
and L (y ) = y g g 
Applying the Laplace transform to the first and the last of 
equations (4.S~) we get 
- I yl 
sy 1 - Y 1 = eX1 Y 1 + °1 Y g 
••• (4.55) 
Solving for Y1 and Y2 we get 
I - I 
Y1 = Y1 (s - 13 ) + Y~ 11 
( s - c<f) ( s - ~3) - 1'; eX3 
••• (4.56) 
I I I I ~~hen numerical values are assigned to 0<.1' ~1' DC.3 and '63, 
the above equa.tions can be 'Put in the partial fraction form 
. ~ ( ! . 
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y = 
• I 
A + 
I 
n ••• (4.57) 
(s - a' ) (8 - b' ) 
where A' and B'are constant and (8 - a / ) and (s - b/) arc the 
factors of the quadra.tic {(s - "';) (s - '(3) - 01' ex; L Using 
the second property defined by equations (4.54), the solutions 
of Yl and Yg can be obtained directly. Substituting there 
solutions in the second ot equations (4.52), the solution ot 
:2 could be obta.ined. Appendix (VI) presents the numerical 
solution corresponding to each of the cuses A= 0.05, 0.10, , •• 
0.25 . . The results obtained in each case are set out below: 
Case I A = 0.05 
Y1 = 39.125e 0.04516t - 1.125 e 0.00497t 
Y
2 
= 40+39.866e 0.04516t _ 22.430e 0.028t 
. -5.436e 0.00497t 
y = 0.515e 0.04516t + 9.485e 0.00497t g . 
Case II A= 0.10 
Y
1 
= 39.05ge 0.04311t -1.05ge 0.00493t 
Y2 = 40+53.6000 0.04311t -36.576e 0.028t 
-5.024e 0.00493t 
Yg = 1.104e 0.04311t +8.896e 0.00493t 
••• (4.58) 
••• (5.59) 
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Case III ..:t~ 0.15 
Case IT 
Case V 
. Y1 = 38.964e 0.04107t -0.964e 0.00488t 
o 
Y
2 
= 40+72.242e 0.041~t -55.67ge 0.028t 
-4.563e 0.00488t 
Y = 1.822e 0.04fo7t +8.178e 0.00488t 
g 
.A= 0.20 
Y
1 
= 38.881e 0.03903t -0.881e 0.00485t 
Y2 = 40+98.277e 0.03903t -82.262e O.028t 
-4.015e 0.00485t 
•• (4.60) 
••• (4.60) 
Y = 2.665e 0.03903t +7.335e 0.00485t •• (4.61) 
g 
A= 0.25 
Y
1 
= 38.751e 0.03701t -0.751e 0.00479t 
Y2 = 40 + 136.848e 0.03701t -121.442e 0.028t 
-3.406e 0.00479t 
Y = .3.681.e O.03701t +6.31ge O.00479t ••• (4.62) 
g 
Setting t = 10 in the above equations the rcopective values of 
Y
1
, Y2 , (Y1 + Y2 ) and Y1/Y2 'vere ohtained. The results are 
shown in Table 4.6 and the corresponding graphs in Figures 4.6 
4.7 and 4.8. 
.. 
": .. , .. ."....:-
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Table 4.6 
A Y1 Y2 Y1+Y2 Y1/Y2 
0.05 60.276 67.194 127.470 0.897 
0.10 58.997 68.815 127.812 0.857 
0.15 57.741 70.470 128.211 0.819 
0.20 56.519 72.138 128.657 0.783 
p.25 55.319 73.883 129.202 0.749 
Behaviour of Y 1 and Y2 ,.,i th reopect to 1 (t. = fO) 
70.0 
65.0 
60.0 
55.0 
50.0 L---~----~-----L----~'----~--~~A 
o 0.5 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 
Fieure 4.6 
• , ;' .. :-~ 
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129.0 
' . 
128.5 
128.0 
. 
127.5 
127.0 ~ ______ ~ ______ ~~ ___ ~~~ ___ ~~ ______ ~~ 
o 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
Figure 4.7 
0.90 
0.85 
0.75~ ____ L-____ ~ ____ -L ____ -J _____ ~~-+ 
o · 0.5 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 
Figure 4.8 
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As in the case of income redistribution discussed in the 
preceding section, Figure 4.6 shows that Y1 declines while Y2 
increases with increasing values of A, in the case of consump-
tion redistribution. But a significant departure from the 
preceding case is that Y1 declines less rapidly while Y2 
registers a sharper increase (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6). As a 
consequence total income (Y1 + Y2) increases in contrast to 
~he decline shown in the preceding section. The level of 
income inequality as represented by Y1/Y2 also declines more 
sharply with increasinG values of A. Thus, within a programme 
of consumption redistribution of the type defined by equations 
(4.44), growth of total income and reduction of income in-
equality emerge as complementa.ry objectives. 
The above result may not be intuitively obvious at first sight 
because under this scheme of redistribution total savings 
remain unchanged. Therefore a question could be posed as to 
how income (Y1 + Y2 ) could increase beyond the level correspond-
ing to the case "lithout redistribu.tion (i.e. A= 0). The 
explanation lies in the mechanism defined by the last equation 
of (4.45) accordulg to which thu entire amount retained by 
government goes into capital formation. This introduces an 
element into the system with a hieh ~~owth rate of eovernment 
capital K~. The gro,\'lth rate in a capital accumulation process 
of the type discussed here is the product of the savings rate 
and the output-capital ratio. Since the savings rate is unity, 
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at least for the portion of income transferred to Rovernment, 
the corresponding element of capital accumUlation will have a 
much higher growth rate than those of other capital stocks in 
the system. Therefore the incomes of the rich and the poor would 
register corresponding increases by virtue of employment in 
government. However"the implicit assumption here is that the 
"Please" effect is negligible. Please {1967} has pointed out 
that although the government would be more farsighted than the 
individual who has a natural preference for present consumption, 
pressures on government to spend on consumption tend to become itr 
esistible particularly )lhen fWlds are available. 
4.10 ConseQuences of Population Increase 
. 'I " ~. 
Recent investigations have brought into focus some of the 
interrelationships that exist between population change and income 
distribution. For example Rich {1973} vlho had carried out an 
analysis of the links between per cupita income of the lowest 60 
per cent of income earners and birth rates in 40 cowltries con-
cluded that income' accruing to the poorest cr~nps contribute more 
to fertility reduction than increase of average per capita income 
as a whole. Aeain, the 'lforld Bank Study {1974; pp. 147-14S} 
including 64 cOWltries concluded that: 
tI ••••• each additional percentaRe point of total 
income received by the poorest 40 per cent reduces 
fertility by 2.9 points. Dy contrast, each 
additional year of life expect~mcy at birth, reduces 
the fertillty index by 1.86 points •••••• The 
coefficients suggest that fertility decline is much 
, . ' 
' .... " .. 
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more sensitive to ch~U16es in income at the bottom 
end of the distribution.1t 
Conversely, it is self evident that a fertility decline amongst 
the poor could lead to a reduction of incomG inequality in per 
capita terms, within growth cum redistribution processes of the 
type discussed in this study. For, lower the rate of growth of 
population amongst the poor, higher would be their per capita 
. 
income and lower would be the extent of income inequality. 
It would be beyond the scope of this study to examine in detail 
the interrelationships between population chanee and income 
inequality. Instead in this section we shall examine the conse-
quences of fertility differentials as betlleen the rich and the 
poor upon the l,,'Towth of their per capita incomes. For this 
purpose \-le shall consider the growth cwn redistribution processes 
discussed in the two preceding section. The time horizon will be 
taken as 10 years. 
In section 4.2, the rich were defined as those belongine to the 
richest 20 per cent of the population. That is, the initial rich 
to poor ratio was taken as 1:4. Takine the former as the unit 
of population and denoting the rich cnd poor popu.lation by N1 
and N2 respeotively. 
N1 = 1 and N2 = 4 at t = o. 
The overall rate of population gro,\"th has fluctuated between 1.6 
, ,', .• .-k: 
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1 
and 1.7 per cent in recent years. However, there are no esti-
2 
mates of fertility differentials in relation to income groups. 
In these circumstances, as in the case of the Chenery-Ahluwalia 
model {1974; p.216, we shall assume a lower rate of population 
growth for the rich and a hieher rate for the poor. The justifi-
cation for this assumption is the evidence (referred to above) 
that, fertility declines id th higher levels of income. Represent-
fng the exponential rate of groi'lth of populution of the rich by 
r 1 and that of the poor by r 2 we shall consider the following 
estimates initially: 
= 0.015 
= 0.018 
As a first step, these rates will be assruaed constant over the 
10 year period to be considered, and we shall refer to this case 
as Variant T. Then,the respectiv~ populatio~in year tare 
given by: 
= 
= 
eO.015t 
4eO.018t 
and 
1 See Central Bank Annual Report 1975-77. 
.... (4.63) 
2 See Department of Census & Statistics 11978} , which prencnts 
the results of the 'vlorld Fert ili ty Survey, ~;ri lJUnka, 1975 
(WFS 1975). Although several aspects relating to fertility 
.have been covered, that relatlllg to fertility differentials 
by income groups has not been covered. 
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Thus, at t = 0, U1 = 1, U2 = 4 and 
at t = 10, N1 = 1.16, N2 = 4.80 · 
We shall next consider Variant II under which r 2 is assumed 
to decrease progressively so that its average over the 10 
year period is the same as that of r 1 i.e. 0.015. 
Thus, at t = 0, N1 = 1, N2 = 4 and 
at t = 10, N1 = 1.16, N2 = 1.16 x 4 = 4.64 
As a third alternative, we shall also consider Variant III under 
which r 2 is made to decrease more sharply so that its average 
value over the 10 year peeiod reaches a level of 0.010 
Then at t = 0, N1 = 1, N2 = 4 and 
Let us define the incomes per unit of population by the following 
equations: 
••• 
and take x1/x2 as a measure of income inequality. 
Under each variant described above we shall consider the following 
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caseeof redistribution with growth. 
Case A: Redistribution of Income with A.=0.10 (see Table 4.5) 
Case B: tI " " It A= 0.25 ( " " " ) 
Case C: 11 " Consumption with A = 0.10 (see Table 4.6 ; 
Case D: " " " ,.,ith A. = 0.25 (see Table 4.6 ) 
The results obtained in respect of each variant are set out in 
Tables 4.7 to 4.9. 
Ta.ble 4.7 
Changes in the values of x1 and x2 over time-Varinnt I 
Case xl 
x2 x1/x2 
t=O t=10 t=o t=10 t=o t=10 
.A 38 50.59 13 14.17 2.92 3.57 
B 38 47.07 13 14.85 2.92 3.17 
C 38 50.85 13 14.34 2.92 3.54 
D 38 47.68 13 15.39 2.92 3.10 
Table 4.8 
Chances in the values of Xl and x2 over tice - Variant II 
Case x1 x2 X1/X2 
t=O t=10 t=O t=10 t=O t=10 
A 38 50.59 13 14.66 2.92 3.45 
B 38 47.07 13 15.36 2.92 3.06 
C 38 50.85 13 14.83 2.92 3.43 
D 38 47.68 13 15.92 2.92 2.99 
.. : . t ;-
.' " 
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Table 4.9 
Changes in the values of x1 and x2 overtime - Variant III 
Case x1 x2 x1/x2 
t=O t=10 t=O t=10 t=O t=10 
A 38 50.59 13 15.39 2.92 3.29 
-
B 38 47.07 13 16.12 2.92 2.92 
C 38 50.85 13 15.57 2.92 3.27 
D 38 47.68 13 16.72 2.92 2.85 
Results of Table 4.7 indicate the extent to which income 
1 inequality in per capita terms could deterj.orate despite str-ong 
redistributive measures, in circumstances '\-lhere the population 
grm'lth rate of the poor exceeds that of the rich. :i:,ven in the 
least unfavot~able case i.e. Case D, income inequality changes 
from 2.92 to 3.10. But under Variant II, l',hich assumes that 
the population grm'1th rate of the poor could be maintained at the 
same level as of the rich, the extent of deterioration of income 
inequality is seen to be curbed to some extent. It is only under 
Variant III ,\-lh1ch is based on a substantial lowerine of the rate 
of population grmlth of the poor that there appears to be possi-
bilities of maintainine income inequality at the same level 
1This deterioration is traceable to the decline in the value of 
the parameter 132 from 0.049 in :Jet 1 to 0.028 in Table 4.4 resulting from the change of the value of parameter 8 2 from 6.17 to 0.10 (see note at end of Table 4.4). 
(Case D) and' of a slicht improvement in income inequality 
(Case D). 
The above results highlight the inadequacy of redistributiv.e. 
measures unless they are coupled \,li th measures to reduce 
population growth rates of the poor. Drastic reductions in 
h t 1· population growt ra e are not altogether impossible. As 
.pointed out in the \'IFS 1975 (see pp. 154-155) fertility is 
continuing to decline at a rapid rate - fast enough to halve 
fertility . in 10 years. The decline is mainly attributed to the 
rise in mean age at marriage and secondly to the reduction in 
marital fertility. This report has also highlighted the pros-
n 
pects forLsuccessful programme in fertility reduction. 
1 
As noted in Chapter 2, the population growth rate which stood 
at 2.7 per cent per annum during the period 1953-63 had 
declined to 1.6 per cent per annum by 1974. 
¥ . 
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.. 
We commenced the substantive part of our study by introducing 
in this c~pter the basic form of the mode1 for redistribution 
with growth. The Chenery - Ahluwalia model was extended by 
introducing the government as a separate entity whilst maintaining 
the basic features of the original model which characterize a 
developing economy. These features were a dualistic mode of 
.production consisting of a modern sector which uses hired labour 
and a traditional sector based on se1f employment, concentration 
in the ownership of capital and differential savings rates for 
the rich and the poor. 
The model showed how wage incomes are derived through employment 
linkages with the modern and government sectors as well as how 
profit and self employment incomes are derived. This was . 
expressed concisely by showing how the distribution of incomes is 
determined by the wage and profitability matrix 'and the vector of 
capital stocks. We also showed that the model could be regarded 
as an extension of the Kaldor - Pas1netti model. In contrast to 
the Chenery - Ahluwalia model "rhich had used simulation techniques, 
the model developed in this study was formulated in terms of a 
set of differential equations. 
The empirical result with which we sought to test the validity 
of the mode1 was ~he Kuznets curve according to which income 
inequality in a low income country has a tendency to trace an 
a .... ~ .J .. _ •• 5.-.. 
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inverted "U" 'shape over time as the country develops. vie 
demonstrated that, in general the model is capable of generating 
the Kuznets curve. A further elaboration of the model by the 
introduction of specific redistributive measures and plausible 
values for the relevant parameters enabled us to obtain as a 
limiting case, a situation where the Kuznets curve was indis-
cernible. We hypothesized that this limiting case should 
represent the Sri Lankan situation where the trends in the recent 
past has been one of a steady decline of income inequality due to 
specific redistributive measures. 
As mentioned at the outset the principal aim of this study was 
to explore interrelationships that could exist between the 
processes of growth and redistribution of incomes by means of a 
formal model representative of the Sri Lankan situation. As a 
first step in this direction, we considered the static form of 
the model and posed a question regarding the type of capital that 
ought to be expanded if the incomes of the poor are to be improved. 
Subject to the assumption that the estimates of the parameters 
used~re resonably accurate, the result we obtained was that from 
the standpoint of improving the incomes of the poor, policies whicr 
stimulate increases in capital for self employment are preferable 
to those that expand state capital. The static form of the model 
also demonstrated that although nationalization of assets owned 
by the priV,ate sector may expand employment, it may not unamb1-
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quously reduce income inequality. 
Dynamio oonsiderations of the model yielded analytical solutions 
which appeared to be somewhat more complex than expected consider-
ing the relatively simple assumptions made at the outset. These 
solutions demonstrated the complex nature of the interrelation-
ships that could exist in a situation of interdependent growth 
(as between income groups) implicit in the Chenery-Ahluwalia 
type of model. 
The first important result that emerged from dynamic considerations 
of the model was that the rate of growth of incomes of the poor 
depends to a ereut extent upon the output-capital ratio relating 
to the capital owned by the poor and their marginal savings rate. 
This result highlighted the role of self reliance and the impor-
tanoe of improving the productivity of capital owned by the poor 
as well as raising their marginal savings rate. 
More importantly, the analytical oolutions obtained elaborated 
the manner in which the incomes of the poor are related to the 
activities of the modern (private) sector and to those of the 
government sector, within the dynamio framework. The second 
important result we obtained from dynwnic conSiderations of the 
model concerns the income of the poor Y2. It was shown that 
~Y2 was positive where «1 was identified as the main parameter 
-~.~ 
, ~, 
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associated with the growth of incomes of the rich, in a situation 
where the rich derive a major part of their income from the modern 
(private) sector rather than from the government. The policy 
implication derived was that slowing down the rate of growth of 
income of the rich would adversely affect the income of the poor, 
the underlying reason being the decrease in wage employment. 
Conversely, if the income of the poor are to be improved through 
employment, expansion of the modern (private) sector should receive 
high priority. 
The third important area of investigations was brought about by 
the introduction of specific redistributive measures into the 
model. Results showed that while income inequality would decline 
under these circumstances, total income too would decline, the 
underlying reason being the diminution of total savings due to 
differential savings rates as between the rich and the poor. Thus, 
income redistribution and growth of total income emerged as competi 
objectives. 
We then proceeded to explore the alternative strategy of redistri-
bution of consumption. That io, a strategy whereby the amount 
taxed from the rich is not entirely passed on to -:the poor, but 
only a proportion determined by the marginal consumption rates of 
the rich and the poor, the balance being retained by government 
for direct investment. This introduced in formal terms a system 
.  . 
- '" ...... '~'I, ' i" '; : - . 
4 - 80 
of redistribution where there was no loss in total savings and 
the overall productivity of capital was raised by the special 
assumption we made about government savings and investment. The 
net result was that income inequality declined while total income 
increased. Thus, under a scheme of consumption redistribution, 
the redistributive and growth objectives emerged as complementary, 
subject to the assumption that the "Please" effect does not take 
place. This result may be regarded as the fourth important result 
we obtained from the dynamic considerations of the model. 
Lastly, we set out to inquire what these growth cum redistribution 
processes mean in terms of per capita incomes. These investigationo 
revealed that unless the rate of growth of population of the poorer 
segments of the community are drastically reduced, income inequality 
in per capita terms is bound to increase. These results highlighted 
the priority that ought to be attached to populn.tion control 
policies. 
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" CHAPrER 5 
A NODEL FOR REDISTRIBUTION \iITH GROWTH: 
SOl'IE ELABORATIONS 
"Can "Te conceive of the existence of 
a theory of economic growth which 
would neither be too closely tied to 
a particular historical situation nor 
resemble a game of entrepreneurial , 
blindman's bluff, but would provide 
some relevant inaights? - not a 
description of reality but (as Joan 
Robinson says) a device for sorting 
out our ideas?" T .I,V. S,~an (Golden 
Ages and Production Functions) 
5.1 An Extension of the Model 
In the previous chapter, we had made several simplifying 
assumptions in order to demonstrate as clearly as possible 
the options available for a programme of redistribution with 
grolith. In this chapter an attempt will be made to extend the 
model by incorporating several features so as to make it rather 
more closely representative of the real situation. The object 
is not to arrive at an exact representation of reality, but to 
take account of some of the more important features of the real 
situation and to evolve the model in a manner ''lhich \llill enable 
us to 'sort out our ideas', gain further insights lmd to di3CUSS 
certain policy implications that are likely to emeree. 
There are three important features which require to be intro-
duced. They are: 
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(a) direct and indirect taxes charged by 
government and a subsidy to the poor; 
(b) an institutional mechanism (a 'financial 
institution'), through which the rich can 
invest a part of their savings and from 
which t he government borrows funds for 
development; and 
(c) a flow of foreign aid to finance government 
investment. 
~hese features were selected particularly in view of their 
prominence in the formulation of national plans and annual 
budgets. The direct tax Td is taken as a proportion of the 
income of the rich and is defined by the equation below: 
• • • 
In reality, different tax rates are applicable to different 
income groups. But as it is beyond the scope of this model to 
go into such detail, we ,shall use only the average rate td. 
Likewise, indirect taxes Ti too are conceived in terms of 
averaee rates and are assumed to be linked to outp~ Ql and 01 1 B 
by the eQuation: 
... (5.2) 
Indirect taxes include business turnover taxes, export duties 
as the main components. Uather than showing these taxes as 
separate entities, tor purposes of simplicity, these are being 
shown in aggregate form, the underlying assumption being thut 
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they are all related to the output of the modern sector as well 
as to the output by the state sector. For, business turnover taxes, 
export duties and import duties are separately related to output 
and we could always work out weighted averages ti1 and tigrelating 
to output by the modern (private) sector and the state sector 
respectively; specifically, a linear relationship is assumed. As 
for Q~, the tax on it need not be taken into account in equation 
(5.2). Since Q~ accrues only to the rich by way of return on 
savings invested, it is rutin to personal income. Accordingly, we 
shall take account of the tax on it throuGh Td • 
The subsidy S is reearded aEl a transfer from government income to 
the income of the poor and is assumed to crm'l at a uniform rate 
of E, as Given in the equation below: 
s = • • • 
The system of financial institutions that exists in reality 
consistinR of Banks, l"inance Companies, the system of Treasury 
Bills, the 11lblic Debt" etc., is too complex to be readily 
incorporated into the model. Further, savings are made bot.h by 
the rich and the poor and are utilized by themselves as \'lell as 
by government. \'/e shall assume that the savi!l{;s of the rich are 
diverted in the first instance towards auementing K~ and that the 
balance savings of the rich are utilized by government through 
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rupee loans and Treasury Bills_ Thut is, in contrast to the 
previous assumptions, we shall now assume that the 'non linked' 
n 
capital stock K1 owned by the rich io the total amount lent by 
the rich to the government for investment. In the case of the 
poor, it is assumed thut there are no 'excess' savings and that 
whatever savings are available are utilized for augmenting X;_ 
K~ can be regarded as representing the total net domestic public 
Y\ debt. The income that will accrue from K1 will be Given by 
••• 
Q, may be regarded as the interest accruing from the investment 
of K1-
It is assumed thut the government will make use of the fund K~ 
n. to create real aosets which will Renerate an ou.tput Sg K1• Since 
b1 K; has to be -paid out to the rich as interest, the net income 
to government \,lill be (ag - b1 )K~. Thus, the total income of 
Government wi ll be given by the expression 
Q! (1 - t ) + T. + Td + (a
e 
- b1) Ir
n 
p; . 1 e ~ ' 1 
= 
Qt (1 - t ) + t Ql + ti1 Qt + td Yl + (ae - b1) Kfl. g 19 ig e 1 
= Q~ + til Q~ + td Y1 + (aF, - b1 ) K~ • • • (5.5) 
As seen above, the indirect tax component charged by Rovernment 
from government enter~)rises cancels out _ This gross income may 
be divided into the wage components received by the tvlO income 
r 
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groups by virtue of employment in Government \'1hich are 
w1gfQ! + t11 Q~ + td Y1 + (ag - b1) K;] 
W2g[Q~ + t11 o·t + td Y1 + (ag - b1) K~] • •• (5.6) 
and the component of income retained by the government for all 
other activities, nameLv 
Pg [Q~ + ti1 Qt + td Y1 + (ag - b1 ) K~ 
where w1 + w2 + p = 1 g g g 
• •• 
• •• 
(5.7) 
(5.8) 
The expression (5.7) represents total government income net of 
personal emoluments, and we shall refer to this component as 
"government· income". This restricted notion of Rovcrnment income 
is particularly relevant to the broad distributional queotion 
l'le are discussing. For, personal emoluments paid out are an 
intep,ral part of the incomes of the rich and the poor, and the 
balance which remains could be regarded as the income of an 
"impersonal" government. It is this balance income that could 
be diverted to various other government activities depending on 
the policy options. As in the case of equations (4.2) of the 
previous chapter, we may l-Trite the ,·mee equations of the rich 
and the poor as 
i + w1g [Q~ + t11 e td Y1 + (a - b1) K~l W1 = w11 ~ 1 (J,1 + e 
£ [Q~ + ti1 Q; + td Y1 + Ca - b1 )K~ J · (5.9) W2 = ''121 Q1 + w2 . g g 
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The profit iricomes of the two income groups reIDain unchanged 
and are given, as before. by 
P1 = P1 Qt 1 + 
Qn 
1 
P2 = Qn. 2 ••• (5.10) 
Eut in the case of the government, the "profit income" or 
"government income" will. now be p;1ven by 
Pg = Pg [ Q.~ + t i 1 Q~ + t d Y 1 + (a g - b1 ) K~ ••• (5.11 ) 
The parameters in the above equations are not altogether independen'l 
but are governed by the manner in "'hich outputs are divided. The 
t Q. ~ u2 t l 
output Q1 is divided into w11 l' w21 "1' P1 Q1 and ti1 Q1. 
Therefore, it follows that 
• • • (5.12) 
Eaking the necessary adjustments for direct taxes on income of 
the rich, and a subsidy uhlch is regarded as a transfer of 
income from eovernment to the poor, the distribution of incomes 
",ill be determined by 
n 
Y2 = W2 + 02 + B 
Y = P - B 
. f!. g • • • (5.13) 
S'ubstitut1ng from equations (5.9), (5.10), (5.11), equations 
(5.1;) read: 
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Y1 = W11 "1t + W1rr rllef. + ti1 ,)( t Y (a - b )Knl '" 0 L ~ "1 d 1 g 1 1J 
e n 
+ P1 Q1 + Q1 - Td 
Y2 = w21 Q~ + "" 2g [Q~ + ti1 Q; + td Y1 + (ag - b1 )K~ 
+ LJ; + 3 
Ye = Pg [Q~ + ti 1 Qi + td Y 1 + (ag - b1 ) K~ - S ••• (5.14) 
In order to check for consistency, when we add up equations 
(5.14) we get 
Y1 + Y2 + Yg = [W 1g + w2e + pc] [Q~ + tj.i Q~ + td Y1 + 
(ae - b1 ) K~ 
+ ["'11 + w21 + P1 J ll~ - Td + Q~ + Q; 
= [Q~ + ti1 Q~ + td Y1 + (ae - b1 ) K~ + 
~11 + "121 + P1}'l~ - Td + ll~ + Q; 
(by virtue of relation (5.8) 
= Q~ + (ag - b1 )K; + (l'l11 + w21 + P1 + ti1)Q~ 
+ td Y1 - Td + Q; + Q; 
Q. L Q~ ( b )1,J1. ' In. (\(\ 
= e + 1 + ag - 1 "1 + .... 1 + '''2 
(by virtue of rel~tion (5.8) 
= Q! + (ag - b 1 )K~ + (-N 11 + w21 + P1 + til )Qi 
It It 
+ t d Y1 - T d + Q2 + Q1 
2 Q! ( ) t\ rI. f\ 
= Qg + '1 + ae - b1 K1 + Q1 + Q2 (by virtue of relation (5.12) 
_ Q t + C"' t + I" rI. (\f\ 
- 1 'g ne ~1 +'2 
(by virtue of relation (5.4) 
• • • (5.15) 
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Thus, the total domestic income equates to the totul domestic 
output (value added) by the rich (~~), by the poor (Q;), and 
by the government (Ql + 0. K1n) • J~liminating the Qs by the use of g g 
equations (4.1) and after a sli~ht re-arranGement of terms we 
get: 
(1-W1g t d ) Y1 = ("'11 + ¥1 )a1 Kt + w1g [ ag K~ + a 1 ti1 K1.t 
+ (ag - b1 )K~ + b1 K~ - Td 
Y2 = (w21 + w2g t i1 )a1 Kt + W2e [ ag K~ + td Y1 
Y = 
e 
+ (ag ~ b1) K~ + b2 K; + S 
Pg[ae K~ + a1 ti 1 K; + td Y1 + (ag - b1 )K~ - S 
••• (5.16) 
The above equations may be rega~'ded .as extensions of equations 
(4.7). It ia clear from the above equations that the distribution 
of incomes is determined not only by the distribution of capital 
stocks, wage and profitability parameters but also by the level 
of subsidies and the rates of direct and indirect taxes. 
5.2 The Static Case 
As in the case of equation (4.7), the picture presented by 
equation (5.16) iD essentially a static one. Nevertheless there 
are several interesting policy implications contained in these 
equations. Some of the policy implications are basically the 
same as those discussed in Chapter 4 (soon after equation 4.7). 
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But since equations (5.16) are an extended form of equations 
(4.7) there are some important additional features that have 
emerged. Ignoring for a moment the difference in revenue impli-
cations,the second equation of (5.16) sho\~s three major options 
available for raising the income of the poor i.e. expansion ot 
State capital (Kt), expansion of capital for self employment (K") g 2 
and increase of subsidies (S). The choice between the first and 
the second has already been discussed in Chapter 4. But the 
choice between the second and the third is perhaps more important. 
Let us assume that a subsidy of Rs.l000 m. purely for cOFsumption 
is under consideration. An alternative proposal would be to erant 
Rs.SOO million as n subsidy and Rs.500 million as a capital grant 
in the form of capital assets (ec. land, irrigation facilities or 
1 
equipment) to augment K2 i.e. cc~ital for self employment. If 
we take b2 = 0.30 then the total addition to Y2 through the second 
2 proposal will be ns.650m , instead of TIs.l000m in terms of the 
first proposal. If the latter procedure is followed in second 
year too, then the new addition to Y 2 j'lOuld be ns. 800m3, a.s aeainst 
Rs.1000m, in terI:lS of the former. If the process is repeated 
1 It ehould be noted that the distinct :Lon between a subsidy and 
a cani tal C'l'ant is not as clcnr cut as it \'Tould appear. For, 
it is possible for the receipient to save some part of the 
subsidy tOl'1!\rds capital formation. On the othor hand a ca, ital 
grant could release some part of the receinient's funds for 
consumj)tion which would have other\·lise gone into saving. 
2 That is: Re.500m + 0.3 x Rs.500m = Rs.650m. 
'3 That is: He.SOOm +0.3 x Its.l000 = Re.800m 
-' -
. ~ . 
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during the tbird year too, then the addition to Y2 in the third 
year will be Rs.950m. In other words, by the end of the third 
year the addition to Y2 is around Hs.1000m, but the burden upon 
the government budeet thereafter \'1ill only be Hs. 500m in the 
form of a subsidy; the balance ,dll be a rccurrin{; return to the 
poor from the capital increment of Hs.1500m built up over three 
years. The government would thus have additional funds at its 
disposal and could be preferably used for development. The 
nwnbers used are purely for l)urposes of illustration and several 
variants are possible • . For example, if the drop during the first 
year from Rs.1000m to Rs.650m is considered to be sharp, then a 
more favourable alternative will be a subsidy of Rs.700m and a 
capital grant of Rs.300m, to yield an addition of Ils.790m to Y2. 
The choice in favou.r of the latter option is further strengthened 
if we take accotmt of the additional revenue eenerated through 
indirect taxes on increased output. Such revenue would obviously 
lower the burden upon the eovernment budget. 
Admittedly, the above discussion has been carried out in aGGregate 
terms and one major drawback is the distributional problem that 
is bound to arise. For, a subsidy such as the rice subsidy is 
spread widely amongst the poor, whereas in the case of capital 
grants for self employment, only certain segments of the poor 
may be bene!i ted. \'le ohall return to this question later. 
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The third equation of (5.16) also serves to swnmarise the 
usual methods available for raising of government income. 
The first term within the square bracket represents the raising 
of government income through public investment, the second term 
represents indirect taxation, the third term represents direct 
taxation and the fourth tcrm represcnts financing of government 
investments through borrowing. Thus,the third equation of (5.16) 
.also expresses concisely the choices available to government for 
raising of revenue. For example, if direct taxation is to be 
reduced by A(td Y1) while holding Government income constant, 
then one of the ways in which it could be compensated is by 
increasing the indirect tax rate ti 1 by A (td Y1Va1 Kt. Alter-
natively, it could be compensa'ted by raising each of the other 
components ns well so that the total increase equates to the 
loos of tax revenue. On the other hand if the subsidy 8 is to 
be lowered by 6. 8 this equation ehows the range of choices 
available for lowering direct and indirect taxes, while keeping 
Y constant. 
e 
Anothor eource of funds available to government is foreign aid 
which we shall now take into aCCOtUlt. i'le shall assume that 
there is a balance of payments deficit which is being met out 
of foreign aid. We shall consider only the net foreign aid 
component Ft (i.e. receipts less total debt service) and assume 
that this will be utilised by eovernrnent for investment in 
5 - 12 
development projects. Taking into account the possibility of 
an. inlprovement in the foreign exchange regime due to increases 
in domestic production (particularly aericultural production) 
we shall assume a moderate decrease of Ft over time eiven by 
the formula 
ot 
= FO e , 0<0 • • • (5.17) 
With the introduction of Ft for Government investment 1 the 
·savings-investment equations (4.15) will undergo a sliGht modi-
fication as follows: 
• £ 
Y1 K1 = q s1 
li:n 1 = (1 - Q)s1 Y1 
le1\. 
2 = s2 Y2 
• 2 
S Y + Ft (5.18) K = ••• g g g 
The parameters s1' 6 2, Se and q retain the same meanings as in 
equation (4.15). 
5.3 Dynamic Considerations 
\Oa th a view to developing the model into a dynamic one we shall 
begin by differentiating equ~-tions (5.16) and rearrangine terms 
to yield: 
-Il 
- w1 g)] 
• 
(""11 
• l . ~ 
+ td (1 Y1 = + ""lg ti1 + P1)a1 K1 + w1g a K g g 
+~11e ae + b1 (1 - ""1g)] K1n 
. 
(""21 + ""26 ti1 )a1 
• l. ii Y2 K1 + w2 a e e g 
" 
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+ P (a - b1 )K1n - E: S eE.-t g g ... 
. 
Eliminating the Ks using equations (5.18) and by further re-
arrangement of terms we get 
[1 + td (1 - w1g)] Y1 = ~w11 + lt1S ti1 + P1)a1 qS1 
+ (1 - q) { \'11 Gag + b 1 ( 1 - w 1 g)} s ~ Y 1 
+ w1 a (s Y + Ft) g gee 
i2 = [(W21 + w2g t i1 )a1 qS1 + (ag - ~)W2g 
(1 -q~sl Y1 
• 
+ w 2 g t d Y1 + b~ So 
+ b2 s2 Y2 + w2g ag Sg Yg + w2g ag Ft 
Yg = Pe ag se Ye + [P1 t11 a 1 
+P
e 
(ae - b1 ) (1 - q) 8 1] 
+ E S efi:.t. 
o 
q S1 
Y + p a F 1 ' g g t 
• • • (5.20) 
These equations are of the form 
• 
Y 1 = ~ Y 1 + '(1 Y (J + ~1 Ft 
. . 
Y2 = {30 + ~ Y 1 + f32 y 2 + ~ Ye + ~2 1'\ + »2 Y 1 + eSt 
i g = ~ Y 1 + r 3 Y g + '13 ~"'t + v3 y 1 - ~ St ••• ( 5 .21 ) 
J . U 
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where o{1 = (1~11+w1G t i1 +P1)s1 q S1+(1-q){w1eag+b1(1-W1p,)} 8 1 
1 + t d (1-\"11 g) 
"6 = was 1 1 e e g 
1+td (1-W1g) 
~ '\'I a 1 = 1C p; 
1 +t d (1 -w 1 g) 
~2 -~w21 + w2e t i1 )a1 q + (ag - b1 )w2g (1-q)] 8 1 
{30 = b2 8 0 
fa = b2 s2 
"\':2 = ,\,12 a s g g g 
'12 = '\'1213 a g 
"2 = w2g td 
~ = P1 ti 1 a 1 
°3 = Pe a 8 g e 
Yl3 = PG s e 
Y3 = P td g 
q s1 + Pg (ag - b1 ) (1 - Q)s1 
• • • (5.22) 
Equations (5.21) mt'l.y be rec~rded ns an extensi.on of equations 
(4.20) • For, if we suppress th e add it ional fe~.tures by sett ing 
~t = 0, td = 0, St = 0, t11 = 0, and ienore the financial 
institutions we eet back the set of equations (4.20). Before 
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proceeding to'· solve the equations (5.21), as in the case of 
Chapter 4, some interesting observations could be made. In 
order to obtain thene let us divide the second equation of (5.21) 
throughout by Y2 to get 
. . . 
Comments made soon after equation (4.22) are applicable to the 
above equations too. But one of the neli features in equation 
(5.23) is the manner in l.,hich foreien aid contributes to the rate 
of erowth of the incomes of the poor. In like manner , Ft will 
contribute to the rate of growth of income of the rich too. But 
the contribution to the former will be ereater provided that 
• • • 
i w ,., . 
• e • 2 C El C; )....;.,1 wr_a-,{_~ ____ _ 
.. y 2 [1 + td (1 -i'l ) Y11 1e 
or 
> 
.... (5.25) 
It is clear from the numerical values used in Chapter 4 (see Set 
1 or Set 2) that W2g)~. Since the factor [1 + td(1-w1e~ > 1, 
Y2 Y1 
it follows thut inequality (5.25) will hold. The implication of 
this is that Ft will contribute more towards the rate of growth 
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of incomes of the poor than that of the rich. Aeain, equation 
(5.2,) also shows that the rate of erm"th of income of the rich 
contributes to the rate of growth of incomes of the poor. How-
ever the impact of this term is ,,"t:duced by the factor "2 = w2g t d 
which is the product of the wage parameter w2g and the direct 
tax rate td. The origin of this feature could be traced back to 
the second of equations (5.16) according to which direct taxos 
from the rich contribute to government revenue from which the 
poor derive a wage income through employment in government. The 
policy implication is that curbing the rate of growth of income 
of the rich will adversely affect the rate of growth of income 
of the poor. 
The other obvious comnent we could make reearding the equation 
(5.23) is that the rate of erowth of incomes of the poor also 
depends upon the rate of growth of the Dubsidy too, as represented 
by the term ESt. Although this is true, it did appear from 
discussion carried out a little earlier, that mechanisms which 
bring abo:lt a gro\,Tth of capital stock for self employment is a 
better alternative. A further point is that the term ESt 
. 
a.dversely affects Y g' the full implicat :Lons of ~'hich could be seen 
only after obtaining a complete solution to the set of equations 
(~.21) to which we shall proceed now. 
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The complete" solution to the system of equations (5.21) is 
given by the set of equations below (see Appendix VII for 
solution) 
y 1 = A eA.-t 
Yg = ..![( A1 
°1 
A t 6"t Et 
+ B e 2 + f1 FO e - fA So e 
- "'1) Ai-It + , (~ - C(1 )Bj:t"l + (6_ "(1)fA1 FO etst 
- (E. - 0(1 )r2 soe(!j 
- fa + (<"2 + 'Y2 ~ ) [Allt + Be.\.a.t " T2 ' ( ~-A2) {).2 - (32) 
+ )A1Foe~t - f2soeEtl 
(&- (32) (E -t2)] 
+ ("(2 +>'2 Q1) f (~ -"'i) Ae~t + (A2-~) B~1t 
~1 , l ().1 -132 ) (A2 -~) 
+ {( cS" - ~) JA1 - 11 } Fo3t - (E -~ )~soeEtl (6-~) (E_(J2) J 
+ ('1.2.+ Y2~) Foeot 
( 6 - (->2) 
• •• (5.26) 
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where the constants A, B and C are given by 
A = 6, Y ~ - (\ - ~ )y 1 + [~ - (0 - A2 ) P,] F 0 + (E - ~) f-2 So 
(A1 - A2 ) 
B = (A1 - oe,)Y 1 - ~1 Y g + fl'2 So (A, - E) + F 0[1\ (cS - A1 ) - ~ 
and C = Y2 + f30 - ("'2 +~D)} [ A + B +)1FO - f2 So] 
. is; A1 - h -"'2 -A: 6-~ E- (32 
- (l2 + ", '6, ) r~Al -~).A. + (-X2 -~)B + {( 0- "',)}l2 - tt,}FO 
~1 L(At -P2) (~-~2) ( cS - (12) 
-(E-~)fI'2SQl-(q2+Y2f\.1) FO -
( E - (32) J ( & - ~2) 
and Al = a, + y, + II V, + / (rx, +. 1', + l, -v,)'1. - 4 (ol,1', - ~ 1, ) 
2 
A2 = "'1 + ~, + 'i, )l, - j(<<, + Y, + l, V,)':. 4 ( «, l, - CX, t, ) 
2 
fA1 = ~ (&- "",) + rt,l, 
62._ ( 0(, + 1, + 1', v,) ~ + (ex, 1, -1, "',) 
?-2 = El, 
E 2._ (~ +)', +11 »,)! + (0(1 1, - floc,) ••• (5.27) 
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The above eq~ations illustrate that interdependencies can be of 
a somewhat complex natureiria dynamic growth cum redistribution 
system when we take into account factors such as direct taxation, 
indirect taxation, subsides, government (domestic) borrowing and 
foreign aid. But reality is indeed more complex, and had we 
incorporated further factors in an attempt to make the model a 
closer representation of reality, the results obtained would 
have been far more intraotable. The above solution for Y2 is 
inevitably more complex in comparison with those for Y1 and Yg 
because of its direct linkages with Y1 through wage income and 
subsidies. 
The solution for Y2 may be regarded as a generalization of 
equation (4.27) of the previous chapter. As in the case of 
equation (4.27), it is clear from the term Ce~lt in the solution 
for Y2 in the above equations that the growth of incomes of the 
poor depends in the first instance, upon the parameterft2 which 
is the product of the output-capital ratio and the marginal 
savings rate of the poor. As noted previously, this implies 
that the poor will have to save and invest more in order to 
generate greater output, or alternatively raise output per unit 
of capital employed. The policy implication of this is that 
efforts at stimulating savings amongst the poor and at enabling 
them to invest more in order to increase their stock of capital 
should receive high priority. Efforts in these direotions have 
been already made in Sri Lanka and in Chapter 9 we shall discuss 
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the possibilities of stepping up such activities. 
Since we have incorporated several new features into the model, 
one would expect more interpretations from equation (5.25) than 
", from equation (4.27) relating to the simple model. This is in 
fact the case; for example, the direct impact of the subsidy 
upon Y2 is represented by the term 
Et Suppose for instnnceP2 = 0 then this term reduces to So e which 
is the total subsidy at time t. This shows that in a situation 
where 1'2 is near zero, that growth of incomes of the poor will 
largely depend upon the growth of subsidies. When~2*0 the 
total subsidy soeEt gets altered by a factor E • There is 
E- (32 
no discont1nutity at E = (32. As in the case of the argument " 
following equation (4.25) it could be shown by considering the 
term 
e S e<:t /.t t _~o,--_ together with the term _ESOe
fw1 that the 
E- (32 £- (32 
solution exists when E ~ ~2. 
E S ed While the term 0 _ reflects the direct effect of subsidies, 
E- (32 
"thesWD of the other two terms in e~t namely: 
E[(l'2 + 'Y2 ",) + (0(2 t, - 0(.11'2>]f2s0 ef.t = I ( say) 
01 (E - (32) 
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in equation (5.26) reflects the indirect effect of the subsidy. 
The origin of those two terms could be traced back to the effect 
of subsidies or government income. 
E2_ (~3 + °1 + 11 V,)E + (0(, 0'3 -~, (;(3) 
I = _ [E ~ '62 :- »2 '(1) + (0(2 ~ 1 - 0(1 1'2~ESoeEt •• (5.30 : 
( E -1'2) [e 1 _ (0<1 + )', + )'1 Y,)E + (0(113 - 110(,) 
01ear1y as E increases, I decreases. Thus, if the rate of erowth 
of the subsidy is higher, there will be a greater diminution in 
growth of government income, which in turn would lead to a 
diminution in the growth of wage incomes of the poor. 
Similar discussion can be, carried out regarding the direct and 
indirect effects of foreign aid, direct taxes and indirect taxes. 
But the usefu1ness of the model could perhaps be better appreCiated 
if numerical values are assigned to the parameters and growth 
patterns are analysed. In particular we could analyse the time 
paths of Y1, Y2 and Yg under alternative values of parameters, 
as for example alternative values for the rate of growth of 
subsidies. The results of such an exercise could be of some help 
in deciding between the policy options available. 
For purposes of illustration, four variants will be discussed • 
. : 1· < , • 
. 
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We shal.~ begin with the values of the parameters shown as 
Set 2 in the previous chapter except for the values of the Y s. 
The Y s have to be adjusted since they now represent po.st tax 
incomes. The direct tax rate wi~~ be taken as 0.1, since on 
the basis of 1972 data on income and on personal eVe"d{e tax, the,..ra. e 
works out to around 0.11. The indirect tax rate ti1 is far more 
difficalt to be estimated. In the absence of a specific method, 
~articularly the contribution to output from the modern sector, 
an estimate of ti1 = 0.5 ~las thought to be a plausible value to 
work with. The rate of decline of foreign aid in real terms is 
tween as 1 per cent per annum. Initially, the rate of increa.ses 
of subsidies was taken as 1 per cent. 
The subsidy considered here has been limited to the food subsidy 
only, estimated at Rs.526m in 1972, representing ~.86 per cent 
of GNP.1 For the purpose of this exercise the value taken was 
So = 4. In the case of foreign aid its various forms such as 
Project Aid, Suppliers Aid, Suppliers Credit, Grants, Special 
Drawing Rights that came within the meaning of foreign aid 
discussed here came to a.bout Rs.600m (net of repayment). Accor-
dingly F 0 was taken as 5. 
1 See Nahalingasivam [1978; p.78} 
" 
" 
Variant I " 
a1 = 0.30 
w11 = 0.1 
W1g = 0.2 
8 1 = 0.15 
& = -0.01 
5 - 23 
b 1 = 0.32 
w21 = 0.4 
w2g = 0.6 
So = -4 
td = 0.1 
-Y1 = 34 
£ = 0.01 
b2 = 0~30 
P1 = 0.5 
p = 0.2 g 
8 2 =0.18 
ti1 = 0.5 
Y2 = 56 
So = 4 
a = 0.25 g 
q = 0.6 
s = 0.10 g 
Y = 10 g 
FO = 5 
Substitution of these values in equation (5.22) yield 
0(1 = 0.033 11 = 0.0046 ~ = 0.046 
~ = 0.0164 (32 = 0.054 Po = -1.2 
'(2 = 0.015 '12 = 0.15 Y2 = 0.06 
0(3 = 0.006 .3 = 0.005 ~}= 0.05 "'3 = 0.02 
When these values are in turn substituted in the appropriate 
equations in Appendix VII we get 
A = 40.06 B = -3.59 ~1 = -0.75 f2 = -0.32 
With these values, the solution (5.26) reads 
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Y = 8.69 eO.034t +22.61 eO.004t -14.96 e-O.01t -6.3 eO.01t 
g 
Y2 = 22.22 + 89.4 eO.054t -43.50 eO.034t -5.58 eO.004t 
-7.2 e-O.01t + 0.743 eO.01t 
At t = 10 
Y1 = 50.55 
'Variant II 
Y = 15.19 g 
Let us assume that subsidies are held constant, i.e. E= 0 
Then the parameters will be the same as in Variant I except for: 
£=0 f.'2=0 
J. = 40.32 B = -2.57 C = 88.83 
Y1 = 40.32 eO.034t _2.57~·004t - 3.75 e-O.01t 
Y = 8.76 eO.034t + 16.2 eO.004t -14.96 e -0.01t 
g 
Y2 = 22.22 + 88.83 eO.054t -43.80 eO.034t 
At t = 10 
Variant III 
'Let us consider the caDe of E = 0.05 
-7.28 e-O•Ott 
Y = 15.56 g 
Then al.l the parameters will be the SW!le as in Variant I 
.. 
except for: 
f = 0.05 
A = 42.23 
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.F2 = 0.312 
B = -}.23 
In this case, at t = 10, we get 
Variant IV 
C = 118.6 
Instead of increasing E let us keep it at E: = 0.01 and increase 
82 to 0.2 so that (32 = 0 • .06. Then all parameters are the same as 
in Variant I except for: 
(32 = 0.06 c = 72.26 
In this case, at t =10, we get 
The results obtained may be summarised as follows: 
Table 5.1 
Summary of the Results of Variants I - IV 
Income Initial Values of variables at t = 10 
Share Values Variant I Variant II Variant III Variant IV 
Y1 34 50.55 50.57 50.51 50.55 (29.1) (30) (30.0) (28.2) 
Y2 56 103.27 102.7 105.51 113.62 (61.1) (61) (62.6) (63.3) 
Yg 10 15.19 15.56 12.5 15.19 (9.0) (9) (7.4) (8.5) 
To1ial 100 169.01 168.83 168.52 179.36 (100%) (1 OO}~) (100%) (100-fo) 
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The above results highlight the limited nature of the impact of 
subsidies upon the incomes ot the poor at a -terminal date. Bearing 
in mind that the estimates ot S and other parameters reasonably 
reflect the Sri Lankan situation it would appear that, when E 
representing the rate of growth of subsidies is increased from 1 
per cent to 5 per cent per annum, the income of the poor Y2 at t = 
10 changes only from 103.27 to 105.51. That is, a five fold 
increase in the rate of growth of subsidies bringing about only a 
marginal gain. -
On the other hand if the parameter (32' is slightly increased from 
0.054 to 0.060,holding E constant at 0.01, Y2 increases from 103.27 
to 113.62. These results indioate that a strategy which designed 
to improve the relative' position of the poor within a growth oum 
redistributive process, should be primarily aimed at raising the 
growth rate of the incomes of the poor. That is policy measures 
should be desiened to inorease 1'2 which in the main parameter 
assooiated with the growth of inoomes of the poor. Sinoe (32 is 
the product of the output-capital ratio b2 and the marginal savings 
rate of the poor s2' it follows that an increase in either para-
meters could bring about the desired result. The parameter b2 
could be increased by a wide range of measures such as the proviSion 
of-better irrigation facilities to farmers, distribution of high 
yielding seed varieties to farmers, provisions of equipment (eg. 
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farm mechanization) or promotion of rural industry. Alternatively, 
a package of measures such as higher interest rates on savings 
deposits, extension of branch banking, increasing the supply of 
investment goods could stimulate greater savings. We shall discuss 
these policies in greater detail in Chapter 9. 
5.4 Summary 
~ attempt was made in this chapter to bring the model developed 
in Chapter 4 closer to the real situation by incorporating three 
important elements. These were direct and indirect taxes, a 
financial institution, and the flow of foreign aid, all of which 
feature prominently in the formulation of national plans and 
annual budgets. We were thus able to show concisely that distri-
bution of incomes ia determined not only by the distribution of 
capital stocks, wage and profitability parameters, but also by the 
levels of direct and indirect taxes. 
Dtatic considerations of the model showed the advantages of moving 
away from subsidies in the direction of augmenting the capital 
stock of the poor. A numerical exercise carried out showed that 
although there would be a drop in the incomes of the poor initially, 
after a short period of time its initial value would be restored 
and would increase thereafter. Nore importantly, the numerical 
exercise showed the manner in which subsidy burden upon the 
. . '.,. .. "B . . 
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government budget could be halved and indicated the more favourable 
option of diverting the balance · resources for development. 
Likewise, dynamic considerations of the model yielded a number of 
. results in addition to those obtained in Chapter 4. The role of 
foreign aid presented an interesting result. It was possible to 
demonstrate that foreign aid would contribute more towards the 
growth of incomes of the poor than of the rich. Another interesting 
result obtained was that the rate of growth of income of the rich 
contributes positively to that of the poor, the policy implication 
being ~curbing the rate of growth of incomes of the rich would 
adversely affect the rate of growth of income of the poor. We noted 
that this result was traceable to tax revenue which enables the 
government to provide a higher wage income to the poor. 
The complete solution showed that interdependencies amongst the 
various elements of the model could be somewhat more complex in 
a dynamic growth cum redistribution process when we take account 
of additional features mentioned above. The more generalised 
solution obtained reiterated the conclusion in Chapter 4 that the 
poor would have to save more and invest more in order to eenerate 
greater output or alternatively raise output per unit of capital 
employed and indicated the areas of priority. Distinctions were 
made between the direct and indirect effects of subsidies. We 
noted that the net result of a higher growth rate in subsidies 
would be a greater diminution in the growth of government income, 
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which in turn"would lead to a diminution in the bTowth of wage 
incomes of the poor. We elaborated this point further in terms 
of numerical simulations which yielded somewhat more dramatic 
results. The entire exercise demonstrated that significant 
. increaseS in the rate of growth of subsidies leads only to a 
terminal 
marginal increase in the income of the poor at aLdate. On the 
other hand the exercise demonstrated the manner in which the 
~ncome of the poor at a terminal date could be increased through 
a marginal increase in the parameter (32 through measures that 
could either increase the productivity of capital owned by the 
poor or their marginal savings rate. \'le also noted that the 
former could include measures such as the provision of better 
irrigation facilities to farmers, farm mechanization, and that 
the latter could include measures such as higher interest rates 
on savings deposits or a greater supply of investment goods. 
6 -1 
. CHAPrER 6 
THE INCENTIVE EFFECT 
"Economic development has led to a 
large secular decline in the work 
week ••• Consequently the alloca-
tion and efficiency of non-rlorking 
time may now be more important to 
economic welfare than that of work-
ing time; yet the attention paid by 
economists to the latter dwarfs any 
paid to the former" - G.S. Becker 
(A Theory of the Allocation of Time) 
6.1 Introduction 
The implementation of redistributive policies whether it be 
through direct taxation or through other measures discussed 
in this study is likely to alter the relative status of skilled 
manpower or the professional class in society. The professional 
class consisting of scientiots, engineers, doctors, economists, 
planners, accountants, managers, administrators, entrepreneurs, 
and other skilled personnel, though relatively small in a develop-
ing country plays a dominant role in the development process of 
the country. Professionals are either at the helm of affairs, 
formulating economic policy and development plans or in charge 
of setting up ner' industrial ventures and guiding them through 
initial stages or engaged in other development work. 
In Sri Lanka, the number of professional techniaal ~~d r~lated 
personnel with graduate or equivalent qualifications was estimated 
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to be around 21,3001 in 1971 representing less than 0.5 per cent of 
the total labour force in 1971 estimated to be of the order of 
4.5 million. 2 The crucial role of skilled manpower in the 
development process was referred to thus by the Cabinet Committee 
"\ie consider that it is necessary to 
recognise the pivotal role of scien-
tific, professional and technical 
personnel in economic development. 
Their skills are vital to our national 
well being •••••••• OUT task is to 
develop a practical frame,.,ork of 
policy which would ensure that optimum 
use is made of our SCientific, profes-
sional and technical personnel". 
It is in the spirit of this train of thought that we shall attempt 
to take account of skilled manpower in the model developed, at 
least in a formal sense and to the extent possible. 
6.2 An Extension of the Model 
In the discussion by Codippily{1974} attention was focussed only 
upon the process of trading off leisure for work by the explicit 
use of utility functions. The utility functions were conceived 
of as depending upon the two variables, leisure and income. 
Although the process of trading off leisure for work, incentive 
1 See Sessional Paper No. X of 1974 Report of the Cabinet Committee 
. Inquiring into the Problem of Technologically Professionally 
and Academically Qualified Fersonnel leaving Sri Lanka, p.10. 
2 See, Department of Census and Statistics, Census of Fopulation 
1971, Sri Lanka, General Report, Colombo, 1978, p.124 
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losses and gains and the consequent impact upon total income 
based on wage rates were discussed in analytical terms, a major 
inadequacy was the absence of explicit production functions. We 
shall therefore redefine the production functions already intro-
duced as being dependent upon skilled manpower as well as capital. 
To begin with, let us eo back to equations (5.14) and make certain 
simplifying assumptions such as ignoring indirect taxes, govern-
ment borrowing the use of non linked capital and use simple~ 
notions of government income for the sake of clarity of exposition. 
1 
We coul.d then write Y1 and Y2 as 
• • • (6.1 ) 
where L1 denoted skilled manpower in the modern (private) sector 
and L denoted skilled manpower in the government sector. g 
Let us assume that the direct tax rate td is one of factors 
upon which L1 and Lg are dependent. Then, as td increases, one 
woul.d expect L1 and Lg to decrease on account of trading off 
1 OUl" p1'eV'lous a S6 umptions abou.t fixed shares 
of wages And ~Tofi ts wou.ld be less tenabl~ 
in te1"rns of the v~Tiable propoy tions iro l'[icit 111 
ihis modal. 
. , 
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leisure for wOrk as shown by Codippily 1 {1974}. Then,for a small 
increase in td denoted bYAtd , the changes in Y1 and Y2 denoted by 
AY1 and~2 will be as follows: 
••• (6.2) 
In the above equations, the terms oQ1 and uQ
e 
are easily identified 
vL1 dLg 
as the marginal. products of skilled personnel in the private and 
1 Utility of the rich had been defined as 
U 1 = U 1 (E1, Y 1 ) 
where lj:1 = leisure enj oyed and 
Y1 = earned income (profit income had been ignored) 
Suppose H1 = maximum number of hours that could be worked 
(with zero leisure) 
w1 = actual number of hours worked 
r 1 = hourly earning rate 
Then U1 = U1 [H1 - w1' r 1 wd 
Maximisation of U1 yields w1 as a function of r 1 
i.e. w1 = f ( r 1) and hence ~w1 = f ( r 1 )AT1 
Therefore AY1 = A( r 1 w1 ) 
= Ar 1 w 1 + r 1 A w 1 
= [w1 + r 1f' (r1)] Ar1 
Clearly if ~rf is negative AY1 will be negative since the 'term 
within square bracket is pos1t1ve,2tst5uming that f'(:() ) o. 
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government sectors. The terms ~L1 and d1 are the rates of change 
_ --ii 
otd utd . 
in the supply of 11 and Lg with respect to td. On account of the 
leisure - income preference relationship (see foot note on previous 
page) we should expect L1 and 19 to decrease with increases in td. 
That is 
~11 
otd 
< 0 
01 
• • • (6.3) g < 0 
otd 
Since w21 and w2g are positive and since the marginal products 
oQ1 and oQ are also positive it follows from equations (6.2) 
- --.£. 
"0 L1 oLg 
that AY2<O for a positive value of td. That is, an increase in 
tax would have the immediate effect of lowering the income of the 
poor, the underlying reason being the decrease in the supply of 
skilled manpower in the private and government sectors and the 
consequent loss of output, on the assumption of course that the 
production functions are 'well behaved'. SUPPosing the t rut 
derived is transferred to the poor, the net effect could be 
investigated as follows: 
From the first of equations (6.1) it follows that: 
Y1 = (w11 + P1) Q1 + w1g Qg (1 + t d ) 
~'.. ' .' :: 
• • • 
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Therefore the ·,increase in tax obtained from the increment Atd 
wi~l be: 
Y1 ~td = (w11 + P1) Q1 + w1gQg Atd 
(1 + t d ) 
1 
= [(W11 + P1 )Q1 + w1g QgJ[ 1 - td1 ~td ••• (6.5) 
If the increase in tax revenue so obtained is transferred to the po~ 
then the net chan6e of income of the poor will be given by: 
••• (6.6) 
The first term within square brackets represents the post-tax 
income of the rich. The second term represents the wage parameters 
of the poor multiplied by the respective marginal products of 
skilled manpower in the private and r;overnment sectors as well as 
the rate of change of their supply in relation to the tax rate. 
In view of the obvious difficulties in estimating these functions, 
partioularly the rate of ohange of supply of skilled manpower 
with respeot to the direot tax rate, we do not propose to quantify 
equation (6.6). The only conolusion we could make is that equation 
(6.6) sums up the positive and negative effects upon the income of 
1 Nore preoisely, inorease in tax = ~[Y1 + Y1 -At~Atd == Y1 Atd 
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of the poor arising from an increase of direct taxes. The first 
term within the square brackets is positive while the second term 
is negative since dL1 and ~ are negative. Therefore the net 
~td ~td 
result would depend upon the relative magnitude of the two terms. 
There is room for the net result to be negative. In such a 
situation, it would appear that the very process of trying to 
improve the incomes of the poor by direct taxation and redistri-
bution would be self defeating. 
The above discussions are based upon static considerations of the 
model. Let us now shift our attention to the more important 
aspect of the problem i.e. that connected with possible decreases 
in skilled manpower over time. This would necessarily involve 
dynamic considerutions of the model. 
6.' Dynamic Considerations 
A decrease in the supply of skilled manpower can take place due to 
a variety of factors other than direct taxes referred to in the 
previous section. Perhaps the dominant factor amongst these is 
the "brain drain" caused by "pull" factors such as better oppor-
tunlties for advancement abroad · or shortages in manpower in 
c~rtain fields or "push" factors such as low salaries, lack of 
recognition of merit, relatively low status of professionals in 
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the administrative system or a 1ack of incentives for professiona1 
1 
advancement. It is not possib1e to take account of these faotors 
in ana1ytioa1 terms. But it is possib1e to indioate a genera1 
framework,in terms of the mode1 deve1oped, within which we can 
disouss the oonsequenoes of a de01ine in ski11ed manpower due to 
a variety of factors in general. Suoh a framework oould be 
developed by differentiating equations (6.1) and an analogous 
equation for Yg to obtain. 
• Et . 
+ b2K2 + Eo SOe 
(sinoe Q2 = b2K2 and 3 = soe~t ) 
Yg = Pg[~Qg Kg + ~Qg Lg + td Y1] 
oKg oLg 
••• (6.7) 
Subject to the simplifioations mentioned above, the oapital 
accumulation equations (5.18) would reduoe to: 
. 
K1 = s1 Y1 
. 
Kg = S Y + F 
______________________ g g t ••• (6.8) 
1 See The Colombo Plan - Special Topio Papers {1972; pp. 1-3} 
• Yg = ~gr()Qg 
l~K g 
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and K' g in equations (6.7) we get 
••• (6.9) 
. 
It is clear from the above equations that negative values of L1 
and i representing decreases in the stock of skilled manpower in g 
the private and government sectors would have a negative impact 
upon the growth rates of income both of the rich and the poor. 
That is, the net result would be a slowing down of the entire 
growth process. We shall not attempt to quantify these results on 
account of the extreme difficulties involved in estimating some of 
the terms. 
The policy implication vIe could derive from these equations ia the 
importance that should be attached to curbing the loss of skilled 
manpower. In the Sri Lankan context some remedial measures have 
been already adopted, such as exempting government employees from 
I, p 
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income tax in"respect of salaries received from Government (see 
Budget Speech of November 1978) or the recent increase in the 
salaries of engineers. Efforts in these directions may require 
to be pursued further. 
., . 
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CHAPrEH 7 
C01'iSIDERATIONS 0]' OprnIAL GROWTH 
"Consumption - to repeat the obvious -
is the sole end of object of economic 
activity ••• consumption for which we 
can profitably provide in advance cannot 
be pushed indefinitely into the future" 
J.H. Keynes (General Theory, page 104) 
7.1 Introduction 
Although a number of issues relating to income redistribution 
and economic grol'lth ha.ve been discussed in the preceding chapters, 
. 
a question we have not dealt with so far concerns optimality in a 
growth cum redistribution process. The basic question to be posed 
is, how can we choose an optimum path "lhen there a.re several 
~ths available for redistribution with growth? This necessarily 
involves the specification of an objective function and the 
optimisation of this ftUlction over time, within the frameuork of 
a growth cum redistribution process. 
The central question posed in Ramaey's seminal paper of 1928 was 
"how much should a society save if ",eIfare is to be optimised?" 
Literature on optimal economic Growth initiated by this paper 
is so voluminous today, particularly due to its erowth during 
the last two decades, that it seems beyond the scope of this 
study to make an adequate review. Instead it may suffice to 
note that cOllsiderutions of optimal economic &Towth have been 
applied to a wide ranee of. situations. Notable contr~tions 
include papers by Goodwin {1961} concerning optimal growth in an 
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underdeveloped economy, by Chakravarty {1962}on optimal savings 
within a finite time horizon, by Chakravarty {1965] again, on opti-
mal capital accumulation in a multi-sector economy, by Uzawa {19641 
and Srinivasan {1964} on optimal growth in a two sector economy~ 
by Karl Shell {1967J on questions of optimality in capital accumu-
lation when there is exogenous technical change, by Dixit {1968} 
on optimal development in a labour surplus economy, by Dixit {1969} 
again, on partial planning in a dual economy with particular 
reference to pricing policy for food, by Dorfman {1969}on the 
application of optimal control theory and by Iyoha {1972} on the 
formulation of the opticisation problem as a multi-stage decision 
problem under uncertaint~ for obtaining a solution on a sequential 
basis with the use of dynamic programming techniques. 
But apparently there has been no attempt to discuss optimal 
growth possibilities within a growth cum redistribution process 
of the type discussed in this study. l~obably, the closest to 
it is the contribution by Hamada {1967} regarding the optimal 
transfer and income distribution in a growing economy. But he 
has discussed only the limited case where ''lorkers do not save 
at all. r·1oreover, the government is not taken account of as an 
explicit entity, and only one policy instrument is used. 
In this chapter ~le shall make an attempt to incorporate optimal 
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growth considerations into the model developed in this study. But 
with a view to keeping the mathematical exposition in a manageable 
form we shall consider the application of optimal growth to a 
somewhat simplified form of the model. 
7.2 The Hodel 
In the simplified model used in this chapter, the outputs of the 
r~spective sectors are defined by the equations 
Q1 = a1 K1 (Modern Sector) 
Q2 =P2 K2 (Traditional Sector) 
Q = a K (Government Sector) g g g ••• (7.1) 
where the Q s and the K s have the same notations as before and 
a1 , P2' and ag are the output-capital ratios. 
As before, it is assumed that the rich and the poor receive wage 
incomes from employment in the modern sector and that the former 
receive a profit income as well. The rest of the income of the 
poor consists of the output generated from capital owned by them 
and wage income from government. One simplifyine assumption made 
here is that of ignoring the waee income of the rich from govern-
ment. The model also has provision for a transfer of income to 
the poor from the incomes of the rich beyond a taxable limit Z1. 
It is assumed that a proportion A of the income of the rich beyond 
a·level Z1 is transferred from the rich to the poor; in fact ~ 
will be one of the control variables. Thus, the distribution of 
" 
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incomes will then be determined according to the following 
.. 
equations. 
Income of the rich: Y1 = Z1+(0<1K1-Z1)(1 - A.) 
Income of the poor: Y2 =IXzK1+(cx1K1-Z1)A+A2K2+Y2Kg 
Government Income: Y =13K g g 
where a1 =CX:, +~, ag= '(2+ 03' and 0 ~ A 6 1 
• • • (7.2) 
In the above equations ~1K1 represents the total income of the 
rich (from the modern sector) and it is assumed that this exceeds 
the taxable limit Z l' i. e ( 0(.1 K1 -z 1 ) ) 0, so that there is a surplus 
available for transfer. But the quantum of such a transfer wi~ 
depend on the value of A which has to be determined. The term 
~2K1 represents the wage income received by the poor from the 
modern sector and 12Kg that received from the government sector. 
The term ~3Kg represents the government income net of personal 
emoluments. It is also assumed that the rich and the poor do not 
reverse roles during the time horizon considered (see Appendix IX 
regarding the vnlid.l.ty of this assumption) 
Assuming s1 to be the average savings rate of the rich, capital 
accumulation by the rich is defined by the equation: 
••• 
. 
The savings rate s1 is assumed to be fixed; K1 is the investment 
net of depreciation. 
In the case of the poor it is assumed that wage income received 
_~ I.: '· . • ~ ~ "~ '. 
" 
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from gover~ent i.e. 12Kg ,wage income received from the modern 
sector i.e. «2K1 as well as the income transferred i.e. 
A(OC1K1- Z1) are all consumed, but that a fixed proportion s2 
of income derived from the use of their own capital is saved 
and invested. 
In view of the importance attached to the growth of capital 
for self employment (see earlier chapters), we shall also make 
provision for the transfer of some part of government savings 
to the poor as capital grants to augment their stock of capital. 
Specifically, it is assumed that a proportionJA of government 
savings beyond a level Ig is transferred to the poor in the 
form of capital grants. Investment Ii may be thought of as the 
average level of government investment that would have to be 
carried out in any case for "continuation projects" of government 
for which commitment has already been made. In other words, the 
implicit assumption is that Ig is exogenously defined. Accord-
ingly, the capital accumulation equations of the poor and 
government are: 
k2 = s2f2~ + fl (s g 13Xg - I e) 
.K = I + (1 -r)(8 ¥3K - I ) g egg e ••• 
where s is the average rate of savings by government assumed g 
fixed, and o~)A ~ 1 . 
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7.3 The Optimisation Problem 
In Chapter 1 we briefly noted that the search for a "more or 
less ethics free" theory of welfare largely influenced by 
Pareto optimality had been a fruitless one. Subsequent 
approaches to welfare theory based on concepts of a social 
welfare function recognised that value judgements were inevitablE 
if distributive questions were to be discussed. It is in the 
spirit of these developments that we make a value judgement 
here. that we are primarily concerned with the question ot 
improving the weltare of the poor. Accordingly we shall consider 
the question of optimisation of the consumption of the poor, 
discounted over a finite period of time. The welfare of the 
rich is not altogether ignored; for. the very formulation of 
the model ensures that the rich will receive an income of 41 
atleast and that transfers could take place only from their 
income in excess of ~1. The usual practice is to consider 
the question of optimisation of utility of consumption rather 
than consumption itself. But with a view to obtaining explicit 
solutions and deriving clear cut policy guidelines we shall opt 
for the latter. 1 Such simplifications have been made,for 
example, by Uzawa {1964} , Karl Shell {1976~ , Hamada {1967} 
Iyoha {1972} and by Heal {1973; pp. 299-301}. 
1 The question of optimising utility of consumption will be 
considered in Section 7.5 
-. . ~~ 
., 
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The consumption function of the poor is given by 
C = 0(2. K1 + (C\'lS - Z1 )A+ (1 - 82 ) f32"Z2 + "t2Kg 
Let b be the rate of discount, assumed to be positive. 
We may now formulate the optimisation problem as: 
Maximise T 1 
llo£2:x, + ("1Kl - Ill) >.. + (1 - B2)f32'K2 +12~] eH dt 
8ubject to 0 
(i) Constraints imposed by the capital accumulation 
equations (7.3) and (7.4) 
( ii) i 1 ' K2 ' Kg > 0 
( iii ) Xl = K1 ) 0 , K2 = K2 > 0 
(iv) O'A~1, o'fL~1 
,K=K)O C g at t = 0 
• • • 
and subject to the assumption that the rich and the poor do 
not reverse roles over the period Co,T) (see Appendix IX) 
(7.6) 
The two policy instruments in the hands of the ·· government are 
represented by A and fA. That is, the government could control 
income transfers from the rich to the poor as well as the 
proportion of government savings transferred in the form of 
capital grants to the poor. The essence of the optimisation 
problem is to determine the manner in which A and JA should be 
varied in order to maximise the above integral subject to the 
conDtraints mentioned. 
1Alternatively one could take up the question of optimising 
. per capita consumption of the poor rather than total 
consumption of the poor. In this case the change in the 
maximand essentially amounts to changing the exponential 
term. But the changes in the constraint equations could 
make the analysis more cumbersome. 
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Another important consideration that should be taken note of 
at this stage is that of terminal capital stocks. Although 
the optimisation exercise is carried out over a finite planning 
horizon, it does not mean that the post planning period could 
be altogether ignored. On the contrary the optimisation 
exercise must inter alia ensure that Bufficient capital is left 
over at the end of the planning period under consideration so 
as to provide for output and consumption in the post planning 
period. One of the earliest attempts to take account of this 
problem in optimal growth literature was that of Chakravarty 
{1962}. He postulated that in order to provide for a capital 
stock which we would wish to bequeath for the future, the 
initial stock of capital Ko should grow at a rategto a terminal 
value of Koest . But the determination of a value forgwas 
arbitrary, and consequently the determination of terminal 
capital stock remained arbitrary. The procedure followed later 
by Chakravarty {1969} sought to get over this problem by taking 
into account explicitly the rate of growth of consumption in 
the post planning period. He obtained an expression K(T) = 
Cr/(b-r) where b is the output - capital ratio, r is the rate 
of growth of consumption andC~ is the terminal year consumption 
which is left to be determined by the optimising mechanism. 
Again Sen {1967} suggested the notion of a "terminal margin" 
in terms of which an arbitrarily stipulated proportion of the 
terminal year's output should be saved. According to this 
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method the value judgement about how much of a margin should 
be left over is reduced to the choice of a value of A in the 
interval ( 0,1). 
Another approach to the question of determining terminal capital 
has been that of incorporating the terminal capital explicitly 
in the maximand. For example Manne {1974} considered the 
maximisation of the function 
T 
L 'Ut (e t )+ pkT+1 
t·1 
where ct = consumption at time t, 
Ut = present value of cardinal utility of consumption 
. ~+1= terminal capital stock 
p = terminal stock valuation coefficient, assumed positive 
The above function is maximised subject to a number of constraintc 
following a linear programming approach rather than a Ramsey type 
one which we shall consider here. As in the case of a dynamic 
Leontief system, the dual variables are calculated recursively. 
In the ensuing analysis (of his study) value judgements are 
found to be inevitable in determing terminal capital stocks. 
Depending on whether the planner is a conservative or a radical 
it is found that p = aT-i-' or p III 0.35 a T +1 
where a is the subjective disoount factor. 
Thus, the inevitability of value judgements and an element of 
arbitrariness in determing terminal capital stocks still 
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remain. This must necessarily be so. For, as well summed up 
by Heal D973, pp.260-261} in order to determine how much the 
terminal capital stocks ought to be, the planning board must 
know: 
(i) how long after T the world will continue; 
(ii) what consumption possibilities from T onwards 
are implied by a given value of KT 
(iii) the form of preferences concerning post-plan 
consumption streams. 
Reasons for arbitrariness in determining KT are clearer now. 
For, no planning board could venture to make even guesses about 
(i) above~ Nevertheless, some value judgements are possible in 
regard to (ii) and (iii) above and it is on the basis of these 
that one would have to proceed. 
For the purpose of this study we shall make the assumption that 
terminal capital is determined by the optimisation process 
itself but that in per capita terms it will not be less than 
the initial capital. As~uming that the output-capital ratios 
remain unchanged, the above assumption ensures that out-
put in per capita terms will not be below those prevailing at 
thebeginnin~of the plan period. This assumption takes account 
of points (ii) and (iii) mentioned by Heal but without being 
too restrictive. For, per capita output levels are assured at 
a level not less than those prevailing initially, and actual 
consumption out of output in the post plan period could be left 
to be determined by the consumer preferences of this future 
", 
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period. Our assumptions reearding terminal capital requirements 
may be spelt out algebraically as follows: 
Let r 1 = rate of population increase of the rich 
= " 
K1 = K1 et'IT 
K2 = K2e
T1T 
K = K g g 
" " " " 
tt poor 
wpere K" X2' Kg represent the lower bounds of terminal capital 
or the minimum terminal capital required. 
Then, according to our assumption concerning terminal capital, 
K1 (T) 4K1 
K2 (T) ~K2 
(T) .-= K ~K ••• (7.7) g g 
the above inequalities complete the formulation of the 
optimisation problem. 
7.4 The Solution 
Let the Hamiltonian be ' defined as 
H =: li~K1 r( cx1K1-Z1 ) A + l'2Kg +( 1-s2 ) P2K2}+q1 8 1 {Z1 +( 1-X){O<1 K1-Z1 )} 
+ q2{s2f2K2+f(Sgt3Kg-Ie)+q3{Ig+(SgY3Kg-Ib)(1-~)~ e- 6t 
- &~ -H -it Where q1 e , q2e , q3e are the Hwnil t onian multipliers. 
K1, K2, Kg are the state variables. 
qt' q2' q3 are the co-state variables 
A and)'- are the control variables. 
t . . -:,:- ' 
t' ''' ' 
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Applying Pontryagin' s Naximwn Principle {1962~, the conditions for an 
., 
optimal solution are th~t there exists non-zero continuous functions 
q, (t), q2 (t) ,q,( t ) within the interv~ Ol:.'·t ~ T such that 
(1) for each fixed set of K1, K2, Kg' q1' q2' q3' a maximum 
Of: Ii.(~1"K2' Kg' Q1' Q2' Q3, AJr) is attained 
(ii) 
in the region defined by 0 4 ). ~ 1, 
q-~Qi= _OH', 1=1,2,org ••• i ' ~K 
where H' is th~ undiscounted Hamiltonian (i.e H = HeSt) 
• ()}{ I ( iii) K i = [) qi' Ki (0) = Ki ' i = 1, 2, Qr g ••• 
and the transversality conditions. 
(iv) qi(T)e- H ~ 0, qie- IiT [Ki(T) -iJ= 0 • • • 
The co-state variables Q1' Q2' Q3 may be interpreted as the shadow 
prices of capital accumulation by the rich, the poor and government 
in terms of consumption foregone by the poor in time t. The 
Hamiltonian H is of the form 
H = [HO +(o<.1 K1-Z1 )(1-~·s1).A. +(Sg~3Kg-Ig)(Q2-Q3)f] e- 6t (7.12) 
where HO is the sum of the terms independent of A and f . 
Since this function is linear in 
A. and r it follows that a maximum 
of H is attained at one of the 
corner points of the square 
o £::A~1, 
As could be seen from figure 7.1 a 
maximum can be attained at A, B, C 
or D depending on 
" . I ~'" j 
:": '~i~ 
A Choice Set for A and,u 
I 
A B 
11--------
o 
; to" , 
."", ,. 
c 
1 
Fieure 1.1 
" 
7 - 13 
the signs of the coefficients of A and fl-
Since the terms (cx,K1-Z:1) and (Sg ¥31{g-Ig > were taken to 
be positive in the formulation of the model, it follows that 
the signs of the coefficients of). and f- will be entirely 
determined by (1 -q1 S 1) and (q2-q3). Thus, there are four 
cases in all: 
Case A : if 1-41 Sl) 0 ,Q2-q3<o, a maximum will be attained at A 
Here ). = 1., f" = 0 
Case B : if 1-41 s1 ) o . , q2-q3) 0 
Here A= 1, fA = 1 
Case C : if 1-Q1S 1 (0 , Q2- q3 )0 
Here A= O,p.= 1 
Case D : if 1 -q1 s 1 < 0 , q2 -q3 <. 0 
Here A= 0, fA- = 0 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" " " B 
" " " C 
It 
" " o 
That is, H could attain a maximum at anyone of the points (0,1) 
. 
(1,1), (1,0) or (0,0) and the solutions are of the "bang-bang" 
type. 
Since the constants in the solution forQ1,Q2' q3 are determined 
by the boundary conditions at t = T and in view of the possi-
bilities of switches from one case to another within the interval 
o ~ t i: T', we shall begin the analysis by inquiring how the 
.system behaves in the neighbourhood of t = T, and work back-
wards thereafter. But the first question that ought to be 
settled is whether all cases are feasible at t = T ? 
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From equation (7.3) it is clear that the lowest rate of 
accumulation of K1 would take place whenA= 1, in which 
case the equation would read as: 
• 
K1 = Er 1 Z1 • •• (7.13 ) 
Therefore K1 = K1 ;.e"1 Z1t · . . (7.14) 
At t = T, K1 (T) = K1 + S1 Z1 T 
-
= K1 eTeT But K1 
::= 
Therefore K1 (T) > K1 , 
. so long as K1 + s 1 Z1 
T ) K eY,T 
1 
or s1 Z1 T ) K (e'1e" " 1 - 1 ) • •• (7.15) 
The above inequality is satisfied in terms of the data frame-
work used (see Appendix VIII). It follO\'1s therefore that 
• • • (7.16) 
which when taken together "1i th the transversali ty conditions 
(7.11) yields 
• • • (7.17) 
That is, the shadow price of K1 is zero at t = T since the 
terminal capital requirement is over-fulfilled. 
Similarly, it is clear . from equation (7.4) that the lowest rate 
of accumulation of K2 would take place "'hen fl= 0, in which 
case the equation would read as: 
• K - - e S2.f3a.t. 
•• 2-·K2 
== "i( _ 1&1" But K2 = 4"2e 
• •• 
• • • 
(7.18) 
(7.19) 
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Therefore (K2 (T) 
as long as 
· ... (7.20) 
The above inequality too is satisfied by the parameters used 
(see Appendix VIII) 
Therefore [K2 (T) - K2] > 0 and it follows from the transversali ty 
conditions (7.11) that 
• • • (7.21) 
In the case of capital accumulation by government, it is clear 
• = -that J{,.,.) 0 • Since by definition K = K , it follows immediately: 
-p g : g 
that .[Ke(T)-iJ )0. Again, as above,the transversality 
conditions yield: 
• •• 
Since q1 = 0 at t = T and q1(t) is a continuous function of t 
within the interval (O,T), the magnitude of q1 will be close 
to zero in the neighbourhood of t = T. In these circumstances 
the inequality 1 - q1 s1 < 0 cannot hold. This means that 
cases C and D are inadmissible at t = T. 
From equations (7.9) the canonical equations for q2 and q, ar€ 
Cl2 -&q2 = - [( 1-s2 ) f3 2+ q 2s 2(32J 
Therefore 
<t, - 6q3 = - [t2+ q2S e 03f -+- q'~g t3 (1-!-)J (7. 24-
42 - q3 = (2-,t32(1-s2 )+&cli''<l2s 2.f2 
Since q2 and q3 (7.25) 
• • that (q2 - q,) 
(7.2S 
-.0 as t-+T, it io clear from equation 
(7.26 
I. 
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Now "2 =-, 0.2, (32 = 0.28, (1 - S2) = 0.9 (see Appendix VIII) 
Therefore D2 - (32 (1 - s2) <.. 0 
i.e. (q2 - q3) tends to a negative value as1 ~T. 
Further, q2 - q3 is zero at t = T. 
Therefore q2 - q3 must be positive just before t = T. 
In these circumstances Case A is inadmissable. 
at t = T. Thus, we are left ,,,i th Case B as the only feas"tble 
case at t = T. 
the 
That is, irrespective of the case in whj.chAsystem may begin 
or enter subsequently, the system must end in Case B. 
Starting from this point we can now work backwards to find how 
the system behavE!l during 0 ~ t ~ T 
The canonical equation for q1 is 
ql - ~ql = -[~ + cXl'~' + q1 sl (;(1 (1 -~)] • •• (7.27) 
The relevant case in the neighbourhood of t = T is Case D. 
Therefore A= 1, and equation (7.27) reduces to 
q1 - &q1 = - ( ~2 + OC1) = - a 
The general solution is 
ht q1 = Ae 
where A is an arbitrary constant. 
At t = T, q1 = 0 
+ n 
r 
• •• (7.28) 
• •• (7.29 ) 
• •• 
• •• 
' ~, 
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Clearly •. Q1 is a continuous function of t for the range 
t defined and it steadily decreases to zero aa t tends to 
T. This solution will hold as long as 1 - q1 sl > 0 
wi thin the int erval 0 '" t i: T. That is, if we start from 
the point t = T and move baclola.rds in time, the above will 
be the solution up to a point t1 '1 0 at which point Q1 = 1 
8 1 
Whilst this is the general case, it may well be that 1 - Q1S1)( 
throughout the interval 0 ~ t i:. T, in which case the above 
solution will hold throughout the interval 0 't 'T. In 
this particular case A= 1 throughout the interval 0' t I: T . 
imp-lying that transfer of income from rich to the poor as 
defined by the equation (7.2) will take place throughout 
the plan period, with the parameter A = 1. 
In the general case just referred to, a switch can take 
place from one case to another, as shown below: 
= 1 
-
••• ,(7.32) 
Therefore t1 = T + t log r 1 - 6 J 
L aS1 
• • • 
As a first approximation t1 = T + t [- ..L - 1(.' S] (7.34) 
a 1 s1 2 ~t ." 
1 By Taylor's theorem log (1 - x) = - x 
e 
where Ixl < 1 
_ !,3 
3 
_ "£4 _ ... 
4 
. 
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Thus, when a switch in the value of A does take place ~lithin 
the interval 0 £:: t "T, the above formulae enable us to 
calculate the corresponding point of time. For example if we 
assiBn the numerical values:-
T = 25 years, £ = 0.05, a1 = 0.3, s1 = 0.25 
equation (7.33) yields 
t1 = 3 years. 
That is, during the interval t1 { t ~ T, q1 (t) which is a 
continuous function of · t steadily decreaseS from l ' to zero 
s1 
as t increases from t1 to T. Throughout this interval 
1 - q1 s1 > 0 and A = 1. During th is regime, capl tal 
accumulation takes place according to equations (7.3) and 
(7 .4) wi th A = 1. 
In the general case, when a Ri'litch takes place as at time t1 
as described above, it follows that just prior to t 1 , 1 
in l-lhich case A= O. The canonical equation for q1 then 
reads: 
. 
q1 - bq1 = - ~2 - q1 s1 oc1 
i.e. q1 - ( E, - s1 O(.t) q1 = - 0(2 
The general solution is 
~lhere A is an arbitrary constant. 
t .... :-: 
• • • (7.35) 
+ 
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i.e. q1 = Ae + ••• (7.36) 
[,- 8 1 ex, 
Therefore A = f1--
lS1 
0<.2 J e(6- s.cx.){- tl 
&- s10(1 J 
Thus, the complete solution is 
+ 
, which is a condition necessary 
for obtaining a value of t1 1'lithin (O,T). This solution will 
hold as long as 1 - q1 8 1 <. 0 within the interval 0 '- t " T, 
that is within 0 ~ t 4 t 1• Clearly q1 (t) as defined by I 
equation (7.37) above is a continuous function of t and steadil;yl~ .. 
decreases from 
I 
I' 
I 
i 
[
1- + 0( 2. to L as t varied 
~ .~ ~- s10<.1 s1 
from 0 to t 1• During this regime capital accumulation takes 
place according to equations (7.3) and (7.4) ,-11th Ar=O-
Let us call the period (0, t 1 ) TIegime I and period (t1,T)Regime I l 
C3ee figure 7.2) 
t . - -
., 
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Behavior of 91 with respect to time 
.. 
o T 
Figure 7.2 
t 
The~ the policy implications are that an optimal crowth cum 
redistribution programme calls for a liberal tax policy in 
Regime I. In fact A= 0 implies that there should be no 
taxes at all upon the j.ncomes of the rich. Such situations 
are not uncommon in the real '·lOrld. :r'or, the real ''lorld 
example is the tax holiday i.e. a period of time over which 
enterprises are allowed to function ~.nd LTOW without taxation. 1 
.Again, this policy implication is also in accord ,.,i th the con-
tention mentioned earlier in this study that an economy must 
be allowed to grow before the fruits of economic growth could 
be redistributed. Thus the first phase may even increase 
(see Appendix X) income inequality before attempts are mad~ to 
level off inco~e inequality which aGain is the broad empirical 
1 See footnote on page 7-21. 
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pattern of the Kuznets hypothesis. 
In Regime II, A= 1. This indicates a strong measure of income 
redistribution. In fact the implication is that all income 
beyond a level Z1 should be transferred from the rich to the 
poor, and capital accumulation would take place according to 
equation (7.3) with A= 1. This is admittedly an extreme case 
and is traceable to the form of the objective function, which 
is linear in A. As could be seen later, it is possible to 
obtain an interior solution for A i.e. an optimum solution 
where the v~lue of A will be between 0 and 1. In such a case -
the value of A will indicate the optimum proportion of income 
(beyond Z1) that should be trru1sferred from the rich to the poor. 
In order to solve the problem completely we shall now proceed to 
investigate the behaviour patterns of q2 and It was 
sho~m earlier (see discussion soon after equation (7.26) that 
q2 - q3 must be positive just prior to t = T. Since the 
relevant case just prior to t = T is Case D, it follows that 
f-= 1 just prior to t = T. If f- = 1, the canonical equations 
for q2 and q3 read as: 
q2 - £q2 = - [(1 - s2) (32 + q2 s2 f21 
• •• (7.38) 
l For example, tax holidays up to a maximum of 5 yearsarooffered 
to industries that are now being set up in the Investment 
Promotion Zone within the Greater Colombo Economic Commission. 
Similar concesslons are also offered to Small and r-:edium Scale 
Industries vThich are set up outside Colombo. 
", 
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••• 
Putting q4 = q2 - q3 we eet 
q4 - cSq4 = [~2 - (1 - 8 2 )(321 + q2(~ l'3 - s2(32) •• (7.40) 
From equation (7.38) 
(6 - Sl,s:l)t Therefore q2 = Ae + (1 - s2)(32 
( 6 - s2f2) 
where A is an arbitrary const,mt 
At t = T, q2 = 0 
Therefore A = - (1-82 ),I32e (6- Sl.j'3J.)(-T) 
(~- s2f32~ 
Therefore, the complete solution for q2 is 
[1 _ e ( & - s 2./h ) ( t - T) q2 = J (1 - 8 2 ),132 
(cS - s2f2) 
Substitutin6 for q2 in equation (7.40) we get 
where G = (Sg It - 8 21'2) (1 - 82 )(32 
o - s2f2) 
The complementary function = Ae ot and 
• • • 
••• (7.41) 
... (7.42) 
the particular integral = 1[12 - (1 - s2 )(32 + G] + Ge{'-S~~~:T)(7 .45 ; 
-s 8 2 f2 
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Since q2~ = 0 and q3 = 0 when t = T, q4 = 0 when t = T. 
Therefore A = [1 {Y2 + (1 - s2)f2 + G} _~le-6T (7.46) 
cS s2(3;1 
Therefore the complete solution is 
q4 = t '[°2 - (1 - s2)(32 + G] [ i~ (t-T) - ~ +G ecS(t-t)[e-S1."l(t~) 1J (7.47) 
s2f2 
Clearly q4 = 0 when t = T. 
It is not ilIlI!lediately obvious whether or not. q4 will be zero 
• for other values of t within the interval (O,T). These 
points of time (if any) could be found by solving the equation: 
In order to investigate the possibility of obtaining roots of 
the equation (7.48) we shall consider the behaviour of q4 in 
the first instance. Differentiatine equation (7.47) we eet: 
G (h-S21e;(t-T) + G (6_s.t.)e(6C S",,')(t-TJ 
6 2P2 8 2 ~2 ' ••• ,{7 .4( 
Substituting for G from equation (7.44) we get, 
• [ ( ~o(t-T) ( )( )<'-6a~J.)(t-'T) ( q4 = '(2 - Sg '63 1 - s2l + sg )'3- s2f2 1-82 e 7. 50 
6 2 s2 
It could be shown thnt q4 < 0 thro 'llghout the interval (0, T) as 
follows: 
(see Appendix VIII) (7.51 
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Subtract~ng the term 3g~3 (1 - s2) from both sides we get 
s2 
l' 2 - Sg 13 (1 - 8 2 ) 
s2 
< 112 (1 - s ) - s 'f (1 -9 ) r 2 g 3 2 
,6 2 
For all t within the interval (O,T) and cS > 0 
~ (T - t) 
e 
.s(t -1) Th~refore e 
) (6- Sa.(lz.)tT-t) e 
1 2 
l,Iultiplying inequalities (7.52) and (7.54) we get 
(7.52) 
ItfolloW8 therefore that q4 < 0 throughout the interval (O,T) 
But q = 0 at t = T. 4 'l'herefore is positive throughout 
the interval (O,T). That is, q4 is a steadily decreasing 
function of t within the interval (O,T) and it decreases to 
zero as t tends to T. 
Since q4 = q2 - q3 ) 0 throughout (O,T) • 
~= 1 throughout (O,T) 
The policy implicati.on of this result is that all eovernment 
savings beyond the level Ig ie. uncommitted government savings 
should be transferred to the poor as capital grants, if an optimal 
1 L.. H·'5 >0 See /.I ppenclt'-x 'lTCC 
2 L.. , j.j , s >0 (E:Ilponen.tial fu.n.cttllh) 
• t •. ,--;': ' 
~ .. ~, 
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growth cum redistribution programme of the type specified 
here is to be carried out. This result also strengthens the 
areuments in the earlier chapters which highlighted the 
importance of increasing capital for self employment if the 
welfare of the poor is to be maximised within the plan period. 
As could be seen from Appendix VIII this result is traceable 
to the higher output-capital ratio associated with capital for 
self employment as compared \Oli th government capital and the 
comparatively higher share of output consumed. In these 
circumstances, capital accumulation takes place according to 
equations (7.4) with JA-= 1 That is: 
K2 = s2 (32 K2 + (s,g °3 Kg - I,g) ••• (7.56) 
• • • 
Since throughout the interval (O,T), the only 
feasible cases are Case B and Case C. The choice between these 
two would depend on the sign of (1 - q1 s1). As seen earlier 
(1 - q1 s1) could remain positive throughout the interval (O,T), 
under \-lhich circumstances the only feasible case \Olould be Case 
B. That is the syotem would otnrt in Cane I3 and end in Case B. 
B~t if (1 - q1 s1) does change sien within the interval (O,t), 
it is negative (Regime I) and during the sub period (t 1 ,T) 
it is positive (Regime II), then the system will start in Case 
C, remain in Case C till t = t1 change over to Case B ut t 
= t1 and remain in Case B throughout the period (t 1 ,T). 
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We may now summarise the main results of this section: In 
the event of there being a switch from one regime to another 
during the plan period (O,T) i.e. a change over from Case C 
to Case B, the results are as follows: 
l1ecanitulation of gain Results 
Reeime I (Case C) 
Sub period: o ,t ~ t 1 , where t1 = T +i log (1 - El ) 
at e1 
Control Variablee: A= 0 , 'p-=1 
Co-State Variables: q1 = [L - 0(2. le (6 - S,CIt,)(t - t,) + 0(.2.. 
e1 6- s10(~ 6 - s10(1 
q4 = q2 - q3 = i-[t2 - (1 - 62)(32 + G] [ ec5(t--r) -1J 
+ Ge~(t-T)[e-52./h(t-T)_ 1] 
s2f2 
These equations represent the manner in \'lhich the shadow price 
of capital accumulation would behave over the sub-plan period 
State Variablee: The capital accumulation equations are 
. 
K2 = s2 ~2 ~ + (s g 13 Kg - I g ) 
kg = Ig 
i . 
. ' . 
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Policy Implications: (1) No taxes should be levied on the 
income of the rich i.e. a tax 
holiday. The economy is allowed to 
grow before redistributive measures 
are introduced. 
Regime II (Case B) 
(ii) All government savings beyond a level 
I g , i.e. uncommitted government savings 
should be transferred to the poor in 
the form of capital grants. This 
alternative is preferable to that of 
expanding state capital. 
Sub period: t1 ,t ~ T 
Control Variables: A = 1 , r = 1 
Co-State Variables: 
q1 - e cS (t - T) 1 = ~ [ 1 
q3 = t [12 -q4 = q2 -
T G. & (t - T) e 
S2 f2 
( ) ~ [ 6(t-T) 1-s 2 f>2 + G e -
[ e- s,,._ (t -1) _ ~ 
These equations represent the manner in ,.,hich tb e shadow prices 
of capital accumulation should behave over the sub-plan period 
State Variables: The capital accumulation equations are: 
• 
K: = 1 s1 Z1 
,. 
K2 = 6 2f2K2 + (Sg13Kg - Ig) 
.. 
:Kg = Ig 
. " "" ... 
~ 
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Policy Implications: (1) Income of the rich in excess of the level 
Z, is transferred to the poor. That is 
the fruits of growth should be transferred 
to the poor during this phase. 
(ii) As before all government savings beyond a 
level Ig , i.e. uncommitted government 
savings should be transferred to the poor 
in the firm capital grants. 
In the event of there being no switch from one regime to another 
during the plan period, the system would start in Case B and end 
in Case B. In such circumstances the results are the same as those 
shown in Regime "Il above. 
7.5 An Extension 
One of the slmpllflcations made in the previous section was that of 
selecting the objective function to be maximised as consumption of 
the poor rather than the utility of CO " sumption. This simplifi-
cation led to a funct ion which was linear in.A and f and hence the 
solution obtained was of the bang-bang type, with A and / assuming 
extreme values of either 0 or 1. Particularly in the case of A , 
the switch from 0 to 1, if a switch did take place, did seem too 
extreme a change. 
An attempt will be made in this section to demonstrate how such 
extreme situations could be avoided in principle, "'ith the us e 
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of a suitable utility function. On account of the nature of 
". 
the mathematical complexity involved, no attempt will be made 
to solve the problem completely. Instead, the emphasis will 
be on demonstrating how a value of A lying between 0 and 
1, i.e. an interior solution could be obtained. Such a value 
if obtainable, would tell us what the optimal proportion of 
income transfer (of income beyond Z1) ought to be • 
. We shall consider a utility function wh·l.ch is commonly used in 
the literature namely: 
u (c)= L.. Cl-V 
1 -v 
• • • (7.58) 
\'lhere Y is a positive constant. As before C represents the 
consumption of the poor. 
The marginal utility is given by: 
••• (7.59) 
, 
Clearly U (0) > 0 and decreases as C increases, as one 
would expect. Thus the utility flIDction defined by equation 
(7.58) is a concave one. 
In this case the optimisation problem would be to 
Naximise ,-'" 
+ (1 - s2)('2 K2 + "2Kd e-'t dt 
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subject to the constraints defined by equations (7.6) 
Let the undiscounted Hamiltonian be defined by 
HI = -Lf 0(.2 Kl + (0(.1 Kl - Zl»).. +( 1 - s2) ~2 K2 + ·'2 Kg] 
1 -'IL 
,- " 
+ q1 s1 {Zl + (1 -).. )(0(.1 Kl - Zl)} + q2{S2f~2 + (BgY3-I g)r} 
+ q,% { I + (s Y,% K - I )( 1 -?)} 
J g g J g g 
Then by applying Pontryagin's l~imum Principle as before the 
nature of the optimal solution could be explored. 
In the case of an interior solution, the optimal value of A is 
determined by the equation. 
oH' = 0 
• • • • IT -v 
- Z1)A+ (1 - s2)~2K2 + i2Xgl (~lKl 
= Ql s l (~l Xl - Zl) ••• 
As usual, this equation may be interpreted as:-
f~einal utility of consumption = ql x (Investment) 
(7.60) 
- Zl) 
(7.61) 
Thus ql is the price of capital accuculation of the rich 
measured in terms of the marginal utility of consumption of the 
poor. 
From equation (7.61) we get 
.J. 
fX.2Kl + (ex, Kl - Z1).A+ (1 - s2)f2K2 + l2Kg = (q1 8 1 )"\1 ••• (7.62) 
••• (7.63) 
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This solution will be an interior solution so long as 
" 
-1. [ (q1 s1 ) 'V - ~ K1 + (1 - s2 )132 K2 + Y2 Kg 1 1 ..• (7.64) 
_, (OC:1K1- Z1 J ) 
i.e. (q1 s1)~ - Earned Income of the poor < 1 ••• 
Income of ·the rich 
The above inequality would obviously depend upon the behavior 
pattern of q1 over the plan period and could be investigated 
through the canonical equation for Q1' which is 
. 
q -1 
, 
~Q1 = - lli 
?JK 1 
••• (7.66) 
i.e q1 - 5q1 = - [{~ K1 + (0(1 le1 - Z1» .. + {1 - s2)(32 ~ + 12KJ«'; 
+ q1 s1 0(.1 (1 - ~ >]. (7. C 
From equations (7.61) anu (7.67) we get 
q1 - bq1 = - [q1 s 1 0<'1}.. + q1 8 1 0<.1 (1 - A)1 
= • • • (7.68) 
i.e. • •• (7.69) 
Therefore · .. (7.70) 
where A is an arbitrary constant which could be determined from 
boundary conditions. 
'On the basis of the terminal capital conditions specified in the 
previous section, q(T) = 0 as before. It io clear from 
I~ 
' .. 
" 
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inequality (7.65) that it cannot hold at t = T; for, as t-+ T 
'. 
_.1. 
ql (t) ~ 0 and (ql )~(O. In these circumstances the solution 
(7,70) cannot hold in the neighbourhood of t = T. But supposing 
this solution is valid during the sub periodt1 ~ t ~ t2 
within the interval (O,T) then the constant A could be found 
from the boundary conditions. 
Thus at least in the case of the sub period (t1, t 2 ) it would 
be p08sible in principle to find a value for the optimal 
proportion lying bet",reen 0 and 1. 
The other significant departure arising from the more general 
utility function is that q2 and q3 are no longer independent 
of q1 as in the previous case. For the respective canonical 
equations are: 
-l> 
[ {CX-zlC1 + (0<.1 K1 - Zl)A + (1 - 6 2)(32 It:2 + Y2KgH 
(1 - s 2) ~ 2 + q2 s 2 f3 2 J 
= - + «(Xl Xl - Zl»). + (1 - s2)f2 1<2 
-v 
+ ~2 :Kg} 12 + q3 s g t31··· (7.71) 
From equations (7.61) and (7.71) we get 
q2 - 6 q2 = - [q1 81 (1 - 81 )(32 + q2 8 2 f2 ] 
q3 - b q3 = - [q1 81 ~ 2 + q3 Ss '(3] • •• (7.72) 
It is clear from the above equations that the solutions for q2 and 
q3 would depend upon the solution for q1 • 
. : '~ \;!. ... ~ .,,'-
~."'"'4' 
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7.6 Swnmary .. 
An attempt was made in this chapter t~ demonstrate a further 
set of interrelationships that could exist between the processes 
of growth and redistribution of incomes, under conditions of 
optimali ty. The discussion ",as generally couched in the well 
known Tinbergen framework consisting of a model, an objective 
function, control variables, constraints and boundary conditions, 
but the techniques used were those of optimal control theory. 
At least in a rudimentary form it ",o.S possible to demonstrate 
how a ,control mechanism could be set up \d thin a gro"lth cum 
redistribution process and how two control variables i.e a tax 
amounting to a proportion A of income of the rich beyond a 
tax limit Z1 and cnnital grnnts to the poor amounting to a 
proportion f- of tmcommi tted government savings could be v~ied 
in order to maximise consumption of the poor over a plan period. 
One of the important results that emerged from the analysis is 
that it is better to use uncommitted government savings for 
purposes of effecting capital grantc to the poor for self 
er:mloyment rather than expand state capital. This ugTees ",1th 
the results of the previous chapters. The more important and 
perhaps the more interesting result is that the control variable 
A should change from 0 to 1 when a "sib'llal" emitted by the 
shadow price q1 indicates a change of regime. The policy . 
:;. '':'' '-.. 
ea ) 
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implication of th i s result is that incomes of the rich (\'Iho 
' . 
derive their income entirely from the modern sector) must be 
allowed to grow up to a point in an environment of tax holidays 
before redistributive measures are introduced. In these cir-
cu.mstances, income inequality could increase initially before 
a decline could be induced through redistributive measures. 
It is interesting to note that this behaviour pattern derived 
from considerations of optimality resembles the Kuznets curve 
discussed in the earlier chapters. Although it may not be an 
easy task to establish a definite link with adequate rigour, 
yet one could hypothesize that the Kuznets curve could be an 
outcome of a vnriety of forces including government policy in 
some way aimed at optimising the welfare of the poor over time. 
One of the limitations in the solution obtained was that the 
parameter A had to shift from one boundary value 0 to other 
1 without proceeding through the intermediate values. That is 
the solution obtained uas of the "bang-bang" type. As mentioned 
previously this was due to the fact that the objective function 
being linear in t he control vr..riables. Hm'lever it was shown 
subsequently in section 7.5, how this somevThat unrealistic 
feature could be avoided by the use of a more eeneral concave 
utility function. But the price that one has to pay is one of 
increased mathematical complexity. A complete solution in terms 
of such a. utility function uas not attempted. 
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CHAPrER 8 
A DISAGGREGATED APPROACH 
"Each economic system - even that of an 
underdeveloped country - has a complicated 
internal structure. Its performance is 
determined by the mutual relations of its 
differentiated parts, just as the motion of 
the hands of a clock is governed by the 
ge~s inside" - Wassily Leontief (Input -
Output Economics, page 41:) 
8.1 Introduction 
Discussions carried out so far have been aggregative in 
character and consequently the policy implications derived 
have been of a broad and general nature. In this chapter, 
an attempt will be made to examine the implications ot 
growth and redistributive objectives upon individual sectors 
of the economy. 
Work in this area was pioneered by Narapalas1ngam \1970} and 
one of the questions he examined was how a change in income 
distribution might affect the productive structure of the 
economy. More recently, P,yatt and Roe {1977} have developed 
a comprehensive social accounting framework for Sri Lanka, 
and have inter alia demonstrated how it could be used as a 
convenient basis for development planning with special 
reference to employment and redistributive objectives. As 
an interesting follow up to their work, P.yatt and ROWld {1977} 
have examined the effect of sect oral expansion upon income 
distribution and have ranked sectors in terms of relative 
" 
__ ~a ... ------------------------------------------------------"----""~, . . .......... .. ' ... ' . ~~ 
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efficiency in improving the distribution of incomes as well 
as in terms of a utility index based on alternative weigh-
ting schemes. This work has been extended in another 
direction by Roe and Tyler {1977a}who identified key sectors 
of the Sri Lankan economy in relation to alternative social 
objectives. Roe and Tyler {1977b} have also demonstrated how 
a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) could provide a clearer 
insight into the relationships between produotive activities 
and income distribution, employment and regional imbalances 
and how SAM could be used as an effective basis for welfare 
planning in Sri Lanka. 
One of the aspects not covered in this area of investigation 
concerns the optimal allooation of resources over individual 
sectors of the economy in relation to a given 80cial objective 
and the ranking of seotors according to their relative 
efficiencies in the use of resources. Rankings so obtained 
need not necessarily be the same as those obtained in the 
above mentioned studies. For, if a unit expansion in output 
of a sector A is more favourable than that of a sector B in 
relation to a given social objective, yet this ordering could 
get reversed if the capital-output ratio of A is sufficiently 
high in relation to B. That is, from the standpoint of 
resource allocation B may be more favourable than A, in attain-
ing a given social objective. 
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The ' central··theme of this chapter will be that of inquiring 
into optimal patterns of resource allocation in relation to 
alternative social objectives. The resource considered here 
is investible capital in the hands of government. The main 
alternative social objectives are the growth objective 
represented by the increase of Gross National Product, the 
redistributive objective represented by the increase of income 
of the poor and the employment objective, all of which are 
represented respectively as functions of gross output of 
individual sectors. Other social objectives considered are 
those of increasing t he income of the urban poor, rural poor and 
the estat e poor. We shall examine the manner in which each of 
these social objectives could be maximised subject to a budget 
constraint, a foreign exchange constraint as well as output, 
market and interdepende.ncy constra.ints, and study in p:lrticular 
the implications of growth and redistributive objectives. 
The question of resource allocation over the sectors of the 
economy is of special significance due to two more reasons. 
Firstly, in the formulation of national plans one of the first 
problems we come across is that of deriving broad investment 
magnitudes for individual sectors. Secondly, the establishment 
of sectoral priorities as well as investment targets becomes 
a pre-requisite for the evaluation of individual projects for 
inclusion in national plans. 
. " 
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The main features of the model used in this chapter, are 
outlined in the section below: 
8.2 The Model 
The starting point of our analysis is the semi-disaggregated 
" 12 sector SAM used by the Roe and Tyler {1977b}. It is 
possible to carry out the same analysis on the basis of a 
fully disaggregated 48 sector model of the Sri Lankan economy. 
But the 12 sector model was preferred firstly because the 
opt1m1sation problem could be kept at a less cumbersome form 
and secondly the 12 sectors in semi-disaggregated form roughly 
corresponds to the major sectors for which investment targets 
are set out in the formulation of national plans in Sri Lanka. 
The twelve sectors are: 
1 • Tea 
2. Rubber 
3. Coconut 
4. Paddy (Rice growing) 
5. Other Agriculture 
6. Agricultural Processing (Includes rice mill1n{ 
7. Mining 
8. Traditional Industry 
9. Modern Industry 
10. Construction 
11 • Trade and Transport 
12. Services. 
-----~--------------------·t 
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The gross output of each of these sectors will be denoted by 
Xi' X2' ••••• X12 respectively. In respect of each sectoral 
output X.i , we shall regard the inputs from other sectors to be 
a constant proportion of Xr Likewise, the value added by each 
. sector, the income shares of rich and poor and employment will . 
be regarded as being directly proportional to gross output of 
that sIotor. 
The assumption of fixed coefficients is no doubt a debatable 
one. For, it could be argued that the relationships between 
gross output and intermediate inputs or between gross output 
and income shares of the poor could be non-linear in character. 
But in the absence of empirical evidence regarding the exact 
nature of the production functions, the fixed coeffioient 
assumption seems inevitable. Therefore, the results obtained 
must necessarily be regarded as first approximations. Never) · 
theless such results could give us useful insighte into the 
nature of interdependencies in the economy. Moreover these 
results could be made use of to derive guidelines for action 
in terms of the orders of magnitude involved. 
The other implioit assumption in our analysis is the invariance 
~f input-output coefficients over time. Although there are 
methods such as the HAS technique developed along with the 
Cambridge Growth Model {196,}, we need not use this 
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technique since the time period considered in our optimisation 
problem is relatively short. In fact the optimisation problem 
considered here only deals with annual allocations of investment 
and of foreign exchange. 
Let Xl' x2 ••••• xn denote annual increments in the gross out-
puts Xl' X2 •••• Xn • Since the question of resource allocation 
is related to annual budgets, we shall formulate the objective 
. function in terms of the x s and write it as 
•••• (8.1 ) 
Where the ~ s are constants characterizing the objective 
function discussed. For example, for the growth objective i.e. 
that of maximising national income, the ~ s will represent the 
value added per unit of gross output in each sector; for the 
redistributive objective the ~ s will represent the increase in 
income of the poor per unit of gross output. Likewise, in the 
case of the employment objective the ~ s will represent employ-
ment generated per unit of gross output in each sector. 
The budget constraint and the foreign exchange constraint may 
be specified as 
v1x1+v2x2+ ••••• +v x n n ~ B • ••••••• (8.2) 
and e1x1+e2x2 • • • • • +enxn ~ E • ••••••• (8.3) 
. where v l , v2. ••• v n are the capital to gross-output ratios, 
t el' e2 ••• e n are the foreign exchange components of 
gross output 
.. .., 
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and B and.,E are respectively the total resources of capital 
and foreign exchange available. 
The next set of constraints we shall impose are the non-
negativity constraints defined by 
x. ~ 0, i = 1,2 •••• n 
1 
so as to ensure that there are no decreases in output. 
Another important set of constraints that ought to be formulated 
~oncerns the interdependencies in the economy. This could be 
done by postulating that the output of each sector should at 
least meet the intermediate demands of other sectors. That is 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
where the a s are the input-output coefficients. 
The above inequalities can be written in matrix form as 
XQAx 
,.. ,.., 
where A is the input-output matrix 
If we start from the identity 
where F is the vector of final demands and consider small 
increments then it follows that 
x=Ax+f 
- .... 
. ..: 
~ ,." ,.. 
. ~ :':' 
(8.5) 
(8.6) 
(8.7) 
(8.8) 
.s . . .,J 
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where ! rep~esen~the vector of increases in final demand. 
Therefore inequalities (8.6) amounts to the statement that 
{I-A)x = f 
-- -
(8.9) 
Two other sets of constraints have to be introduced in order to 
make the model more realistic namely, supply constraints and 
market constraints. Supply constraints represent the physioal 
upper limits to which sectoral outputs could be expanded during 
.a period of one year. For example in the case of a crop, the 
availability of land or in the case of an industrial project the 
gestation period could impose an upper limit. Market constraints 
are more obvious; in the case ot a good which cannot be inter-
nationally traded (e.g. construction), the domestiC demand would 
impose an upper limit to output. But for sectors producing 
internationally traded goods, or international sectors in the 
terminology of Tinbergen ~966}, (e.g. Tea, Rubber, Coconut), 
market constraints are less obvious. Nevertheless there are 
limits to which exports ot one commodity could be expanded in 
any one year since it takes time to enter into new markets, 
particularly when they are highly competitive, and it would 
appear reasonable to assume that market constraints exist even 
in the case of international sectors. 
Supply constraints and market constraints may be represented by 
the equations 
• • • 
and 
(8.10) 
(8.11) 
. , '~ ,~ 
" 
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or (r - A)x ./. f 
.- ... ,..., ••• (8.12) 
where xi' ti represent the respective upper limits. 
Thus the optimisation problem consists of maximising the objective 
function W subject to the constraints specified ;above. For 
purposes of greater cl.urity, the optimisation problem in its 
entirety may be recapitulated as follows: 
Maximise W = ~1x1+~2x2+··.+~nxn 
.Subject to: 
(8.l)(Objective function 
Vlxl+v2x2+ ••• +vnxn' B (8.2)(Budget Constraint) 
, e,x,+e2x2+ ••• +en%n ~ E (8.3)(Foreign Exchange Constraints) 
xi~O, i = 1 ••• 12 (8.~(Non-negativity Constraints) 
(l-all )xl -a12x2- ••• -a1 xn ~ 01 (8.5)(Interdependency n Constraints) 
-a2l Xl +( 1-a22 )x2- ••• -a2nxn ~ 0 ' 
... ... f n = 12 ••• 
-an 1 x i -an2x 2 - ••• + ( 1-ann )xn 'q 0 
x~ ~ Xi' i = 1, ••• 12 (8.10)(Supply Constraints) ' 
(1-a11 )x1-a12x2- ••• -anxn ~ f1 
-a21 x1-( 1-a22 )x2- ••• -a22xn ~ f2 
• • • ••• 
••• 
• • • 
(1-a )x ~ fn nn n 
n = 12 
Thus, the optimisation problem consists of maximising the 
objective function W subject to 50 constraints in all. 
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Having obtained the optimal solution the optimal allocation 
of resources could be easily derived as follows: 
* Let xi represent the optimal solution. Then since v 1 represents 
the corresponding capital to gross output ratios, the optimal 
. allocation of capital over the sectors are represented by 
In matrix form the optimal capital allocation is represented by: 
v1 0 
v2 
.. 
0 
,... 
vn 
/" ,..* 
or vx 
* x 1 
x * 2 
0 
-
Q 
.. 
x * n 
•••••• (8.13) 
~ ,.. 
where v, x* represent the diagonalised forms of the vectors v 
- - -
* and x 
If the capital budget is the binding constraint, then 
n 
i~ 1 i.e. , * v x = B • • • • • • (8.14) 
Likewise the optimal allocation of foreign exchange is represented 
by 
1 
,. .... * 
e x 
- -
1 
•••••• (8.15) 
If the foreign exchange constraint is binding (both constraints 
could be binding), then 
, * e · x 
- -
= E 
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Since the problem formulated above has more than one objective 
" 
function it is also possible to examine the implications ot a 
given optimal solution (arising trom one 
another objective. For example, suppose 
the coefticients of the growth objective, 
objective), upon 
, oe;, ~ 
'" 
••• are , n 
and let x1*, x * 2 ••• 
1 1 1. 
xn * be the optimal solution. Then it oc.1'~ , ••• ~ denote the 
coefticien~of the redistributive objective function (OC; repre-
sent~ the income of the poor from sector i) then the increase of 
-'* income of poor = ~! ••• (8.1,6) 
3 1 J Likewise, it "'1 ' "'2 ' ••• ocn represent the co,efficients ot 
the employment objective ( ~~ represent the employment generated 
per unit of gross output in sector i) then increase in 
3 I ill 
employmen t = ~ x ••• (8.17) 
Conversely, if we take the redistributive objective as given, 
the optimal solution so obtained could be made use of to find 
out the implications upon the growth objective. Thus,the optimal 
solutions so obtained would open up yet another area of inquiry 
in regard to the interrelationships between redistributive and 
growth objectives in terms of resource allocation ' and these 
could be reduced to numerical form. 
The next section sets out the data framework used. 
8.3 -The Data Framework 
Values of all parameters ch~acterising the objective functions 
. 8 - 12 
, 
were derived from the 12 sector SAM presented in Roe and Tyler 
{1977}. Six objective functions were developed. They are: 
Obj. 1. The Growth Objective - where ~i represents value added 
. in sector i as a proportion ot 
gross output of sector i. 
Obj. 2. The Redistributive 
Objective 
Obj. ,. The Employment 
Objective 
Obj. 4. The Urban Weltare 
Objective 
Obj. 5. The Rural Welfare 
Objective 
Obj. 6. The Estate Welfare 
Objective 
- where ~i represents the income of 
the poor earned from sector i as 
a proportion of gross output of 
sector i. 
- where ~i represents the employment 
generated in thousands per Rs.1 m 
expansion of gross output of 
sector i. 
- where ~ represents the income of 
the urban poor earned from sector 
i, as a proportion of gross output 
of sector i. 
- where ~ represents the income of 
the rural poor earned from sector 
i as a proportion of gross output 
of sector i. 
- where ~i represents the income of 
the estate poor earned from sector 
i as a proportion of gross output 
of sector i. 
Values ot the parameters of the respective objective functions 
are shown in the Table 8.1. 
· ~: 
,. 
;, .i-" . 
,; . \ 
J 
Objec-
tive 
Obj.1 
Obj.2 
Obj.3 
Obj.4 
Obj.5 
Obj.6 
x 1 x2 
0.679 0.856 
0.584 0.679 
0.703 0.511 
0.002 0.005 
0.078 0.406 
0.505 0.267 
Table 8.1 
Objective Functiona 
x3 x4 x5 x6 
0.917 0.862 0.853 0.125 
0.522 0.666 0.500 0.069 
0.090 0.635 0.156 0.039 
0.031 0.011 0.045 0.009 
0.419 0.656 0.446 0.053 
0.071 0.0:10 0.006 
~ x8 x9 
0.780 0.324 0.429 
0.385 0.212 0.131 
0.193 0.198 0.051 
0.018 0.045 0.032 
0.367 0.166 0.099 
":'" 0.001 0.001 
x10 x11 
.' 
0.552 0.816 
0.243 0.289 
0.066 0.156 
0.050 0.084 
0.187 0.199 
0.006 0.006 
x12 
0.726 
0.302 
0.139 
0.073 
0.206 
0.023 
CD 
I 
... 
\.),J 
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In order to calculate the capital to gross output ratio~ vi' 
estimates of the respective capital output , ratios were first 
obtained from Tyler {1976}. These estimates were adjusted by 
multiplication by a constant factor so as to obtain a weighted 
(by value added in each sector) capital-output ratio ot 3.41, 
which is the estimate used in Chapter 4. This procedure was 
carried out since the sectoral capital-output ratios appeared 
to be understated. These ratios were then multiplied by the 
respective value added to gross output ratios (derived from the 
SAM) in order to arrive at capital to gross output ratios 
required for the formulation of the budget constraint. The 
foreign exchange components of gross output e1 were directly 
estimated from the 12 sector SAM for purposes of formulating 
the foreign exchange constraint. The table below shows the 
coefficients of the budget and foreign exchange constrainta. 
, --. I .... . . 
-~ 
"j'i~ ' S?'C 
Coefficient 
vi 
e. 
l. 
-- ._-----
Table 8.2 
Coefficients of the Budget and Foreign Exchange Constraints 
%1 x 2 %3 %4 %5 %6 %7 %8 
1.690 2. t73 2.349 0.463 0.947 0.205 3.730 1.106 
0.087 0.032 0.017 0.026 0.029 0.099 0.028 0.106 
%9 %10 
.4 %11 
2.156 0.925 2.540 
0.145 0.038 0.025 
%12 
8.255 
0.078 
co 
I 
~ 
V1 
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The total budget B was taken as Rs.1000 million so as to be 
broadly representative of capital formation by Government and 
1 Public Corporations during 1970. The upper limit (E) on 
extra foreign exchange needed tor meeting additional foreign 
exchange requirements for increases in gross output was taken 
as Rs.100 million. 
The input-output coefficients were also derived from the 12 
sector SAM and the "interdependency" constraints were 
formulated in terms of equation (8.9). The coeffiCient of 
these constraints are shown in Table 8.3. 
1The exact fieure for 1970 was Rs.1020.9 million. 
Source: Central Bank Report, 1974, Appendix Ill, Table 7. 
SEC-
TOR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8: 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Table 8.3 
Coefficients of the Interde~endencI Constraints 
x1 x2 x; x4 x5 %6 %7 %8 %9 %10 %11 %12 
1.000 -0.0012 
1.0000 -0.0059 ,.-
I 
1.0000 -0.1223 -0.0036 ! 
0.9382 -0.5012 -0.0013 
-0.0127 -0.0027 0.9485 0.0154 -0.0183 -0.0461 -0.0013-0.0026 -0.0237 
-0.0060 0.9832 -0.1389 -0.0006 -0.0243 . 
I 
1.0000 -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0388 -0.0006 
-0.0174 -0.0103 -0.0094 0.9287 -0.0188 -0.0530 -0.0161 -0.0030 
' . . ! 
-0.0949 -0.0642 -0.0156 -0.0309 -0.0271 -0.0119 -0.0827 -0.0267 0.7866 -0.0714 -0.0430 -0.0188 
-0.0092 
-0.0637 -0.0294 -0.0156 -0.0071 -0.0125 -0.0575 -0.0550 -0.0840 
-0.0069 -0.0053 -0.0+04 -0.0079 -0.0005 - 0.0020 
0.9160 -0.0034 -0.0285 
-0.0895 -0.1160 0.9536 -0.0376 i I , 
, I 
-0.0006 -0.0031 -0.0057 0.9915 I 
C> 
--. 
-.J 
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In the case'· of supply constraints, an attempt was made to take 
account of maximum annual increases in output that have taken 
place during the past ten years under the best of possible 
circumstances. Working papers prepared for the Medium Term 
Investment Programme 1978-82 were also consulted so as to ensure 
that estimates of physical upper limits on increases in output 
were far as possible in agreement with lhese estimates. Market 
constraints were formulated on the basis of what would seem 
possible tor the market in each sector to absorb. Special 
attention was paid to Sectors 10, 11 and 12 which are dominated 
by goods which cannot be internationally traded. In these cases, 
constraints were fixed on the basis of maximum increases in 
demand likely to be experienced. The estimates obtained are 
set out in the Table 8.4. 
Table 8.4 
SupplY and Market Constraints 
Sector Percentage increase Supply 11 Market ! constra,!.nt~ 11 assumed in fixing Constraints 
supply constraints (Rs.m) i (Rs .m) t li 
'il 
1 • Tea 3% 26 172 11 1 
2. Rubber 2% 8 110 i 
3. Coconut 7% 40 65 I 
4. Paddy 10% 113 49 
,:1 
,. Other Agriculture 15% 270 799 ! 
6. Agric. Prooessing 50%' 1010 87' 'I 
·1 7. Mining 20% 22 28 
'I 
8. Trad. Industry 20% 269 1014 , ;1 
9. Modern Industry 10% 154 648 I , , 
10. Construction 20% 382 169 :I 
~' c 
11 • Trade 8; Transport 15% 447 208 
1 12. Services 10% 165 158 
. , 
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The somewhat "low market oonstraint for Paddy should not be 
interpreted as an undue restriotion. As oould be seen from the 
12 sector SAM, the output of paddy first enters the Agricultural 
ProceSSing sector for milling before release to the market • 
8.4 Results 
1 The optimal solutions in respeot of growth and redietributive 
objectives are set out in Tables 8.5 and 8.6 below. The optimal 
allocations of investment as well as the implications of these 
solutions in regard to growth, income distribution, employment 
and additional foreign exchange requirements, derived from 
equatiOns (8.13),(8.15), (8.16) eto. are also set out in these 
tables. 
The solutions obtained indicate that whether the objeotive is 
one of growth or of inoreasing the incomes of the poor, the main 
thrust of development ought to be in agriculture and that the 
investment in agriculture should be about 50 per cent of total 
investment. This is not altogether surprising since agriculture 
is considered to be the leading sector in the Sri Lankan economy 
from the point ot view of potential for development. Value added 
1 Optimal solutions were obtained by the use of the MINIlP 
. packaBe developed by the Computer Department of the UniverSity 
of Warwick. 
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per unit of gross output is greatest in the a.gricultural 
sector i.e. potential for growth is greatest in agriculture. 
Further the majority of the poor live in rural and estate areas 
(see Chapter 2), primarily engaged in agricultural activity. 
The two solutions are remarkably similar; the values in respect 
of the first six variables are identical. In tact, the value8 
for the first five sectors namely Tea, Rubber, Coconut, Paddy 
and Agriculture are the upper limits fixed by supply constraints 
(see Table 8.4). This means that optimality with respect to the 
growth objective or with respect to the redistributive objective 
calls for the development of these five sectors up to levels set 
by physical cor.straints. The potential indicated for Sector 5, 
namely Other Agriculture (which includes subsidiary food crops, 
livestock and minor export crops) is particularly Significant. 
Output in this sector has steadily increased during the last 
1-few years • . 
The identical values obtained in respect of the first six 
variables in the two solution8 suggests that agricultural 
development provides a strong linkage between growth and 
redistributive objectives. These two objectives appear to be 
completely complementary as far as agricultural development is 
. concerned. These results also strengthen the arguments in 
that 
Chapter 3Lgrowth in the agricultural sector could have been a 
1 Output of subsidiary food crops and of minor export crops 
have doubled during the period 1970-75 (Source: Oentral 
Bank ot Ceylon). 
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major cause tor re~uction ot income inequality in Sri Lanka in recent 
years. 
Table 8.:2 
Variant I - The Growth' Objective 
0Etimal Solution 
Sector Increase Investment Foreign Increase Increaee Increase, J 
in Gross Allocation Exchange in in in EmplG' '" 
, output Inveet- Percen- Require- GDP Income of ment ,I 
(Re .m. ) ment tage ment the poor 'I (Re .m. ) (Rs .m.) (Rs .m. ) (Rs .m.) (Thousand: ' 
1 • Tea 26.00 43.94 4.39 2.26 17.65 15.18 18.28 
2. Rubber 8.00 17.38 1.74 0.26 6.85 5.43 4.09 
3. Coconut 40.00 93.96 9.40 0.68 36.68 20.88 3.60 
4. Paddy 113.00 52.31 5.23 2.94 97.41 75.26 71.76 
5. Other 
Agric. 270.00 255.70 25.57 7.83 230.31 135.00 42.12 
6. Agric. 
Process. 211 .41 43.34 4.33 20.93 26.43 14.58 8.24 
7. Mining 7.28 27.15 2.72 0.20 5.68 2.80 1.41 
8. Trad. 
Industry 18.13 20.05 2.01 1.92 5.87 3.84 3.59 
9. Modern 
Industry 43.13 92.98 9.30 6.25 18.50 5.65 2.20 r 
10. Conetruc- I 
tion 184.90 171.03 17.10 7.03 102.06 44.93 12.20;. 
11 • Trade & !: 
Transport 61 .74 156.82 15.68 1.54 50.38 17.84 9.63 1 
12. Services 3.07 25.34 2.53 0.24 2.23 0.93 0.43 
Total 988.66 1000.00 100.00 52.08 600.05 342.32 177.55 
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Table 8.6 
.. 
Variant II - The Redistributive Objective 
O~timal Solyt~oD 
Sector Increase Investment Foreign Increase Increase Increas! 
in Gross Allocation Exchange in in in 
/ output Invest- Percen- Require- GDP Income Employ-. . 
-. (Rs.m) ment tage ment of the ment 
(Rs.m) (Ra.m) (Rs.m) poor (Rs .m) (Thousands 
1 • Tea 26.00 43.94 4.39 2.26 17.65 15.18 18.28 
2. Rubber 8.00 17.38 1.74 0.26 6.85 5.43 4.09 
3. Coconut 40.00 93.96 9.40 0.68 35.68 20.88 3.60 
4. Paddy 113.00 52.31 5.23 2.94 97.41 75.26 71.76 
5. Other 
Agric 270.00 255.70 25.57 7.83 230.31 135.00 42.12 
6. Agric. 
Process. 211.41 43.34 4.33 20.93 26.43 14.58 8.24 ' I' 
7. Mining 7.32 27.30 2.73 0.20 5.71 2.82 1.41 .• 
8. Trad. 
Industry 43.30 48.00 4.80 4.60 14.06 9.20 8.59 
9. Modern Ind. 43.39 93.55 9.36 6.29 18.62 5.68 2.21 . 
10. Construc-
tion 184.85 171.00 17.10 7.02 102.04 44.92 12.20 : 
I 
11 • Trade & Trans 
,. 
i: Transport 50.69 128.75 12.87 1.27 41.36 14.65 7.91 ;; 
'" 
12. Services ,.00 24.77 2.48 0.2, 2.18 0.91' i' 0.42 1. 
.( 
Total. 1001.06 1000.00 100.00 54.51 599.30 344.51 180.s' l: 
! 
! 
As regards variables 7-12, representing the non agricultural sectors, 
optimal values under Variant I differ from those obtained under 
Variant II. The differences are slight except in the case ot 
traditional induatry and trade and transport. The redistributive 
objective calls for greater emphasis in traditional industry 
\ 
" 
indicating ·.the scope of this sector in raising the income levels 
of the poor. Trade and transport generates income primarily for 
1 the upper income groups and as one would expect a reduction is 
indicated under Variant 11. 
In over&!1 terms, the above results show a slight trade-oft 
between growth and redistributive objectives. Under Variant I, 
the increase in GDP is Rs.600.05 mil1ion and the increase in 
income of the poor is Rs.342.32 million. Whereas under Variant 
11, the increase in GDP is Rs.599.30 million but the inorease in 
income of the poor is Rs.344.51-million. Although this tra~e­
off is hardly Significant, probably a more appreciab1e trade-otf 
would result it the opt1m1sat10n problem 1s carried out recur-
sively over time. This exercise is not being attempted on 
account of the extremely complicated nature of the problem when 
tormulated in multisectoral. terms. In terms ot employment, 
Variant 11 shows a slight advantage over Variant I, but foreign 
exchange requirements are slightly higher. In both variants, 
the major contribution to employment are shown trom the Paddy 
sector and from Other Agriculture. 
Table 8.7 presents the optimal solution in respect of the 
emp10yment objective (Variant Ill), and related results. Except 
in the case of coconut, no change is indicated in the variables 
1 As could be seen from Objective 1, the proportion of value 
added to gross output is 0.816, but income of the poor as a 
proportion of gross output is on1y 0.289 (see Objective 2) 
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relating to··the subsectors of agriculture. This suggests that 
as tar as agricultural development is co~cerned, there is a 
great degree of complementarity between the employment objective 
and the growth objective, and in turn with the redistributive 
objective. In other words, agricultural development provides a 
strong positive linkage between the growth, redistributive and . 
employment objectives. 
The decline in the value of the variable representing coconut is 
not altogether surprising. As, could be seen trom Objective 3 
(see Table 8.t) the generation of employment per unit output ot 
coconut is much lower than those of tea, rubber and paddy, 
although the coefficients are of comparable magnitude in the case 
of Objectives 1 and 2. Arising from the lower value for the 
variable representing coconuts, a slightly lower investment in 
agriculture is shown in Variant Ill. Investment in agriculture 
as a proportion of total investment is of the order ot 47 per 
cent as compared with a proportion of about 50 percent in 
Variants I and II. 
I, '::' 
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Table 8.7 
Variant III - EmElo~ment Objective 
0ntima1 SolHtion 
Sector Increase Investment Foreign Increase Increase Incree.: 
in Gross Allocation Exchange in in in 
output Invest- Percen- ReqUi~e- GDP Income Employ· 
men of the ment . ment tage (R M) (Rs.M) (Rs.M) s. (Rs.M) Poor Rs.M 
1 • Tea 26.00 4'.94 4.'9 2.26 17.65 15.18 18.28 
2. Rubber 8.00 17.J8 1.74 0.26 6.85 5.43 4.09 
3. Coconut 25.87 60.77 6.08 0.44 23.72 13.50 2.33 
4. Paddy 113.00 52.31 5.23 2.93 97.40 75.26 71.76 
5. Other 
Agric. 270.00 255.70 25.57 7.83 2'0.,1 1'5.00 42.12 
6. Agric. 
Process 211.44 43.5-5 4.33 20.93 26.43 14.59 8.25 
7. Mining 0.93 J.47 0.35 0.03 0.73 0.36 0.18 
8. Trad. 
Industry 269.00 297.52 29.75 28.51 87.16 57.03 53.26 
9. Modern 
Industry 34.22 7'.78 7.38 4.96 14.68 4.48 1.75 
10. Construc-
tion 11.79 10.91 1.09 0.45 6.51 2.86 0.78 
11 • Trade & 
Transport 48.02 121.97 12.20 1.20 39.18 13.88 7.49 
12. Services 2.29 18.90 1.89 0.1-8 1: .66 0.69 0.32 
Total 1020.56 1000.00 100.00 69.98 522.28 338.26 210.61 
Perhaps the most significant feature in the results at Table 8.7 is the 
marked variation in the values of the Variables 7-12 representing the non-
agricultural sectors. The optimal solution under Variant III shows a 
significant increase in respect of traditional industry, highlighting 
" 
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the potentia~this sector offers in regard to employment creation-
a somewhat obvious result since the implicit capital labour ratio 
is as low as Rs.5,585 as compared with Rs.42,263 for modern 
1 industry. The optimal value for the sector is in fact the upper 
limit fixed by conditions of supply (see Table 8.4) 
Variant III also indicates that construction per se is not that 
labour intensive and that the emphasis on this sector ought to 
. 
be very much less from the standpoint of employment creation. 
Decreases of varying magnitudes are also indicated in respect of 
the sectors of Jvlining, I·lodern Industry, Trade and Transport, and 
Services. 
In overall terms, an interesting trade-off is seen between the 
growth and employment objectives. Under Variant I the increase 
in GDP is Rs.600.05 million and the increase in employment is 
177,550. vlhereas under Variant Ill, the increase in GDP is 
Rs.552.28 million but the increase in employment is 210,610. How-
ever, the general result that emerges is that under conditions of 
optimality, the growth, redistributive and employment objectives arc 
to a eree.ter dee~'ee co~plementary than competitive. Results 
relating to Variant IV i.e. the optimisation of the urban welfare 
Function (the share of income of the urban poor) are presented 
in Table 8.8. 
1The capital-labour ratio for modern industry ranges between 
Rs.25,000 and 145,000 (see Central Bank of Ceylon, Review of 
the Economy, 1975. p.60) 
- , ' ~ .. - -:-:;-. 
'.~ . 
Sector 
1 • Tea 
.' 2. Rubber 
-• .r 
:;(. : 3. Coconut 
4. Paddy 
5. Other Agric. 
) . \ 6. Agric. Process. 
7. Mining 
8. Trad.. Industry 
9. Modern Ind. 
10. Construction 
11 • Trade & Transport 
12. Services 
Total 
L . 
Table 8.8 
VariantlV - Urban Welfare Objective 
Optimal Solution 
Increase Investment Foreign Increase 
in Grose Allocation Exchange in 
output Invest- Percen- Require:- ~ GDP 
ment tage ment 
_(Rs .M) (Rs.M) (Ra • tot ) (Ra.M) 
- - - - -
1.48 3.22 0.32 0.05 1.27 
4.55 10.69 1.07 0.08 4.17 
19.90 9.21 0.92 0.52 17.15 
270.00 255.70 25.57 7.83 230.31 
37.15 7.62 0.76 3.68 4.64 
7.62 28.42 2.84 0.21 5.94 
250.91 277.52 27.75 26.60 81.29 
39.98 86.20 8.62 5.80 17.15 
184.82 170.96 17.10 7.02 102.02 
54.88 139.40 13.94 1.37 44.78 
1.34 11.06 1.11 0.10 0.97 
872.63 1000.00 100.00 53.26 509.69 
Increase Increase 
in Income in 
of poor Income of 
Urban 
poor 
(Ra.M) (Ra.M) 
- -
1.00 0.01 
2.37 0.14 
13.25 0.22 
135.00 12.15 
2.56 0.33 
2.93 0.14 
53.19 11.29 
5.24 1.28 
44.91 9.24 
15.86 4.61 
0.40 0.10 
276.71 39.51 
-
Increase 
in 
Employ-
ment 
(Thousand :' 
-
0.76 
0.41 
12.64 
42.12 
1.45 
1.47 
49.68 
2.04 
12.20 
8.56 
0.19 
131. 52 
()) 
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As one would expect the optimal solution indicates a shift 
away from the major agricultural crops i.e. Tea, Rubber, Coconut 
and Paddy. But the emphasis on other agriculture remains un-
changed at its upper limit. This is because subsidiary food 
crops could be grown in urban areas (which are much less 
urbanized by Western Standards), and particularly in large 
extents of land in semi-urban areas. As could be seen from 
Objective Function 4, (see Table 8.1) income of the poor per 
unit of gross output in Other Agriculture i.e. the coefficient 
of x5 1s the fourth highest, compared with rest ot the 
coefficients in this objective function. 
The other sectors highlighted in the optimal solution are 
Traditional Industry, Construction and Trade and Transport. 
An investment allocation of nearly 59 percent of total invest-
ment is indicated for these three sectors alone. 
The optimal solution also shows that preoccupation with urban 
. in 
welfare could lead to lesser increasesLGDP and employment. 
However, no meaningful comparisons could be made with variants 
I, II and III since we are dealing with only a very small 
segment of the community. 
Results relating to Variants V and VI are presented in Tables 
8.9 and 8.10 
Sector 
1 • Tea 
2. Rubber 
3. Coconut 
4. Paddy 
5. Other Agric. 
6. Agric. Proceee. 
7. Mining 
8. Trad. Industry 
9. Modern Ind. 
10. Construction 
11 • Trade & Transport 
12. Services 
Total 
" 
Table 8.9 
Variant V - Rural Welfare Objective 
Optimal Solution 
. 
Increase Investment Foreign Increase 
in Grose Allocation Exchange in 
output Inveet- Percen- Require- GDP 
ment tage ment 
(Ra .m. ) (Ra.M) (Re .M. ) (Ra.M) 
8.00 17.38 1.74 0.26 6.85 
40.00 93.96 9.40 0.68 36.68 
113.00 52.31 5.23 2.94 97.41 
270.00 255.70 25.57 7.83 230.31 
211.41 43.34 4.33 20.93 26.43 
7.38 27.53 2.75 0.21 5.76 
83.69 92.56 9.26 8.87 27.12 
41.71 89.93 8.99 6.05 17.89 
184.85 170.99 17.10 7.02 102.04 
52.34 132.94 13.29 1 .31 42.71 
2.83 23.36 2.34 0.22 2.05 
1015.21 1000.00 100.00 56.32 595.25 
Increase 
in income 
of poor 
(RS .M. ) 
5.43 
20.8.8 
75.26 
135.00 
14.58 
'2.84 
17.74 
5.46 
44.92 
15.13 
0.85 
338.09 
Increase Increase 
in in 
Income Employment 
of Urban 
poor 
(Rs.m.) (Thousands 
3.25 
16.76 
74.13 
120.42 
11.20 
2.71 
13.89 
4.13 
34.57 
10.42 
0.58 
292.06 
4.09 
3.60 
71.76 
42.12 
8.24 
1.42 
16.57 
2.13 
12.20 
8.17 
0.39 
110.62 
Q) 
I 
I\) 
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Sector 
1 • Tea 
2. Rubber 
3. Coconut 
4. Paddy 
5. Other Agric. 
6. Agric. Process 
7. Mining 
8. Trad. Industry 
9. I·lod ern Ind. 
10. Construction 
11. Trade & Transport 
12. Services 
Total 
Table 8.10 
Variant VI - Estate vlelfare Objective 
Optimal Solution 
Increase Investment Foreign Increase 
in Gross Allocation Exchange in 
output Invest- Percen- Require- GDP 
ment tage ment 
(Rs .I-i) (Rs .r-I) (Rs.M) . (Rs .r-I) 
26.00 43.94 4.39 2.26 17.65 
8.00 17.38 1.74 0.26 6.85 
40.00 9~.96 9.40 0.68 ~6.68 
113.00 52.31 5.23 2.94 97.41 
270.00 255.70 25.57 7.8~ 230.31 
211.41 43.34 4.33 20.93 26.43 
7.29 27.19 2.72 0.20 5.69 
17.90 19.80 1.98 1.90 5.80 
42.52 91.67 9.17 6.17 18.24 
184.98 171 .10 17.11 7.03 102.11 
48.54 123.28 12.33 1 .21 39.61 
7.31 60.33 6.03 0.57 5.31 
979.95 1 OJK1. 00 100.00 51.98 592.~~ __ 
Increase Increase 
in Income in Income 
of poor of Estate 
poor 
(Rs .1-1) (Rs .foI) 
15.18 13.13 
5.43 0.21 
20.88 2.84 
75.26 
135.00 2.70 
14.58 1.27 
2.81 
3.79 0.02 
5.57 0.04 
44.95 1 .11 
14.03 0.29 
2.21 0.17 
339.69 21.18 
Increase 
in 
Employ-
ment 
(Thousands 
18.28 
4.09 
~.60 
71.76 
42.12 
8.24 
1.41 
3.54 
2.17 
12.21 
7.57 
1.02 
116.00 
Q:) 
VI 
o 
e 
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Since both variants represent non-urban situations, the similarit~ 
of the two solutions are not altogether surprising. However, 
there are a few obvious, but important differences. Tea has a 
zero value in Variant V, indicating the absence of any impact of 
Tea upon the rural community. Again, Traditional industry 
receives low emphasis under Variant VI. The contribution to GDP 
and employment, under both variants are substantially higher than 
in the Variant V and comes very close to those of Variants I, II 
and Ill. This shows that preoccupation with development issues of 
the non-urban sector has a closer correspondence to national 
development objectives than those of the urban sector - a result 
which is to be expected since the vast majority of the poor live 
in non urban areas (see Chapter 2). However, both solutions have 
some elements in common vi th Variant IV. The closest are the 
values for other agriculture and construction, which highlight 
the potential of these sectors in raising the incomes of the poor 
whether they be in urban rural or estate areas. 
8.5 Summary 
In contrast to the approaches in the previous chapters which 
were essentially aggregative in character, the approach adopted 
in this chapter was to consider growth and redistribution in 
terms of individual sectors of the economy. An attempt was made 
to inquire into the interrelationships that could exist between 
growth and redistributlv.e objectives in terms of individual 
... 
~.t , >. 
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sectors of the economy, under conditions of optimality. The 
technique of optimisation over time, of the type appearing in 
the previous c~apter was not attempted here in view of somewhat 
intractable mathematical diffioulties that oould arise. 1 The 
method adopted here was one of one-period optimisation and the 
entire problem was formulated in terms of a simple linear 
programming model, the constraints imposed being the capital 
budget, foreign exchange, supply, market and interdependency 
. constraints. Optimal allocations of capital resources over the 
major seotors of the economy were obtained with respeot to the 
growth, redistributive employment objectives as well as urban, 
rural and estatewelfare objectives. It was thus possible to 
compare the respective optimal allocations with a view to 
establishing possible links between the objectives conSidered, 
via individual sectors of the economy. 
The first important result that emerged from the analysis was 
that whether the objective be one of growth or of raiSing the 
income of the poor or of employment creation, the main thrust 
of development ought to be in agriculture and that, subjeot to 
the validity of the assumptions made, particularly those regard-
ing the constraints, the investment in agriculture should be 
around half of total investment. Conversely, agricultural 
-1 A rigorous discussion would have perhaps required a major 
extension of the Chakravarty model U965} or the Von 
Neumann Model {1945} . 
", 
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development •. emerges as a strong link between the growth, 
redistributive and employment objectives. These results lend 
further support to the great emphasis on agriculture placed 
by successive governments in Sri Lanka. 
The second interesting set of results obtained were the signi-
ficant differences in the allocation of resources over the non 
agricultural sectors with respect to the objective functions 
considered. For example, in comparison with the growth objective, 
the redistributive objective called for a greater emphasis on 
traditional industry and a lesser emphasis on trade and transport. 
Likewise the employment objective called for a much greater 
on 
emphasisLtraditional industry and a much lesser emphasis on 
construction. 
The other interesting results obtained were the trade-ofts between 
the respective objective functions. The trade-off between the 
growth and redistributive objectives appeared to be much less 
than between the growth and employment objectives. However, in 
general the growth, redistributive and employment objectives 
showed a greater degree of complementarity than competitiveness 
under conditions of optimality. 
obj ectiveril: 
Variants IV to VI concerning the urban, rural and estate welfareL r 
also yielded some interesting results. For example, although the 
-8 - 34 
urban welfare objective called for a shift away from the main 
crops, the emphasis on other agriculture .remaining unchanged; 
the potential for agricultural diversification was thus high-
lighted. Results also indicated that preoccupation with urban 
welfare could lead to lesser increases in GDP and employment as 
compared with the other alternatives. Results also emphasised 
the converse, namely that preoccupation with development issues 
in the non urban sector had a closer correspondence to national 
development objectives. 
Some of the above results have, no doubt, only confirmed the 
intaitively obvious. Perh~ps the more important contribution of 
the preceding analysis is that it has provided a framework for 
resource allocation. The respective optimal solutions show the 
manner in which resources ought to be allocated ideally, so that 
the actual process of resource allocation has a framework to 
work with, although it is still at best a first approximation. 
Furthermore, some idea of the broad allocation of resources as 
between sectors ls an essential pre-requisite for the evaluation 
of individual projects prior to inclusion in national plans. 
The preceding analysis has also demonstrated the implications of 
one optimal solution upon other objectives as well as on the use 
of foreign exchange. 
• 
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CHAPrER 9 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
"A good choice of policy depends on 
some subtle aspects of the economic 
environment and social preferences" -
R.H. Solow (Growth Theory, An 
Exposition, p.91) 
9.1 Formulation of Economic Policy 
The urgencies of seeking solutions to certain economic problems, 
particularly in a developing country, are such that often 
policies are formulated on an ad hoc basis. Apart from the 
question of urgency, ad hoc methods of policy formulation are 
some times inevitable due to the general paucity of information 
about the economic environment. Although several examples could 
be cited to show that economic policies formulated on such methods 
have not been altogether wrong, yet in general these methods 
could have adverse effects upon some part of the economy or on 
the economy as a whole in the long run. For, the economy is just 
not a collection of separate entities but a system with a number 
of interdependencies amongst its components, as for example 
between output, employment, wage rates, shares of income, govern-
ment expenditure, money supply, rates of interest and other 
variables. Therefore a remedy in one regime of the economy may 
result in a problem in another, which may not be obvious at the 
time of decision making. It follows therefore that a specific 
problem cannot be looked upon as a problem by itself but a 
problem in a system. In other words we have to look at the 
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system as a whole and adopt a systems approach to problem 
solving. 
It is in this context that a model of the economy could be 
of great help. For, it enables us to set out in a relatively 
concise form the interdependencies between the important 
components. As noted earlier, the aim of model building is 
not to obtain an exact representation of reality but a represen-
tation of the more important facets of reality as a system of 
interdependent elements. Having constructed a model, it is 
possible for one to study the impact of the changes in one 
element upon the other elements of the system and deduce 
policy implications. 
Some amount of caution is however necessary in the use of 
models. For, a model can be no more accurate than the set of 
assumptions upon which it is built. Further, even if we have 
built a fairly realistic model, much of its usefulness will 
depend upon the quality of data fed into the model. We have 
already discussed the limitations of the model developed in 
this study and of the data used and it is important to keep 
these limitations in mind when attempting to deduce policy 
~mplications. In fact the results may be somewhat different 
if some values of the parameters differ from those estimated. 
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In view of the nature of limitations of the model and 
inadequacies in the quality of data available, what would 
seem more prudent is to obtain information about 'types of 
effect which certain policies if 'formulated will produce 
rather than to devise preCise quantities or targets for the 
key variables. However, this does not altogether preclude 
us from deriving broad magnitudes wherever possible, for 
purposes of guidance. 
In this chapter we shall attempt to bring together only the 
policy conclusions derived at various stages of this study. 
General conclusions and some of the important analytical 
results will be recapitulated i~ Chapter 10. 
9.2 Capital for Self Employment 
Subject to the assumption that the estimates of the parameters 
used in this study are reasonably accurate, considerations of 
the static form of the model demonstrated that policies which 
stimulate increases of capital for self employment are prefer-
able to those that expand state capital, from the standpoint 
of improving the incomes of the poor. Dynamic considerations 
of the model amplified this result further by showing that 
the rate of growth of incomes of the poor depends to a great 
extent upon the output - capital ratio relating to the capital 
owned by the poor and their marginal savings, rate. The 
------------------------------". , .... ~ ; 
., 
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parameter ~2 which is the product of these two variables 
assumed a crucial role in the numerical simulations carried 
out in Chapter 5; slight changes in ~2' produced dramatic changes 
in the incomes of the poor at a terminal date Further, our 
discussions in Chapter 7 concerning the question of optimising 
the incomes of the poor over time revealed that uncommitted 
investible resources in the hands of the government should 
preferably be converted into capital grants to the poor rather 
than using these resources for expanding state capital. 
Thus the broad strategy indicated consists of: 
(a) expanding capital for· self employment rather than 
expanding state capital; 
(b) raising the output of capital for self employment; and 
(c) raising the marginal savings rate of the poor. 
In tangible terms, this points out to the desirability of 
implementing projects such as land settlement schemes (where 
farmers are allocated state land for purposes of cultivation), 
greater efforts in raising productivity of capital which in 
the case of land would take the form of providing irrigation 
facilities, more distribution of fertilizer, the intensifica-
tion of agricultural extension services, and to the encourage-
ment of savings and investment amongst the lower income groups • 
. , .. .. :.: .. 
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As noted in Chapter 3, successive governments in Sri Lanka 
have implemented land settlement 'schemes since the enactment 
of the Land Development Ordinance in 1935. Nearly 75,000 
families had been settled over the period 1946-71. 1 Likewise 
efforts have been made to raise agricultural productivity 
through a number of measures such as agricultural research, 
extension services, distribution of fertilizer and irrigation 
that 
achemes. It is significant to noteLthe largest ever irrigation 
cum power project in the country namely the r.lahaweli project 
has just been initiated. It envisaeea the settlement ot 140,000 
families over n land area of approximately 900,000 acres.2 
9.3 Subsidies 
One of the interesting results that emerged 'from - the numerical 
simulations in Chapter 5 was that significant increases in the 
rate ;of growth of subsidies could lead only to a marginal 
increase in the income of the poor at a terminal date. For, 
when the growth rate of subsidies increases by fivefold from 1 
per cent to 5 per cent the terminal income of the poor increases 
only from 103.27 to 105.51.subject to the assumption that the 
estimates of the various parameters are reasonably accurate. 
The underlying reason is the diminution in the growth of 
government income which in turn would lead to a 
.. 
1 Source: Administration Reports of the Land Commissioner ~970/71 
2 Government of Sri Lanka, 11ed:1Um !I9rm Investment Programme 1979-83 • 
.l 
. ' . . 
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diminution in the growth of wage income of the poor. These 
results highlighted the desirability of moving away from a 
system of consumer subsidies. 
As noted in Chapter 3 the present climate of thought has moved 
distinctly away from the preoccupation with consumer subsidies. 
The removal of the rice subsidy from the richer half of the 
~opulation could be seen to be a major step in this direction; 
subsidies are now restricted to a target group consisting of 
household earning less than Rs.300 per month. A further move-
ment in the direction of reducing subsidies would appear to be 
desirable. For, in terms of static considerations of the model 
(see Chapter 5) we noted how the partial conversion of a consumer 
subsidy into a capital grant would produce more ~esirable results 
in terms of consumption after a time lag of about 3 years. . How-
ever, one of the limitations of the alternative of effecting 
capital grants to the poor is that only certain segments of the 
poor are benefited, whereas a subsidy such as the rice subsidy 
is spre~d widely amongst the poor, While there does not seem to 
be a clear cut answer to this problem, a partial solution might 
be to spread as far as possible,at least in a geographical sense, 
land development projects or rural industrial projects. 
9.4 Redistribution of Consumption 
The 1nvestigationein Chapter 4 revealed that while income 
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inequality would decline with the introduction of specific 
redistributive measures, total income too would decline, the 
underlying reason being the diminution in total savings due to 
a differential savings rate as between the rich and the poor. 
Thus income redistribution and the growth of total income emerged 
as competing objectives. We then examined an alternative strategy 
of redistribution of consumption. That is, the strategy whereby 
the amount obtained from the rich as taxes is not transferred 
entirely to the poor, but only a proportion c1/c2 of this amount, 
where c1 and c2 are the marginal rates of consumption of the 
rich and poor respectively. Under this scheme, the balance is 
to be retained by eovernment for direct investment. As noted 
in Chapter 4 this introduced in formal terms a system of 
redistribution where there was no loss of savings and a special 
assumption about eovernment according to which the amount 
retained by government was saved and invested. The outcome of ' 
this strategy was noted to be a decline in income inequality 
while total income increased. Thus, under a scheme of consumption 
redistribution, the redistributive and growth objectives emerged 
as complementary objectives, subject to the assumption that the 
"Please" effect did not take place. 
In practice the implementation of such a scheme would take the 
shape of a more judicious use of government revenues, so that 
" 
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the balance left over after the transfer is saved and invested. 
A broader issue which we were unable to capture within the 
framework of the model concerns the production of consumer 
goods. A programme of consumption redistribution may also 
necessitate the stepping up of supplies of goods consumed by 
the poor (eg. specific categories of wage goods) so as to 
enable them to purchase these goods from the increased incomes 
they would receive from such transfers. 
Thus the main policy conclusion we derived was that a system 
of consumption redistribution as defined in this study is 
preferable to one of income redistribution, from the point of 
view of pursuing the twin objectives of growth and redistri-
bution of incomes. 
9.5 The Role of the Modern (Private) Sector 
One of the interesting analytical results obtained in Chapter 4 
was that £} Y2 ) 0 where DC1 was identified as the main parameter 
C)ot1 
associated with the bTowth of incomes of the rich in a situation 
where the rich derive the major part of their income from the 
modern (private) sector rather than from the government. It 
~as clear from the definition of ~1 that it is the parameter 
which represents the growth rate of the modern (private) sector. 
Also in Chapter 6 we discussed the circumstances under which 
., 
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the modern (private) sector must be allowed to erow before 
redistributive measures are introduced, from the standpoint 
of optimising the incomes of the poor. 
Subject to the assumption that the estimuteeof the parameters 
used are reasonably accurate the policy implication of these 
results is that a slowing down of the growth of the incomes of 
the rich could adversely affect the incomes of the poor in the 
. 
long run, the underlying reason being the linkaBe between the 
two income groups through the wage income the poor receive 
from employment in the modern sector. It was apparent therefore 
that if the incomes of the poor are to be ~ettered through 
employment, expansion of the modern (private) sector should 
receive high priority. 
It is significant to note that a number of meaningful steps in 
this direction have been already taken. Perhaps the most 
important of these is the establishment of the Greater Colombo 
Economic Commission (GCEC), to be in charge of an area of 
approximately 180 sq. miles in the northern outskirts of Colombo 
city. Major export oriented industries both local and foreign 
are to be attracted into Investment Promotion ZoneSwithin the 
GCEC through a number of incentives such as tax holidays 
averaging to 5 years, duty free imports of raw materials and 
machinery, exemption from tax for foreign personnel employed in 
l . 
= 
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the industrial projects and nominal tax rates after the expiry 
of the tax holid~ period. A wide range of infrastructure 
facilities are also to be provided. However it should be noted 
that the extent of foreign ownership lessens the linkages between 
the socio-economic groups implicit in the model. The role of 
private foreign investment has not been covered in our study. 
A-number of concessions have also been offered to private 
industry outside the GCEC. These include tax holidays to small 
and medium scale industry, removal of licence control on 85 
per cent of imported raw materials, and a more liberal adminis-
trative framework for the approval of new industries. All these 
will have the effect of increasing industrial output in the 
modern (private) sector and thereby create greater employment 
opportunities. There is scope to take further steps in this 
direction such as for example the provision of greater credit 
facilities to industrialists, stepping up of extension services 
and the systematic removal of undue delays in the system of 
approval . of new industries. 
9.6 The Role of Foreign Aid 
Another interesting analytical result we obtained from Chapter 
5 was that foreign aid wil~ contribute more to the rate of growth 
of incomes of the poor than that of the rich, subject to the 
• 
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assumption that the estimates of the parameter in our El tudy are 
reasonably accurate. The underlying reason ·for this is that 
foreign aid is largely directed towards the government projects 
which primarily provide incomes for the poor. The policy 
implication of this result is that the seeking of foreign aid 
is potentially in conformity with a growth cum redistribution 
strategy. 
A number of interestiQg developments in this area have been 
witnessed in the recent past. The volume of aid pledged at the 
fourteenth Sri Lanka Aid Group meeting held in l1ay 1978 is the 
hiehest on record since the inception of the Aid Consortium. The 
total pledge amounts to approximately US ~ 380 million of which 
US $ 129 million constitutes an outright grant. These figures 
exclude the foreign assistance under negotiation for the Mahaweli 
1 Project referred to earlier. 
9.7 Population Policies 
In Chapter 4 we also set out to examine the impact of differential 
population growth rates upon the distribution of income. The 
results obtained illustrated somewhat dramatically the inadequacy 
of redistribution measures unless they are accompanied by measures 
to'curb the growth rate of the poor. The analysis demonstrated 
that it is only when the rate of growth of population of the poor 
1 See Budget Speech of November 197& 
• 
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could be reduced to a level below that of the rich, that there is 
some scope to reduce income inequality in per capita terms. Such 
a task is not impossible. For, we noted that fertility is 
continuing to decline at a rate fast enough to halve fertility 
in 10 years. The implicit policy conclusion is that population 
control policies should be primarily aimed at the lower income 
groups. This could be facilitated to some extent if conscious 
efforts are made to locate family planning units in geographical 
areas where the poor are pr~dominant. Likewise educat~onal ' and 
publicity programmes could be directed primarily at the poor 
households. 
9.~ The Incentive Effect 
In Chapter 6 we attempted to take account of skilled manpower 
as factor of production in the production functions used in 
the model. The first important analytical result obtained was 
that taxation to a point which would affect the supply of 
skilled manpower, due to the leisure-income preference relation~ 
ship, could adversely affect the incomes of the poor. In other 
words it is poosible that income redistribution could besel! 
defeating particularly when it involves taxation of skilled 
personnel. Although we were not able to solve the problem 
completely due to difficulties in obtaining estimates of some 
of the parameters, it was also possible to demonstrate how the 
entire growth process could slow down due to a decrease in the 
f 
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supply of skilled manpower. 
The implicit policy conclusion is that possibilities of incentive 
losses should be carefully taken into account when tax proposals 
affecting professional incomes are formulated. One approach in 
this direction is to review the present structure of "earned 
income" reliefs and revise taxes downwards as appropriate. But "lo •. 
the " Budget for ""1:979· (see Budget Speech of November 1978) has 
already made a far reaching change, namely to exempt all government 
eaployees from income tax in respect of employment income obtained 
from government. This was primarily aimed at giving relief to the 
professional categories employed in government. Although it may 
not be necessary to extend the same facility to the private sector, 
in View of the generally higher system of rewards prevailing in 
the private sector, yet it may be opportune to consider the question 
of granting greater reliefs on professional incomes earned. 
9.9 Allocation of Resources 
An attempt was made in Chapter 8 to inquire ~to the interrelation-
ships that could exist between growth and redistributive 
objectives in terms of individual sectors of the economy under 
conditions of optimality. The objective functions considered 
inc~uded the growth pbjective, the redistributive objective, the 
employment objective as well as the urban, rural and estate welfare 
objectives. The problem was formulated in terms of a simple linear 
budget, foreign exchange, supply, 
., 
... 
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market, and interdependency constraints. We were thus able to 
obtain an optimum allocation of resources over the major sectors 
of the economy in respect of each objective function. 
The fir.st important policy conclusion that emerged from the 
analysis was that whether the objective be one of growth or 
raising the incomes of the poor or of employment creation, the 
main thrust of development should be in agriculture and that 
the investment in agriculture development emerged as a strong 
investment. Thus agricultur~l development emerged as a strong 
linkage between the growth, redistributive and employment 
objectives. It is interesting to note that the actual allocation 
of resources contemplated by government in regard to public 
sector projects over the period 1979 to 1983 comes fairly close 
to this result. In fact the proposed capital· expenditure on 
agriculture (inclusive of the Hahaweli Project) represents 
approximately 42 per cent of the total investment proposed. Thus 
there appears to be further scope to move towards an optimal 
allocation by diverting more resources to aLTiculture. 
Another major policy conclusion we derived from this analysis 
concerned the allocation of resources over non-agricultural 
sectors. The growth and redistributive objectives called for 
a greater emphasis on traditional industry and a lesser emphasis 
on trade and transport. The analysis also indicated the employ-
9 - 15 
ment potential of traditional industry. This indicates the 
high priority that ought to be assigned towards the development 
of small and medium scale industries as well as cottage 
industries. In tangible terms this calls for greater support 
facilities such as establishment of common services centres to 
cater to the needs of the small industrialists, greater extension 
services, more credit facilities and training personnel in 
government who would be concerned in the development of the small 
scale industry. 
The results of Chapter 8 also provided a framework within which 
questions of resource allocations could be examined. For example 
the analysis showed that the growth objective called for an 
allocation of about 50 per cent from the total resources available 
for investment, those for modern industry, construction, trade 
and transport beine respectively 9.30, 17.10 and 15.68 per cent. 
The broad allocation of resources between sectors thus obtained, 
although at best is a first approximation could serve as a 
useful starting point when' the actual process of resource 
allocation has to be considered. 
", 
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CHAPrER 10 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
"Economic theory, in its purest and 
most abstract form, can be treated 
as a system of logic, having no more 
immediate ethical contact than a 
proposition in Euclidean geometry ••• 
Yet no scientific investigation how-
ever abstract or detached, can entirely 
escape the probability of having ethical 
consequences, remote though this 
possibility may at first appear" -
W.S. Vickrey (Goals of Economic Life). 
We began this study by inquiring into the nature and extent of 
income inequality in Sri Lanka. The main conclusion was that 
significant progress had been made in moving towards a more 
equitable distribution of incomes in Sri Lanka over the period 
1963-73. The share of income of the richest decile of house_ 
holds declined sharply from 40.60 per cent in 1963 to 28.03 per 
per cent in 1973, whilst the share of the poorest decile rose 
significantly from 1.50 per cent in 1963 to 2.79 per cent in 
1973; significant improvements had taken place in the other 
lower deciles too. 
We also noted that the overall reduction of income inequality 
had come about due to the reduction of income inequality.in: 
the urban and rural sectors; there had been no reduction of 
e 
10 - 2 
income ineq~ity in the estate sector. But in real terms, 
non-urban incomes per spending unit had witnessed steady rates 
of growth in contrast to a decline in the case of urban spending 
units, indicating that conditions had moved in favour of the 
, non urban population over a period 1963-73. Also there were no 
marked disparities in consumption as between U;;t'ban, rural and 
estate spending units in 1973, except in the case of a few items 
n~ely the relatively higher level of consumption of protein 
foods in the urban sector, inadequate housing facilities in the 
estate sector, low expenditure on education by estate spending 
units, and the relatively higher expenditure on durable consumer 
goods by urban spending units. It was also noted that there had 
been a growth and redistribution of incomes over the period 1963-
73. For,a little less than a third of the total increase in real 
income during this period had reached the bottom forty per cent 
of the spending units whose share in 1963 was nearly 15 per cent 
of total income. Thereby, their share of income rose to over 19 
per cent by 1973. 
An attempt was made in Chapter 3 to isolate the main factors that 
could have contributed towards the reduction of income inequality 
in recent years. Although there was no clear cut way of quantify-
ing the contributions from each factor, it was noted that reduction 
= 
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of income inequality would have come about partly from welfare 
measures such as the subsidies on food, health, education and 
transport, as well as minimum wage policies and partly from 
agricultural development primarily aimed at domestic production 
of essential food items, Wllich had the effect of increasing 
farmer incomes. 
As stated at the outset, the main purpose of this study was to 
explore the interrelationships that could exist between the 
processes of growth and redistribution of incomes by means of a 
formal model representative in Sri Lanka. The scenario for this 
study was set, so to speak, by the Chenery-Ahluwalia model for 
'distribution with growth U974}. Their study attempted to 
introduce somewhat concisely a unified theory of redistribution 
with growth, bringing out clearly some aspects of interdependent 
growth amongst the various socio-economic groups through employment 
linkages. We extended this model firstly by incorporating the 
g·overnment as a separate entity participating in a growth cum 
redistribution process andL~~C~%~~ducing a number of other 
features such as the role of financial institutions, direct and 
indirect taxes, subsidies, foreign aid, incentive losses and also 
considerations of optimal growth. 
Although the assumptions made at the various stages ot development 
of the model were somewhat Simple, the analytical results obtained 
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seemed to be more complex than one would have expected. This 
indicates the nature of. complexities that could exist in reality 
within a process of interdependent growth. One of the important 
analytical results which we were able to derive was that showing 
how the model could generate the Kuznets pattern in general. A 
further generalization incorporating specific redistributive 
measures enabled us to obtain, as a limiting case, a situation 
where the Kuznets pattern was indiscernible. We hypothesised 
that this limiting case should represent the Sri Lankan situation 
where the trend in the recent past has been one of a steady 
decline of income inequality through specific redistributive 
measures. 
The analYtical results demonstrated the importance of raising the 
productivity of capital owned by the poor and of raising their 
marginal savings rate, the possible adverse effects upon the 
income of the poor by.slowing down th~ growth of the modern 
(private) sector and the urgency of directing the population 
control policies towards the poor if income inequality is to be 
reduced in per capita terms. We also showed how the redistributive 
and growth objectives could become competing objectives under a 
scheme of direct income redistribution and in contrast how these 
two objectives could be made complementary under a scheme of 
consumption redistribution as defined in this study. The model 
developed was extended in Chapter 5 by the incorporation of 
.. ~ 
", 
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financial institutions, direct and indirect taxes, and foreign aid. 
With the incorporation of these elements, the analytical solutions 
obtained assumed further complexity and demonstrated the somewhat 
complicated nature of the interactions amongst the Various elements 
of the model. In particular the analytical solutions demonstrated 
the possible impact of subsidies, higher productivity of capital 
and foreign aid upon the incomes of the poor within a growth cum 
r~distribution process, and set out a framework for evaluating 
the policy options available. For example, the results high 
lighted that increasing the growth rate of subsidies could have 
only a limited impact upon the income of the poor in the long run 
whereas, a marginal increase in the productivity of capital owned 
by the poor could bring about substantial benefits. 
The role of skilled manpower in the development process was given 
explicit recognition in Chapter 6, by incorporating it as a factor 
of production. We were thus able to demonstrate at least in a 
rudimentary form the possible adverse effects on economic growth 
arising from a lowering of the supply of skilled manpower due to 
the interaction of taxes upon the leisure-income preference 
relationship. That is, with increased taxes, there would be a 
tendency for skilled personnel to trade-off leisure for work or 
even emigrate, resulting in a downturn of development activity. 
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As noted at the outset, the question of optimality within a 
growth cum redistribution process has not been adequately covered 
in the literature; the closest was the contribution by Hamada 
U967}. But as noted earlier he had considered only the limited 
. case where workers do not save at all. Further,only one policy 
instrument was considered. What we attempted to do in Chapter 7 
was to extend the approach by Hamada firstly by allowing a positive 
s~vings rate by the poor, secondly by introducing two policy 
instruments, thirdly by assigning a specific role to government. 
More generally we sought to introduce considerations 9f_~ptimality 
into a Chenery-Ahluwalia type of model, and explore the inter-
relationships that could exist between the processes of growth and 
redistribution of incomes under conditions of optimality. 
The entire discussion was couched in the well known Tinbergen 
framework consisting of a model, an objective function, control 
variables, constraints and boundary condition~.The optimisation 
problem was formulated in terms of Hamiltonians and analytical 
solutions were obtained using Pontryagin t s Naximum principle. We 
were thus able to demonstrate how a control mechanism could be set 
up within a growth cum redistribution process and how two control 
variables i.e. a tax on the income of the rich and capital grants 
to :the poor could be varied in order to maximise welfare of the 
poor over a finite time horizon~ subject to given constraints. 
-10 - 7 
The solutions also showed how the shadow prices of three different 
types of capital behaved over a finite time horizon. In particular, 
the shadow price of capital in modern (private) sector presented 
an interesting possibility of how it could signal a change of 
. regime - the first regime where such capital is allowed to expand 
in a tax free environment and a second regime where surpluses are 
transferred to the poor. We also noted that in such circumstances, 
income inequality could increase initially before redistributive 
forces induce a decline. Thereby, we attempted to derive a 
theoretical result which would correspond to the Kuznets pattern. 
The manner in which the "bang bang" type of solution obtained 
could be avoided by the use of a more general concave utility 
function was also discussed. 
A major departure from the aggregative character of the discussions 
was made in Chapter 8 by trying to inquire what the growth, 
redistributive and employment objectives mean in terms of 
individual sectors of the economy. Thereby we sought to capture 
a further set of interrelationships that might exist between the 
objective functions considered. Unlike in the case of Chapter 7 
where the problem was conceived of as one of optimising an 
objective function over time, here the problem was formulated in 
terms of a simple linoear programming model, subject to a budget, 
foreign exchange, supply, market and interdependency constraints, 
. , 
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the time period involved being one year. The analysis showed 
that agricultural development provides a strong linkage between 
the growth, redistributive and employment objectives and that 
investment in agriculture should be around half the total 
investment • In other words these objectives assumed complementarity 
with respect to agricultural development. The analysis also 
demonntrated some trade-offs in resource allocation over the 
non-agricultural sectors with respect to the objective functions 
considered. For example, the redistributive objective called for 
greater emphasis on traditional industry and lesser emphasis on 
trade and trrulsport, whereas the emphasis was somewhat reversed 
under the growth objective. More importantly, the analysis 
provided a broad framework for resource allocation between sectors 
although it was still at best a first approximation. 
The policy conclusions derived from the analytical results were 
recapitualted in Chapter 9. But as noted therein a number of 
these policies are already being implemented. However, it is not 
immediately obvious whether the policies which are being imple-
mented are mutually consistent. Perhaps the main justification 
for the model building exercise carried out,in this study lies 
in the fact that we were able to derive these policy conclusions 
somewhat rigorouslY,from a model which has attempted to work 
towards a unified theory of redistribution with growth, subject 
to the assumption that estimates of the parameters used were 
reasonably accurate • 
.... 
• 
," 
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There are several directions in which this study could be 
extended. Firstly, the number of income groups could be 
increased so as to make it more representative of the real 
situation. But since analytical results are bound to be 
intractable when this extension is introduced computerisation 
would seem inevitable. The second direction in which this 
study could be further extended is by examining the question 
of resource allocation over the sectors over time; we had 
considered only a one period optimisation. This may be 
extended for a time horizon of say 5 years to b"eg1n with. But 
a rigorous exercies may necessitate a major extension of the 
multisector optimisation model of Chakravarty 1965 and is 
bound to present numerous mathematical difficulties. More 
importantly, the main task ahead would be one of trying to 
derive improved estimates of the main parameters and thereby 
develop a firmer empirical foundation to start with. For, 
the final results obtained could be more accurate than the 
assumptions and data used. 
In conclusion, it is hoped that this study has contributed, 
at least in a small way to the current efforts towards 
developing a unified theory of redistribution with erowth. 
It" is also ou t' earnest hope that this study will stimulate 
further discussion and research on this subject, which is of 
considerable relevance today • 
'. I 
I 
1. 
2. 
,. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
1'. 
14. 
~ .. . '\ 
.. 
1-1 
APPENDIX I 
(To Chapter 2) 
TABLE A I - 1 
Sectoral Composition of Gross National Product 
at Constant (1959) Factor Cost Prices - 1977 
Rs. Million 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Hunting and Fishing ',828 
Mining and Quarrying :511 '. 
Manufacturing 1,505 
Construction 480 
Electricity, Gas, Water and 
Sanitary Services 37 
Transport, Storage and 
Communication 1,1'98 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 1,623 
Banking, Insurance and Real ' 
Estate 229 
Ownership of Dwellings 360 
Public Administration and 
Defence 703 
Services 1,703 
Gross Domestic Product 11,977 
Net Factor Income from 
Abroad 
- 25 
Gross National Product 11,952 
Percentage 
,2.0 
2.6 
12.6 
4.0 
0.:5 
10.0 
13.6 
1.9 
'.0 
5.9 
14.' 
-0.2 
100.00 
Source: Central Bank of Ceylon, Annual Report 
1977, Table 2, p.7. 
• to ,. 
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APPENDIX Il 
(To Chapter 2) 
TABLE A 11 - 1 
Composition of Exports and Imports 1975-71 
(a) Exports 1975-77 (at Current Prices) 
Rs. Million 
1 • Tea 1,932 2,100 
2. Rubber 654 890 
3. Coconut Products 397 382 
·4. Minor Agricultural Crops 
(Selected Items) 171 231 
5. Gems (Precious and Semi 
PreciOUS Stones) 180 261 
6. Industrial Exports 542 .782 
7. Other Exports 48 156 
8. Re-exports 10 1.4 
3,934 4,816 
(b) Imports 1975-77 (at Current Prices) 
1. Jibod and Drink: 
2. Textiles and Clothing 
:3. Other Consumer Goods 
4. Intermediate Goods 
of which (i)Fertilizer 
(i1)Petroleum 
5. Investment Goods 
6. Unclassified Imports 
2,520 
20 
111 
1,888 
(208) 
(872) 
653 
59 
5,251. 
.1m 
Rs. Million 
1,491 
49 
149 
2,259 
(99) 
(1,164 ) 
641 
54 
4,643 
3,503 
931 
335 
338 
298 
866 
345 
23 
6,639 
2,181 
150 
203 
2,648 
(51 ) 
(1 ,441 ) 
746 
79 
6,007 
Source: Central Bank of Ceylon, Annual Report 1977, 
Tables 10 and 1" pp. 24-25. 
, , 
.. 
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APPENDIX III 
(To Chapter 2) 
A note on the Consumption Patterns 
in Urban, Rural and Estate Sectors 
and the Changes in the Distribution 
o~ Income 
The purpose of this note is two fold. Firstly, we shall compare 
the oonsumption/expenditure patterns in regard to food, olothing 
housing and other seleoted items as between urban, rural and 
estate seotors. Seoondly, we shall examine how the distribution 
pf inoome within eaoh seotor changed over time. 
The main sources of information used were the Consumer Finanoe 
Survey of 1973 and the Housing Census of 1971 carried out by the 
Department of Census and Statistics. Other souroes suoh as the 
Central Bank Annual Reports and the "Population of Sri Lanka" 
(1974) by the Department of Census and Statistios were also 
used in the latter part of this note. 
The CFS 1973 sets out the average quantities of food items 
oonsumed per head in terms of a cross olassifioation of 20 items 
of food (with sub items) by 9 inoome groups. However, for the 
purpose of this comparative aocount, 18 main items were seleoted 
after snmmarising the sub items and we have oonsidered only the 
overall averages with a view to presenting the main features of 
the disparities between urban, rural and estate oonsumption 
patterns. The results are presented in Table AlII - 1 below 
• 
III - 2 
TABLE A III - 1 
Average -Quantities ot Food Consumed Per Head 
tor Two Months in 1 
1. Rice 
2. Wheat Flour 
3. Bread 
4. Other grain 
5. Starch Food 
Unit 
-lb. 
lb. 
lb. 
lb. 
Urban 
29.50 
3.86 
10.19 
1.86 
Rural 
32.36 
4.66 
5.88 
3.32 
Estate 
32.92 
24.16 
2.23 
t.68 
All Island 
31.88 
6.40 
6.34 
2.88 
(Includes Yams) ,;l.::;,b.:.,. __ .:..1 ~. 7L..:6~_--=:2_._79",--___ 1-=> .:.;:;88~ __ ....::.2:... 5~0 
Sub Total 1-5 lb. 47.17 49.01 > 62.87 50.00 . 
6~ Vegetables oz. 
7. Pulses oz. 
8. Meat oz. 
9. Fish oz. 
10. Eggs No. 
11. Milk Bottle 
12. Tinned Milk oz. 
13. Milk Products oz. 
14. Sugar oz. 
15. Jaggery oz. 
16. Fruits No. 
17. Fruits (Tinned/ 
Dried) oz. 
18. Coconuts No. 
109.14 136.12 120.93 129.57 
18.54 18.74 33.58 20.35 
21.80 7.30 7.09 10.01 
72.29 46.23 16.78 48.27 
4.14 
2.42 
8.04 
0.67 
71.64 
1.68 
1.88 
0.04 
12.49 
1.87 2.80 2.9~ 
1.25 4.19 1.76 
3.41 1.52 4.10 
0.12 0.06 0.22 
19.36 56.80 65.18 
0.81 2.39 1.84 
0.97 1.88 1.23 
45.29 
14.14 13.09 
32.12 
13.73 
Source: CFS 1973, Tables S 589-592, pp. 494-501. 
The above table indicates that in 1973, rural and estate household" 
were able to enjoy higher levels of per capita consumption in cereal" 
and starch toods (1 teu 1 to 5), vegetables and pulaes than urban 
households. But in the case of meat, fish and eggs, the rural and 
estate households were worse oft, and so was the case in regard to 
III - , 
tinned milk and milk products. Estate households were however, 
better off in regard to milk consumption, and this could be 
exp1ained in terms of the predominance of dairy farming in 
the estate areas. There appears to have been a wide disparity 
between urban and rural sugar consumption, even when one takes 
into account the consumption of jaggery, a sugar substitute. 
A part of the explanation for this disparity could be an under-' 
estimate pf jaggery consumption. Moreover, this disparity may 
have also been partly offset by the high per capita dried fruit 
consumption in rural areas. Thus, it would appear from this 
table that except in the case of meat, fish, eggs and milk, 
there did not seem to be marked disparities in consumption per 
capita, as between urban, rural and estate households. This 
disparity was perhaps partly oftset by the higher consumption 
of vegetables and fruit in rural areas and high consumption of 
protein containing pulses in the case of the estate areas. 
In the case of clothing, the average expenditure per spending 
unit could be used to assess disparities since there is no 
marked variation in the price of cloth as it is distributed 
throughout the country through consumer co-operatives at 
more or less uniform prices. The average expenditure on 
c10thing and footwear incurred by urban, rural. and estate 
" 
-
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spending units in 1973 are reported to be as follows: 
1 • 
2. 
... 
TABLE A III - 2 
Average Expenditure per Spending Unit per month 
on Clothing and Footwear 
Item Urban Rural Estate 
Rs. Rs. Rs. 
Clothing 28.10 19.44 27.49 
Footwear 2.90 1.36 0.92 
Total 31.00 20.80 28.41 
Source: CFS 1973, Table S 593 - 596 
All Islan 
Rs. 
21.91 
1.61 
23.52 
It is clear from the above table that rural spending un! ts 
spend much less than their urban counterparts on clothing 
and footwear. One cannot immediately interpret this result 
as a rural spending unit being worse off than an urban spen-
ding unit as regards clothing and footwear. For'; the rural 
life style and rural occupations such as paddy cultivation 
call for much les8 clothing. On the other hand, estate 
spending units with an income level comparable to that of a 
rural spending unit spent almost as much as an urban spending 
unit on clothing and footwear. This could be explained in 
terms ot the neoessity for greater expenditure on clothing by 
estate households as they live in estate areas mainly located 
in the hill country regions where, the climate is relatively 
cold. 
',' 
I 
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We shall now examine the position regarding the next 
important item, namely housing. As in the case of food, 
expenditure cannot be taken to be a oriterion. For'f;. urban 
rents al'e very much higher than rural rents. It is therefore 
necessary to use measures for purposes of 
comparison. The table beloy attempts this comparison. 
TABLE A III - 3 
Floor Space per person and Number of Persons 
per Room - 1971 
Seotor Floor Space No. of Percentage of 
per Persons housing units 
person per Room below minimum 
(1 ) (2) Standard 
<:~ ) 
Urban S~·lt. 8 • 4 2.34 45.9 
Rural 79.21 2.19 39.0 
Estate 51.93 3.38 46.9 
All Island 81.85 2.65 41.2 
Source: Department ot Census and StatistiCS, 
Housing Census - 1971. 
Note 1. Room include bed rooms, living rooms, sitting rooms 
and dining rooms. 
Note 2. Computations tor columns (1) and (2) were made from 
Tables 8 and 6 respectively. 
Note 3. Column (3) was obtained from Table 9 and is intended 
to measure the extent of over crowding. The extent 
of overcrowding had been calculated tor Table 9 on 
the basis of instances where:-
(i) No. of occupants exceeded 2 in Housing Units 
of less than 100 sq. ft. 
(11) No.of occupants exceeded 4 in HOUSing Units 
of 100 - 250 sq. ft. 
. . 
. .. . . 
., 
(iii) 
'. 
(iv) 
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No. of occupants exceeded 6 in Housing Units 
of 250 - 500 sq. ft. 
No. of occupants exceeded 8 in Housing Units 
of 500 - 1000 sq. ft. 
The above table indicates that although floor space per person 
in the rural sector is less than that in urban areas, there is 
less overcrowding in rural areas than in urban areas. The 
other significant feature is the unsatisfactory nature of 
housing conditions in estate areas, indicated by the higher 
number of persons per room and the higher percentage of sub 
standard housing. 
The indicators presented in Table A III - ~ above gives us 
essentially a quantitative picture of disparities in hOUSing 
standards. This must necessarily be supplemented with a 
qualitative picture in order to appreciate the real nature of 
the disparities in housing standards Table A III - 4 below 
attempts to do this. 
TABLE A III - 4 
Housing Units classified by Structural 
Type and basic amenities - 1911 
Sector Percentage 
Permanent 
type 
of Housing Units 
of 
Semi- Tem- Total 
Perma- porary 
Percentage Percen-: 
of Housing tage of· 
Units with Housing· 
piped water Units 
Urban. 
ural 
Estate 
All Island 
nent type 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
on tap with 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, - Housing 
Census 1911. Tables 3, 10, 13A. 
. .... 
.su 
..... , " 
~ .. : 1······ 
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Note: Percentages of the respective structural types were 
derived from Table 3. These types were defined as 
fOllows: 
Permanent - where walls, floor and root are all 
made of durable products like brick, 
cement, tile, asbestos sheets etc. 
Temporary - where walls are made of cadjan, p~ah 
or other inferior and non-durable 
material. 
Semi-
permanent - where a mixture of both durable and non-
durable materials have been used. 
On the basis of conventional urban housing standards and 
amenities, it would appear from the above table that urban 
households are better off on the whole. On the other hand, 
if we regard some of the semi-permanent structures (i.e where 
a mixture of both durable and non durable materials are used) 
as acceptable, results of Table A III - 4 may not be so 
obvious. An environmentalist could further argue that village 
wells are a better source of pure water than large scale water 
supply systems. Whilst it is true that some sections of the 
urban community, particularly the higher income groups enjoy 
comfortable housing conditions, the general urban scene today 
is one of high density, overcrowding, acute shortage of rental 
accommodation, and sub standard housing. In contrast, these 
problems are not prevalent in the rural areas. As much aB 
76.9 per cent of the hOUSing units are owner occupied in 
contrast to an extent of 47.7 per cent in urban areas • 
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A brief comment also seems necessary in regard to the rest 
' . 
of the items in the basket of goods. These items are: 
(i) Medical Services 
(ii) Other goods and services, which include 
- education, 
- personal spending, 
- betel, 
- tobacco, 
- alcoholic beverages, 
- recreation and entertainment, 
- transport and communication, 
- servants, 
- ceremonial, 
- litigation, 
- laundry, 
- gifts, 
- fuel and light. 
(iii) Durable consumer goods, which consists of jewellery 
and other items. 
According to the CFS 1973 (Tables S 594 - 596), significant 
differences do exist only in the case of three items, namely 
e ddc at ion , transport and communication and "other" durable 
consumer items. In the caSe of the first item, the monthly 
expenditure was as low as to 1.58 per estate spending unit as 
compared with Rs.10.32 in the case of an urban spending unit 
and Rs. 6.22 in the case of a rural spending unit. In the case 
ot the second item, the urban expenditure per spending unit 
was nearly 3 times that of an estate spending unit and over 
50 per cent that of a rural spending unit. Differences were 
even more marked in the case of "other" durable consumer goods 
Urban expenditure per spending unit was over' times that of 
an estate spending unit and over 5 times that of a rural 
spending unit. This disparity is also clearly seen in terms 
... , . 
\ 
.  
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of the ownership of durable consumer goods given in CFS 1973 
Table 40. For instance cookers (Kerosene and other) are 
owned by 33.4 per cent of urban households in contrast to 
5.7 per cent in the case of rural households and 4.1 in the 
case of estate households. Again, the percentages of house-
holds owning refrigerators in urban, rural, estate areas ~e 
respectively 4.9, 0.5 and 0.8. The respective percentages 
in the case of telephones are 1.0, 0.1 and 0.6. 
Thus the general picture that seems to emerge from this 
comparative account is that except in the case of a seleoted 
number of items in a common basket of goods, the disparities 
are not so marked as between urban, rural and estate house-
holds. The first exception is the consumption of meat, fish, 
eggs and milk, in regard to which the urban hOU8ehold~ were 
better off. Inadequacy of housing facilities in estate areas 
were the second element of disparity. The third major 
element of disparity was in regard to the expenditure on and 
ownership of durable consumer goods which are relatively 
higher in urban areas. Lastly, expenditure o~ education by 
estate spending units was found to be significantly below that 
of urban and rural households. 
In the above discussion an attempt was made to form broad 
impressions of the disparities in real income on the average 
" 
'''l , -, .> 
r '. 'i: . : .:~.::.~ 
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as between urban, rural and estate spending units. At this 
stage it would be of interest to inquire as to whether the 
pattern of income distribution in 197' as between urban, rural 
and estate sectors represents an improvement on previous 
patterns. The table below attempts to indicate the changes 
that have taken place during the period 1963-73. 
TABLE AlII - 5 
Changes in Inter Sectoral Distribution of 
Income 1963 - 73 
1963 197' 
Sector ~ of " of total " of * " of total Population Income Population Income 
Urban 19.1 28.3 22.4 24.4 
Non-Urban 80.9 71.7 77.6 75.6 
Note: The above results have been derived from tables on 
distribution of total income in CFS 1963, and CFS 
197'3 and from DOS "Population of Sri Lanka" (1974) 
Table 4.2. 
* In the absence of a break up of the 1973 population, 
the 1971 break up was used. 
The most significant features in the above table are the 
the 
increase in the share of non-urban incomes althoughLproportion 
of non-urban population has declined, and the decline in the 
share of income in the case of the urban population even 
though the urban population has increased. These results 
indicate that economic changes have distinctly moved in 
favour of the rural community. 
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Since re~ income has increased by approximately 51 per 
cent over the period 1963-73 as against a population increase 
ot 24.5 per cent (see Computation Sheet at the end ot this 
Appendix), and since income distribution has moved in favour 
of the rural and estate communities, it tollows that rural. 
and estate real incomes should have shown tavourable rates ot 
growth, relative to the urban sector. The table below shows 
the rates at which non-urban income have increased and also 
the rates at which urban incomes have declined in real terms. 
TABLE A III - 6 
Rates of Growth ot Real Income 1963-7' 
Sector Rate ot growth Rate ot growth 
of real income ot real income 
per spending Unit per capita 
Urban -1.5 -2.2 
Rural 1.7 1.7 
Estate 0.9 1.8 
Note 1: See Computation Sheet tor derivation ot 
results. 
Note 2: In the estate sector, the size of a spending 
unit has declined sharply from 5.69 in 1963 
to 5.19 in 1973. This accounts for the wide 
disparity in growth rates as between columns 
1 and 2. 
The analysie carried out in the Computation Sheet aleo 
shows that urban per capita income has declined at the rate 
ot 2.2 per cent in real terms and that non-urban per capita 
,', 
~ .:~' 
" 
~' , . . 
" ~~ 
.. .~ .. , 
. 1 ............. · 
~~ . 
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income has increased at the rate of 2.7 per cent in real 
terms. The results are similar to those obtained by 
Karunatilake {1974 ; p. 98} in respect of income receivers. 
He estimated that average real income has declined at the 
rate of 1.8 per cent in the case of the urban sector, and 
that real income has increased at the rate of 2.0 per cent 
in the rural and estate sectors. 
These results indicate tha~ the urban household is worse 
off today than ten years ago in contrast to his rural 
counterpart whose conditions have improved. The worsening 
conditions of the urban population could be seen in terms 
of increasing numbers of the urban unemployed, worsening 
housing conditions in urban areas, demands for increased wages ' 
by urban workers, indebtedness amo~t the middle income 
groups, the worst affected being the urban poor. In contrast, 
increased farmer incomes in the rural areas have enabled rural 
householdS to afford better hOUSing facilities, to acquire 
consumer durables and to purchase a wider range of consumer 
goods. A comparison of the tables on "Amenities and Equipment" 
in CFS 1963 and CFS 1973 shows the manner 1n which the owner-
ship of consumer durables has increased in the case of rural 
and estate households. However 1n a specific item like 
housing conditions, the situation in the estates may have 
worsened. 
., 
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It would perhaps be beyond ' the soope of this study to go into 
... 
further detail. We shall therefore shift our attention to ~o-
ther. important souroe of inequality namely inequality within 
sectors. Aocording to the CFS 1973 the patterns of inoome 
distribution in the urban, rural and estate seotors were found 
to be as follows: 
TABLE A III - 7 
Inoome Distribution - Urban, Rural and Estate Seotors 
( 1973) 
Inoome Urban Rural 
Group (Monthly Peroent- Peroen- Peroen- Peroen-Inoome) age of tage tage of tage of 
Sp. Units ot Six Sp. Six 
Month Unit Month 
Inoome Inoome 
Less than 
Rs.1oo 6.26 1.}2 
. 7.36 1.90 
Rs .101-Rs.200 18.08 6.98 29.29 '15.49 
Rs.201 - 400 42.33 31.61 45.76 43.82 
Rs.401 - 600 18.67 23.21 11.52 19.08 
Rs.601 - 800 6.65 11.56 3.34 8.04 
Rs.801 - 1:000 3.42 7.59 1.34 4.04 
Rs. 1 000 over 4.59 17.73 1.39 7.63 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Note: Results were derived from CFS 1973 
Tables S 580 - S 583. 
Estate 
Peroen- Peroen~ 
tage of age of 
Sp Six 
Unit Month 
Inoome 
4.84 1.32 
31.10 17.62 
49.54 47.81 
10.24 16.55 
2.61 5.87 
0.37 1.04 
1.30 9.79 
100.00 100.00 
As seen from the above, table, spending units in the inoome group 
Rs.201 - 400 oonstitute the largest proportion of spending units 
in· the urban, rural and estate seotors. The other noteworthy 
feature in the above table is that the proportion reoeiving an 
... 
: ",: 
:.d 
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income of l~ss than Rs.100 per month is less in the estate 
areas than in the rural and urban areas indicating the 
occurence of .: acute poverty to lesser extent in estate areas. 
The above table also shows the share of total income accruing 
to each income group. But in order to study the nature ot 
income inequality in each sector, we shall rank the spending 
units by quintiles and consider the shares of income reoeived 
. and in particular the changes of these shares over time. The 
shares of income received by each quintile during 1963 as 
well as in 1973 are shown in the table below. 
TABLE A III - 8 
Percentage of Total Income received by each 
quintile of Ranked Spending Units in Urban, 
Rural and Estate Sectors (1963 & 1973) 
Qulntile of URBAN RURAL 
SP. Unit 
Share of total income 
. 
ESTATE 
received 
1963 1973 1963 1973 1963 1973 
Lowest 3.3 6.1 4.7 7.4 8.3 
Second 7.4 11.3 9.6 12.6 14.1 
Third 11.6 15.6 14.7 16.8 17.2 
Fourth 20.5 21.8 21.5 21.7 21.6 
Fifth 57.2 45.2 49.5 41.5 38.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sogrce: Derived from Tables on Income Distribution by 
Spending Units in CFS 1963 and CFS 197~ i.e 
Tables 501 in CFS 1963 and Tables 580-583 in 
CFS 1973 • 
8.5 
13.1 
16.; 
21.4 
40.5 
100.0 
\ 
I 
: 
" 
'\ 
\ 
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The above table clearly shows the marked improvement in the 
-. 
shares o~ income accruing to the lowest qu1ntiles both in 
the urban as well. as rural sectors. This improvement ls al.so 
accompanied by a significant decline o~ the share of income 
accruing to the top quintile both in urban and rural areas. 
As ~or the estate sector, the indications are that income 
distribution ooul.d have worsened. For, the shares received 
by the second and third quintiles show a deoline and the share 
received by the top quintile shows a slight increase. Thus, 
thereduotion of income inequality in the country as a whol.e 
during the period 1963-73 (as shown in Table 2.2) could be 
explained entirely in terms of the reduotion in income 
inequality in the rural and urban areas. Lee {1976} expresses 
doubts that there has been a dramatic reduction in income 
inequality over the period 1963-73 on grounds that changes in 
rel.at1ve , prices, part1cularly that o~ tood would have 
considerably distorted the measurement of income and advocate 
the use of oonsumption data instead. But he bases his arguments 
mainly on the decline of rice consumption per capita, and 
19nores the consumption o~ flour and rice substitutes which had 
increased over the same period. Moreover he does not establish 
alternative results based on constant prioe valuation of an 
entire basket of goods and conventional measures of inequality. 
"'~ .. 
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It would be relevant at this stage to examine what these 
.. 
changes mean in terms ot a growth cum re-distribution process. 
It we regard the total real income in 196, as 1 00 units, then 
real income in 197' would be 151.1 units (see Computation 
Sheet). In the terms of the shares ot income received in 196' 
the urban sector received 28.25 units, the rural sector 
received 62.29 units, and the estate sector received 9.47 units 
in 196,. But in terms ot the shares ot income rec;:ived in 
197', the 151.1 units of income were shared by the urban, 
rural and estate sectors, each receiving '6.85 units, 100.'5 
units and 1'.90 units respectively. If each of these six 
estimates are now divided in terms of the shares ot income 
reoeived by the respeotive quintiles as shown in Table A III - Ell 
! 
then the ohanges in real income received by each quintile in 
each sector could be seen from the tables A III - 9 and 
A III - 10. 
TABLE A III - 9 
Distribution ot Real Income in 1963 
Quintile Urban Rural Estate 
Lowest 0.93 2.9' 0.79 
Second 2.09 5.98 1.34 
Third 3.28 9.16 1.6, 
Fourth 5.79 13.39 2.05 
Fitth 16.16 '0.83 3.66 
Totarl 28.25 62.29 9.47 
Total .. 100 
-
." 
! 
Jt , 
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TABLE A III - 10 
Distribution of Real Income in 1973 
Quintile Urban Rural 
Lowest 2.25 7.43 
Second 4.16 12.64 
Third 5.75 16.86 
Fourth 8.03 2'1.78 
Fifth 16.66 41.65 
Total 36.85 100.35 
Estate 
1.18 
t .82 
2.29 
2.97 
5.63 
13.90 
Total .. 151.1 
The above tables indicate that the increases in real income 
have been distributed in favour of the poor. For, by add~ 
up the gains by the 2 lower quintiles in each of the 3 sectors, 
it could be seen that a little less than one third of the total 
increase of 51.1 units of income have gone to these six 
segments of the population. The process that appears to have 
taken place is one of growth with a redistribution of incomes. 
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Computation Sheet 
(Computations for Tables A III - 4 and A III - 5) 
1 • Populatiop 
Total Urban Non-Urban 
196, 10.582 m 2.016 m (19.1%) 8.566 m (80.~) 
1973 12.711 m 2.842 m (22.4%) 9.869 m (77.6~) 
Percentage Increase 20.1% 41.0% 15.2~ 
Growth Rate ot Popu-
lation 2.,,, p.a 4.4% p.a. 1.8% p.a. 
Source: D.C.S. "Population ot Sri Lanka" 1974 Table 4.2 
2. National Income 
1963 
1963 
1973 
G.D.P. at 
Current Factor 
Cost Prices 
(Rs. m) 
6849 
13265 
G.D.P. at Const. 
1959 Prices 
(Rs. m) 
6796.7 
t0426.4 
Private Dispo-
sable Income at 
Constant prices 
(Rs. m) 
Percentage Increase 
Growth Rate 
51.1% 
4.4% p.a. 
6402 
9845 
53.7% 
4.4~ p.a. 
Source: Central Bank of Ceylon 
3. Shares ot Income 
* 1963 Total Income ot Sample Drawn: Rs.2.085 m CFS 196, 
Table SUI. 1-00 
Total Income of Urban Sp.Units: Rs.20.588 m CFS 1963 
Table SUI. 1-00 
Share ot Urban Income 
* 
. 
• 28.3 per cent 
1973 Total Income of Sample Drawn: Ra.','" m (CFS 197' 
Table S 580) 
Total Income of urban Sp.Units: Rs.0.813 m (CFS 1973 
Table S 581) 
Therefore share of Urban Income = 24.4 per cent 
(*Two month Income) 
.-----~----~--~~------~~------------------------------------.. ~~ . ". '1.\,. ~,; 1: ~, . ....-. " , . 
-." 
, : . ,, ';~:t 
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4) Rates of Growth of Income 
(i) Monthly Income per Sp. Unit at 
Urban. 
(Rs. ) 
Current prices 316 
Monthly Income per Sp. Unit at 
(1959) Const. prices 319 
Size of Sp. Unit 4.13 
Monthly Income per capita 64.70 
(ii) Monthly Income per Sp. Unit at 397 
Current prices 
Monthly Income per Bp. Unit at 272 
(1959) Const. prices 
Size of Sp. Unit 5.30 
Monthly Income per capita 51.32 
Urban 
(iii) Rate of Growth of Real Income 
per Bp. Unit - 1.5% 
Rate of Growth of Real income per 
capita - 2.2% 
.!.2.2l 
Rural 
(Rs.) 
166 
168 . 
.lm. 
291 
199 
5.36 
37.13 
Rural 
1.7% 
Estate 
(Rs.) 
177 
179 
5.69 
,1.46 
285 
195 
5.19 
37.57 
Estate 
0.9% 
1.8% 
Notes 1,. The monthly income per Sp. Unit at current 
prices were derived from CFB 196, Tables 501 
2.00 - 2.0' and CFS 197' Tables 580 - 58,. 
2'. Real incomes were derived by using the "Implicit 
Price Index", ie(G.D.P. at Current Prices)/G.D.P 
at Const. (1959) prices, to deflate incomes at 
current prices. 
r 
,. The sizes of Sp. Units were derived from CFS 196;\ 
Table 5 and CFS 197' Table 4 • 
" 
" '> ""! I -- ~: 
" 
.. 
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Appendix IV 
(To Chapter 4) 
Solutions to Equations (4.20) 
The set of linear simultaneous differential equations (4.20) 
are : 
· Y1 = cx'1 Y1 + Y1 Y • • • 
(1) 
g 
· (2) Y2 = Po + 0(2 Y1 + (32 Y2 + 1'2 Yg • • • 
· ~3 Yg (3) y = • • • g 
~e solution to ,equation (3) is easily found as 
- "'3 t Y = Y e g g • •• 
Substituting for Y g in equation (1), we get 
Y1 - ClC.1 Y1 = "1 yg e1'5
t 
The Complementary Function = A1 
constant, and the 
• where A1 is an arbitrary 
Particular Integral = '61 Yg e'l3't:. 
"3 - ct1 
Therefore,the General Solution is 
At t = 0, Y1 = Y1 
Therefore Y1 = A1 + ~1 Yg 
"3 -~ 
+ 1'1 Y g • •• (5) 
• 
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Using equations (4) and (5), we can now substitute for Yg and Y1 
in equation (2) to get 
Y2 - h Y2 = (lo + "'2[ 'I1 
Complementary Function = A2 e fht 
Particular Integral = - & + ~ [Y1 
(32 ~ - 1'-'2 
Therefore,the General Solution is 
Y2 = A2 ePa.t [- - ~ eol.t t - (30 + 0{2 Y1 - ~ Ye 73; CX1 - (32 '(, - ~ 
- [~'11 +l21 'Y3t + Y e B 1, -P2 't, -0(.1 
Eliminating A2 • using the initial condition Y2=Y2 at t = 0 
y 2 = [y 2 + Ch - "'2 { 'I t - 1(1 Y g ) - \ {~ '11 + l' 2Y e (l, 
/32 ()(t -(32 1',- 0(1 1':,.- (32 l', -~1 IJ 
+ 
••• 
Equations (4), (5) and (6) constitute the solution to the set 
of linear simultaneous differential equations (4.20) 
(6) 
. 
-
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Note: Consider the differential equation in Y1 we obtained by 
eliminating Y between equations (4) and (1) g 
Setting OC1 = t, in this equation, it reads 
• l'3 t Y1 - 1'3 Y 1 = '11 Y g e 
As before the complementary function = A1 
l'3t e 
Substituting Y1 = t 01 Yg e"3t 
L.H.S = 11 Yg e13t + t 13 '(1 Yg J3 t - t 't 3 ¥1 Yg 
Therefore is a particular integral 
Therefore,the general solution is 
13t - l,t Y1 = A1 e + t 11 Yg e 
-From initial conditions, A1 = Y1 
- "it Therefore Y1 = Y1 e
3 
¥Jt e 
, . ~ , 
• 
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APPEIUJIX V 
(To Chapter 4) 
Notes and Explanations regarding the 
• Estimation of Parameters 
(1) Estimation of the Ratios Y1 : Y2 : Yg 
In the 1973 Survey of Consumer Finances, 
Number of housing units sampled 
Number of households sampled 
Number of spending units per household 
Mean Income per spending unit 
= 5000 
= 5088 
= 1.05 
= Rs. '3732 per 
annum 
Therefore 11ean Income per household = Rs. '3732 x 1 .05 per annum 
= Rs.3919 per annum. 
Total number of housing units = 2,530,455 
Therefore total number of households = 5088 x 2,530,455 
5000 
Therefore total household income = Rs.3919 x 5088 x 2,530,455 
5000 
i.e. Y1 + Y2 = Rs.10,100m approximately. 
Since the survey was conducted in Janun.ry 1973, this 
estimate may be regarded as an estimate of household income 
during 1972. 
From the Estimates of Government Revenue and Expenditure, 
it was found that 
Government Revenue in 1972 = Rs.2978 million 
Personal Emoluments in 1972 = lls.1252 million 
Therefore Government Revenue net of 
Personal Emoluments = Rs.1726 million. 
Net Food SubSidy = RS.526m (C.B. estimate) 
Therefore Government "Income" in the sense of equation 
(4.6) = Rs.1200 million 
i.e. Y = Rs.1200 g 
p 
v ~ 2 
Therefore (Y1 + Y2) : Yg = 90 : 10 approximately. 
From Table 2.1, share of income of 
Spending units receiving over Rs.400 per unit = 43 per cent. 
i.e. Y1 = 43 per cent of (Y1 + Y2) 
Therefore Y1 : Y2 : Yg = 38 : 52: 10 approximately. 
It should also be noted that spending units receiving 
under Rs.400 per month constituted nearly 80 per cent ot 
the total i.e. Population Ratio of Rich to Poor = 1 : 4. 
(2) Output - Capital Ratios 
The first step in this exercise was to obtain a oonstant 
price series of GDP as well as of Gross Domestic Capital 
Formation (GDCF). Since the former was readily available, 
only the latter had to ba computed. In computing the latter 
the first step was to split up the GDCF into its local and 
foreign components using estimates of the import content in 
GDCF provided in the Central Bank Reports of 1967 onwards 
under the Tables entitled "Direct Import Content of Gross 
Domestic Expenditure". Then GnCF at constant prices was 
derived as shown in the table below. 
... 
~ 
. , 
./ 
Year 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Local 
Component 
of GDCF'" 
(lc) 
(Ra·. in) 
(1 ) 
749 
656 
778 
775 
850 
820 
798 
870 
1031 
1295 
1642 
2056 
1905 
1737 
2093 
2722 
Table A - V - 1 
Estimation of G.D.C.F at Constant Prices 
Ind. Taxes 
less 
Subsidies * 
(Current 
Price ) 
(Rs.rn) 
(2) 
3B3 
40B 
384 
491 
485 
485 
529 
629 
754 
664 
900 
1109 
931 
981 
1661 
1624 
G.D.E at 
current 
prices * 
(Rs· .. ·m) 
(:3) 
6576 
6849 
6816 
7069 
7510 
1958 
8051 
8627 
9294 
11035 
12423 
13060 
12888 
13814 
16876 
22610 
Ind. Tax 
-:- G.D.E 
= r 
(4) 
0.0582 
0.0596 
0.0558 
0.0695 
0.0646 
0.0609 
0.0651 
0.0729 
0.0811 
0.0602 
0.0124 
0.0849 
0.0721 
0.0110 
0.0984 
0.0718 
Ic( 1-r) 
: '\ (Ra.m) 
(5) 
705 
617 
735 
721 
795 
710 
746 
801 
947 
1217 
1523 
1881 
1167 
1614 
1887 
2527 
Ic(1-r) 
deflated 
by factor 
cost 
deflator 
( Rs-.m) 
(6) 
705 
617 
748 
744 
801 
717 
753 
818 
940 
1096 
1317 
1510 
1453 
1213 
1289 
1312 
Import 
content 
of 
GDCF* 
(If) 
(Rs.m) 
. (7) 
364 
322 
324 
305 
310 
293 
215 
325 
346 
404 
611 
498 
344 
381 
537 
418 
Import 
content 
deflated 
by Import 
Price 
Index * 
(B) 
364 
295 
318 
366 
349 
168 
126 
195 
187 
190 
260 
182 
126 
172 
207 
109 
.. 
(9)=(6)+(8) 
G.D.C.F. at 
1959 constar: 
prices 
(Rs.m) 
1069 
912 
1066 
1110 
1156 
945 
879 
1013 
1127 
1286 
1511 
1752 
1597 
1445 
1496 
1481 
The estimates of GDCF at (1959) constant prices, so obtained as well as the GDP estimates (already 
available in C.B Reports) were then tabulated and 5 year moving averages were computed in order to 
find the trend in the capital output ratios. However, the capital-output ratio was estimated for 
the purpose of the present study in terI!lS of the average annual increase of GDP and the average 
annual GDCF as shown in Table ! - V - 2. 
Defini tioris:Ic=~ cal -Corlponcnt of GDCF, If = Import Cont:E:nt o~ GDCF < 
~ . '. . 
*Sources: ' Centrnl Rank of Ccylon Annual Reports ~ 
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Table A - V _ 2 
Estimation of Capital - Output Ratio 
Year G.D.C.F. 
at (1959) 
Constant 
Prices 
G.D.P. at (1959) 
factor 1 
coat 
(Ra. (Ra. 
Billion) Billion) 
1959 1.069 5.930 
1960 0.912 6.332 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1.066 
1 .110 
1.156 
0.945 
0.879 
1.013 
1.127 
1.286 
1.577 
1.752 
1.579 
1.445 
·1 .496 
6.465 
6.760 
6.951 
7.397 
7.565 
7.854 
8.255 
8.937 
9.369 
9.771 
9.792 
10.102 
10.426 
G.D.C.F. 
5 Year 
Moving 
Average 
It 
(Rs. 
Billion) 
1.0626 
1.0378 
1.0312 
1.0206 
1.0249 
1.0500 
1.1764 
1.3510 
1.4642 
1.5278 
1.5698 
G.D.P. 
5 Year 
Noving 
Average 
Yt (Re. 
Billion) 
6.4876 
6.7806 
7.0276 
7.3054 
7.6044 
8.0016 
8.3960 
8.8368 
9.2956 
9.5942 
9.9634 
0.2936 
0.2470 
0.2778 
0.2990 
0.3972 
0.3944 
0.4408 
0.4276 
0.2986 
0.3692 
3.6192 
4.2016 
3.7120 
3.4134 
2.5780 
2.6623 
2.6688 
3.1595 
4.9035 
4.1381 
Average Annual Increase in Yt (G.D.P) during the period 1962 - 1976 
=1: A'J = 0.3445 
10 
Average Annual It (Investment) during the period 1961 to 1970 
= 1: It = 1. 175 
10 
Therefore Average Incremental Capital - Output Ratio = 3.411 
Therefore Average Incremental Output-Capital Ratio = 0.2932 
(Note: Same results could be obtained by conSidering total increase 
in GDP and total investment) 
1 Source: Central Bank of Ceylon, Annual Reports 
, . .. . ' , 
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Although the aggregate capital-output ratio was thus derived, firm 
data was not available for the derivation of this parameter for 
the various sectors, i.e. the modern sector, the government sector 
and the traditional sector. In these circumstances, the use of 
, 
. 'judgement was inevitable. Accordingly the output-capital ratio 
in government was assumed to be 0.25 considering the heavy infra-
1 
structural compononts in government enterprises. The parameters 
a1 and b2 were both set at 0.30 (in Set 2). But in view of higher 
efficiencies that could prevail in investmen~which employ only 
highly skilled labour or investment abroad b1 was set at 0.32. 
(3).~age and Profitability Parameters 
The first source of information for this computation was "A Framewor 
of Economic Statistics in Sri Lanka with special reference to Employ 
ment and Income Distribution" by Pyatt et al. According to the 
Table on summarised social accounts, the total of wages in the 
Private Sector was Rs.4114m and the total value added was Rs.9911m. 
Thus the share of waees, (assumed as wage income of poor) was taken 
as 0.4. 
The balance proportion of 0.6 was taken to consist of salaries and 
management fees amounting to 0.1 and pure profits amounting to 0.5. 
Thus 
In the case of the government sector, the total of personal emolu-
1 This \-1ould have the effect of 101'lcrine the productivity of capi ta1 
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ments was earlier noted to be Rs.1250m approximately in 1972. 
Together with the wage bills in Corporations and Co-operative enter-
prises, the total wage bill was estimated to be in the region of 
Rs.4500m. 
. Therefore (w1g + w2g) : Pg = 4500 : 1200 = 4 : 1 approximately 
Tables II J 2 and II J , of the C.B. report 1972 gives information 
on Employment in Government institutions and in Corporations. By 
considering the "Administrative Technical and Professional Offices 
of staff rank" as well as certain cate60ries of "Subordinate 
employees" to constitute the "Rich" in Government Services and by 
assuming p~ausible monthly incomes it was estimated that w1 : w2 g ' g 
= t : , 
2 : 6 : 2 
(4) Savings Ratios 
The basic source of information for the estimute of the marginal 
savings rate was a mimeographed paper by P.N. Radhakrishnan entitled 
"Aggregate Savings and its components - Trends, Prospects and 
Implications - Sri Lanka" on the basis of time series data covering 
the period 1959-1974, he estimated the agbTegate savings function · 
to be 
St = 0.17 Yt - 288.12 
(0.014) 
-. " 
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In the absence of cross-section estimates, the time series estimate 
of 0.17 was assumed to be the marginal savings rate of the poor. 
The average savings rate of rich was assumed to be fixed at 20 per 
cent. Thereafter, the constant term So in the savings function of 
the poor was calculated as follows: 
Savings function of the Poor: 
Therefore average savings rate = ~ = 0.17 + ~ 
Y2 Y2 
Since Y2 = 38 
Average savin.gs rate of poor = 0.17 + ~ 
38 
Population ratio of Rich to Poor = 1 : 4 
Therefore weighted average savings rate = 1/5 (0.2 +4(0.17+s0 
-38 
The weighted average was ass :uned to be 10 per cent since the 
saving rate during the period 1972/73 was estimated to be 
around this figure. 
i.e. 1/5 (0.2 + 0.4 (0.17 + ~) = 0.1 
38 
Therefore So = 3.61 
figure of 
A higherL4 was taken to be the eotimate of sO. 
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Appendix VI 
(To Chapter 4) 
. Solutions to Equations (4.52) 
As in the case of equations (4.43) in Section 4.8, the values 
of the basic parameters used are the same as those of Set 1, 
. except for b2 = '_0.28 and s2 = 0.1. In terms of these values, 
0<.1 = 0.0472, 
(;(2 = 0.0144, 
02 = 0.005 
'{1 = 0.005 
(32 = 0.028, 
"'3 = o. 005, 
(30 = -1.12, 
~1 = 1 
( ) 
I ...,' ,-vI The transformation 4.51 then yields values for ~1 ' 01 ' ~ 
etc. for each value of A, and the coefficients of equation (4.52) 
could thus be calculated. 
Case I A = 0.05 
Equations (4.52) read: 
• Yt = 0.04509 Yt + 0.00475 Yg 
• Y2 = 0.01729 Y1 - 1.12 + 0.028 Y2 + 0.01522 Yg 
· Y = 0.00503 Y + 0.000526 Y1 g g --- (1) 
Let L (Y 1) = y 1 and '- (Y 2) = y 2 
" 
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Applying the ·.Laplace Transform to the first and third of 
1 
equations (1) and solving for y 1 and Y 2 w.e get: 
Y1 = 38 (s - 0.00503) + 0.0475 
8 2 - 0.0501s + 0.0002243 
Y = 0.0200 + 10 (s - 0.04509) 
g s2 _ 0.0501s + 0.0002243 
--- (2) 
These equations can be put into the partial fraction form: 
Y1 = ~2! l22 1 .12~ 
(s - 0.04516) (s - 0.00497) 
Y = 0.212 + 9.485 --- (3) 
g (s 
- 0.0415) (s - 0.005) 
Using the second property defined by equationa (4.54), 1.e 
that eat = -1- or conversely that 
to Y . and Y s-a are: 
1Y1 = 3~.125 e 0.04516t -1.125 e 
at -1 1 
e = e:a, the solut:ons 
1 
0.00497t 
Y = 0.515 e 0.04516t + 9.485 e 0.00497t 
g 
As defined by equations (4.54), 
l {F}= s f(s) - F(O) 
Therefore, in place of equations (4.55) "Te get 
sY1 - Y1 = 0.04509 Y1 + 0.00475 Ye 
sYg - Yg = 0.00503 Yg + 0.000526 Y1' 
where Y1 = 38 and Yg = 10 
These equations could be easily solved for Y1 and Yg • I I __ 
Alternatively, the values of ~1 ' 11 ' etc. and of Y1 and Ye 
could be directly substituted in equations (4.56) 
t 
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Substituting~for Y1 and Yg in the second of equations (1), 
Y2 - 0.02~ Y2 = -1.12 + 0.6841 eO.04516t + 0.1252 e 0.00497t 
Therefore, Y2 = Ae 0.028t + 40 + 39.866 e 0.0451t _ 5.436 eO.00497t 
At t = 0, 52 = A + 74.430 
Therefore, A = 22.430 and 
Y2 = 40 + 39.866 e 0.0451t - 22.430 e 0.028t _ 5.436 eO.a0497t 
At t = 10, Yt = 60.276 
Y2 = 67.194 
Y = 10.711 g 
Therefore, Y1 + Y~ + Y = 138.247, 
'" g 
Y1 + Y2 = 127.47' and 
Y1/Y2 = 0.897 
Case II A = 0.10 
Equations (4.52) read: 
• Y1 = 0.04298 Y1 + 0.0045 Yg 
• 
--- (5) 
Y2 = 0.0203 Y1 - 1.12 + 0.028 Y2 + 0.01544 Yg 
· Y = 0.00505 Y + 0.001086 Y1 g B 
. " 
, .-.. 
(1 ) 
., 
• 
"" ' .. 
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Applying the ~ Laplace Transform to the first and the third of 
equations (1) and solving for Y1 and Y2 we get: 
. 
Y1 = 28 (s - 0.00505) + 0.045 
s2 _ 0.04603 s + 0.0002122 
y = 0.04085 + 10 (s - 0.04298) 
g 8 2 - 0.04803 s + 0.0002122 
--- (2) 
These equations can be put into the rartial fraption form: 
Y1 = 39.059; 
(s - 0.04311) 
1.059 
(s - 0.00493) 
y = 1.104 + 8.896 
g (s - 0.0411) (s - 0.00493) 
As before, the inverDe Lapluce Transform yields 
Y1 = 39.059 e 0.04311t - 1.059 e 0.00493t 
y = 8.896 e 0.00493t + 1.104 e 0.04311t 
g 
--- (3) 
--- (4) 
Substituting for Y1 and Ye in the second of equations (1), 
Y2 - 0.028 Y2 = - 1.12 + 0.8099 e 0.04311t + 0.1159 e 0.00493t 
Therefore, Y
2 
= A eO.028t + 40 + 53.600 eO.04311t _ 5.024 eO.00493 
--- (5) 
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At t = 0, " 52 = A + 88.876 
Therefore, A = -36.576 and 
Y2 = 40 - 36.576 eO.028t + 53.600 eO.04311t _ 5.024 eO.00493t 
At t = 10, Y1 = 58.997 
Y2 = 68.815 
Y = 11.045 g 
Therefore, Y1 + Y2 + Yg = 138.857 
Case III A = 0.15 
Equations (4.52) read: 
· Y1 = 0.04087 Y1 + 0.00425 Yg 
• Y2 = 0.0235 Y1 - 1.12 + 0.028 Y2 + 0.01567 Yg 
• 
Yg = 0.00508 Yg + 0.001683 Y1 
Applying the Laplace Transform to the firot and third of 
equations (1) and solving for Y1 and Y2 we get: 
. 11 = 38 (s - 0.00508) + 0.0425 
8
2 
- 0.04595 B + 0.0002004 
1 = 0.06395 + 10 (s - 0.04195) g 2 
s - 0.04595 s + 0.0002004 
--- (1) 
--- (2) 
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These equations can be put into the partial fr~ction form: 
38.964 
(s - 0.04107) 
0.964 
(s - 0.00488) 
y = 1.822 + 8.178 
g (a - 0.04107) (a - 0.00488) 
Therefore,the inverse Laplace Transform yields 
Y1 = 38.964 eO.04107t - 0.964 eO.00488t 
Y = 1.822 eO.04107t + 8.178 eO.00488t 
g 
--- (3) 
--- (4) 
Substituting for Y1 and Yg in the aecond of equations (1) 
Y2 - 0.028 Y2 = - 1.12 + 0.9442 eO.04107t + 0.1055 eO.00488t 
Therefore, Y2 = A eO.028t + 40 + 72.242 eO.04107t - 4.563 eO.004881. 
--- (5) 
At t = 0, 52 = A + 107.679 
Therefore, A = -55.679 and 
Y2 = 40 +. 72.242 eO.04107t - 55.679 eO.028t - 4.563 eO.00488t 
At t = 10, 
Therefore, Y1 
Y1 = 57.741 
Y2 = 70.470 
Yg = 11.365 
+ Y2 +Y = g 
Y1 + Y2 = 
139.576 
128.211, 
Y1/Y2 = 0.819 
a.nd 
" 
", 
VI - 7 
Case IV A= 0.20 
Equations (4.52) read: 
Y1 = 0.03876 Y1 + 0.004 Yg 
Y2 = 0.0268 Y1 - 1.12 + 0.028 Y2 + 0.01589 Yg 
Y = 0.00511 Y + 0.002326 Y1 g g 
Applying the Laplace Transform to the first and third of 
equations (1) and solving for 11 and Y2 we get: 
Y1 = 38 (s - 0.00511) + 0.04 
6 2 - 0.04387s + 0.000189 
( 1 ) 
Y = 0.0884 + 10 (s - 0.03876) 
g s2 _ 0.043878 + 0.000189 
-,.- (2) 
These equations can be put into the partial fraction form: 
Y1 = 38.881 (s - 0.03903) (s - 0.00485) 
0.881 
y = 2.665 + 7.335 
g (8 - 0.03903) (s - 0.00485) 
Therefore, the inverse Laplace Transform yields 
Y
1 
= 38.881 eO.03903t - 0.881 eO.00485t 
y = 2.665 eO.03903t + 7.335 eO.00485t 
g 
--- (3) 
--- (4) 
.. 
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Substituting' for Y1 and Yg in the second of equations (1) 
12 - 0.028 Y2 = -1.12 + 1.084 eO.03903t + 0.09294 eO.00485t 
Therefore, Y2 = A eO.028t + 40 + 98.277 eO.03903t _ 4.015 eO.00485~ 
--- (5) 
At t ::: 0, 52 = 134.262 + A 
Therefore, A = -82.262 and 
.Y2 = 40 + 98.277 eO.03903t - 82.262 eO.028t - 4.015 eO.00485t 
At t =10, Y1 = 56.519 
Y2 = 72.138 
y ::: 11.637 g 
Therefore'Y1 + Y2 + Yg = 140.294 
Y1 + Y2 = 128.657, and 
Y1/Y2 = 0.783 
Case V A= 0.25 
Equations (4.52) read: 
· Y1 = 0.03665 Y1 + 0.00375 Yg 
· Y2 = 0.0303 Y1 - 1.12 + 0.028 Y2 + 0.01611 Yg 
· Y = 0.00514 Y + 0.003026 Y1 g g ( 1 ) 
.  
• 
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Applying the ~aplace Transform to the first and third of 
equations (1) and solving for Y1 and Y2 weeet: 
Y1 = 38 (0 - 0.00514) + 0.0375 
s2 _ 0.04179 s + 0.000177 
y = 0.1150 + 10 (s - 0.03665) 
g 2 
8 - 0.041798 + 0.000177 
--- (2) 
These equations can be put into the partial fraction form: 
. 
Y1 = 3A.751 
(s - 0.03701) 
0.751 
(s - 0.00479) 
Y = 3.681 + 6.319 
g (s - 0.0370~) (s - 0.00479) 
A 
Therefore, the inverse Laplace Transform yields 
Y1 = 38.751 eO.03701t - 0.751 eO.00479t 
Ye = 3.681 eO.03701t + 6.319 eO.00479t 
--- (3) 
Substituting for Y1 and Yg in the socond of equations (1), 
Y2 - 0.028 ,Y2=- 1.12 + 1.233 eO.03701t + 0.07905 eO.00479t 
Therefore, Y2 = A eO.028t + 40 + 136.848 eO.03701t _ 3.406 eO.00479· 
--- (5) 
., 
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At t = 0, ~ 52 = 173.442 + A 
Therefore, A = - 121.442, and 
Y2 = 40 + 136.848 eO.03701t - 121.442 eO.028t - 3.406 eO.00479t 
At t = 10, Y1 = 55.319 
Y2 = 73.883 
Y = 11.959 g 
Therefore, Y1 + Y2 + Ye = 141.161 
" 
-
o. 
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APPENDIX VII 
(To Chapter 5) 
Solutions to Equations (5.21) 
The set of 1inear sima1taneoUB differential equations (5.21) 
are: 
• 
y 1 = 0<.1 Y 1 + '(1 Y g + '11 F", 
i 2 = Po + CX2 Y 1 + (32 Y 2 + 12 Y g + '1.2 Ft 
In order to so1ve the above equations we shall first select the 
first and the third equations and write them in the form 
(D - 0(1)Y1 - "1 Yg = 'l1 Ft 
(v, D + "'"')Y1 - (D - Y,)Yg = ~ St - ~, Ft 
where D represents the operator~ 
dt 
••• 
Using the operator (D - 1,) on the first equation and 
multiplying the second equation by )'1' we get 
(D-et1 ) (D- '6',)Yt-l1 (D- '(,)Yg = ~1 (D- Y,)~\ 
"(1 (",DT")Y1- &'1 (D- 't3)Yg = '(1 ~ St - 'l, "1 Ft ••• 
(1 ) 
(2) 
Eliminating Yg we get 
[ (:D -~ )(D-9- Yl ", D- V(,] Yl = ql (D-9 Ft -ll E s~ + ~"1 F, 
i.e [D1_(1X1+~+t1 Y,)D+(Cl1 '6',-r1~~ Y1= ~1(D-~)Ft: 
The auxiliary equation is 
),1_(1X1+Y,+'(11)A+(c(1 l',-l10(3) = 0 
• • • • 
••• 
" 
',~~ 
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Should this "equation have complex roots, the solution obtained 
in respect of Y1 will be oscillat~ry. However, as shown below, 
the roots of equation (4) are real and distinct. 
The discriminant of this equation is 
2. ' 
11. = ( 0(1 + 'Y, + '(1 V,) - 4 ( CX1 1, -Y1 ex,) 
Further, from the 
definition of the coefficients in equation (1), "t l' v" (){1' "'(, 
and ~, are positive 
Therefore A )0 
The roots of equation (4) are therefore real and distinct. 
Suppose we denote the two roots by A1 and A2 defined by: 
A1 = (cx,+',+l1 V,)+ j«(/..1+l ,+l1y,f1 - 4(~r, -,)11) 
2 
2 
then the complementary function is given by 
Y1 = A eA1t + B eA~t 
••• 
• • • 
where A and B are constants to be determined from initial 
conditions. 
(6) 
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The particular integral of equation (3) is given by 
P. I = 1 {~1 (D- 1. )Ft - c: 't1 st. +~, 1'1 Ft} D1_(o(1 +l,+l1 y,)D+(CX1 "',- r1~) . , 
= t~1 (6-)+Q, 01} FO e 6t 
&~( 0<.1 + t1 + 11 Y," +(0(1 )',- )'10(,' 
where); = {~1 (6-1',) + '1., y11 
1 b -(<X1+l',+l1 '3)b '-(CX1 ",-l1<X') 
and 12 = £1'1 
~1-(ct1+ l',+'t1 Y,)E +(0.:11,- l'1 0l,) 
Therefore the complete solution of equation (,) is 
At Alt U ~t 
Y 1 = A e I + B e + t-1 FOe -f2S 0 e 
\/hen t = 0 Y1 = Y1 (initial income of the rich) 
Therefore Y1 = A + B + t-1 FO - 12 So 
Substituting for Y1 in the first of equations (1), 
)'1 Yg = (A1-'1)A i·,t +(A2-1X1)E i·2.t +(&-~ )i1 Fo e't 
( . ) £t eSt 
- f - ~ Y"2 So e - ~1 FOe 
When t = 0 Yg = Yg (initial government income) 
•••• 
(8) 
• •• (9) 
• •• ( 10) 
• • • ( 11 ) 
• •• (12 ) 
Therefore l 1Yg = (A1-~ )A+(A2-'2)B+{ (b-"',) r1-~1 FO-(E -~»)'2 SO} 
• •• ( 1') 
" 
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Solving equations (11) and (13) we get: 
A = '''1 Y g - ().2 - ~ fy 1 + [ rt1- (~ - ~ )1""11 F 0- ( ( - ~ ) f-2 So 
(A1-~) 
and B = ().1-~ }Y1-Y1Yg+f'2S0(A1-E)+FO[JA1 (6-).1 )-~11 
(~-~) 
••• ( 14) 
In order to solve for Y2, we shall in the first instanoe take 
the seoond of equations (5.22), substitute for Y1 from the first 
of equations of (5.22) and re-arrange terms to get : 
••• (15) 
The oo'mplementary fWlotion is Y 2 = C e Iht where C 
is a oonstant to be determined from the initial oonditions. 
The Particular Integral is given by: 
P.I = - f>O+(~+Y21X.1) Y1 +(02+ Y2 11) Yg +(~2+Y2~1 )Foe&t /&--; (D- ~2) (D- 132 ) (D- (32) 
Substituting for Y1 and Yg from equations (10) and (12) we get: 
P.! = -/~+(~+')~cx.1)[ A eAr~ + B e A2,t + f'1 Fo e cSt -f"2 So eftl 
(32 A1- (32 A2-~ ~- P2 £ - (32 
-
+ (°2+1'2 '61 ) r(~-- CX;>- A eA1t + (~-')B i'lt 
'1 l (A1- (32) ()\2- ~2) 
;a 
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••• (17) 
Therefore the complete solution of Y2 is: 
2 - - ro 2 2 1 1--=-1 ,.::::0:......-_ I: Y - C e'~'4t A + (0( +y ex. >[A e>"lt + B eA.'1t +}.). F e6t -}.).2 So eEt~ 
. 1; >"1-(32 ).2-(32 ~ - (32 E - ~2 
+ (12+Y2~1 ) [(~-«,) A eXit + (~-~) B e\'·t+{(&-Q(1);t1-~1}Fo e&t 
i1 (~- ~2) <>~2- 1"2) (6- f32) 
• • • ( 18) 
where from initial conditions, C is given by 
C = Y2+ ~-(0l2+Y2CX:1 >[ A + 
f'2 ~- (32 
• • • (19) 
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Thus the complete solution to the system of equations (5.22) 
is given by equations (10), (12) and (18), where the constants 
A, B and C are determined by equations (14) and (19). 
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" APPENDIX VIII 
(To Chapter 7) 
Explanatory :Note No.1 to Chapter 7 
The values m' parameters used are essentially the same as 
those estimated for Chapter 4, except for the parameters s2 
which is taken to be 0.1 
That is 
a1 = 0.3, (32 = 0.28 (same as b 2 in Ch.4) ag = 0.25 
w11 = O.~ w21 = 0.4 P1 = 0.5 
w2g = 0.8 Pg = 0.2 
Now 0(,1 = a1 hl11 + P1)' 0(,2 = w21 a1 (32 = ~, "(2 = W2e; a B-
and 13 = Pg a g 
Therefore 1X1 = 0.18, 0<.. = 0.12, f2 = 0.28 02 = .0.2 2 
and )'3 = 0.05 
Since the ra+.e of population increase has varied between 1.7 
and 1.6 per cent during the past 4 or 5 years, we shall take 
r 1 = 0.015 and r 2 = 0.018, as plausible values of these 
parameters. The implicit ,asswnptinn here is that fertility at 
higher income levels is considerably low. 
Income earned by the rich = ~1K1 
But lowest income received by the rich = Z1 
Let Z1 be set so that Z1 = 0.8 0<.1 1:1 
That is ~1 is so defined that at leaot 80 per cent of their 
income initially earned, is assured to them. 
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Therefore 'savings = S1 Z:1 = s1 0.8 0{.1 ~ = 0.0288 K1 
since r 1 = 0.015 , K1 (e
T1T 
- 1) = 0~455 K1 when T = 25 
Also s1 Z1 T = 0.72 K1 , '\'lhen T = 25 
Therefore s1 Z1 T > K1 (e Xi T - 1) . . . . . . (1 ) 
Clearly, this inequality will hold for values of T less 
than 25 years. 
Now 
But r' 2 
= 0.028 
= 0.018 
Therefore 8 2 t 2 .., r 2 
Again Y 2 = 0.2 
But f2 (1 - 52) = 0.28 x 0.9 = 0.252 
Therefore ''( 2 < (32 (1 - s2) 
• • • •• (2 ) 
.••• (3) 
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Appendix IX 
(To Chapter 7) 
IExplanatory Note No.2 to Chapter 7 
The object of this note is to examine whether the rich and the 
poor could reverse roles during a finite time horizon of 25 years. 
The best of possible circumstances which could bring about a 
reversal is Regime II with A = 1, r = 1, indicative of strong 
redistribution measures. In this case the relevant equations 
are. 
Y1 = Z1 
Y2 = a 1 K1 - Z1 + f2 K2 + '(2 Kg 
Y = l'~ K • •• (1) g J g 
. 
K1 = s1 Z1 
*2 = s 2 f 2 K 2 + (s g l' 3 I{ g - I g) 
. 
K = I g g ... (2) 
Since f2 ) D2 (see Appendix VIII), it follows that an increment 
in K2 will favour a higher Y2 than an equivalent increment in Kg' 
Noreover, equations (2) indicate that K2 has an exponential growth 
in contrast to the purely linear growth of K (since I = constant) g g 
Therefore, the accumulation afK2 ought to be taster than that of 
K • g 
It is clear from the second equation of (2) that K2 will be 
higher with lower values of I g , 
Setting I = 0, equations (2) read g 
-K = 0 g 
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Therefore K1 = s1 Z1 t + I, 
K = K g g 
Substituting for Kg in the second equation of (3) 
K2 - s2f2 K2 = Sg ¥3 Kg 
where A is an arbitrary constant. 
Initially, when t = 0, · K2 = A - a 03 K g - Pi 
s2 (32 
• •• (3) 
• •• (4) 
, 
••• (4) 
As in the case of Chapter 5, we take the initial values of Y1' 
Y2~ Yg (after redistribution) to be 
Y1 = 34 
Therefore at t = 0, 
Y1 = 21 = 0.8 ~1 K1 (see Appendix VIII) 
Y = a K g g g ••• (5) 
As in Appendix VIII, we shall U9 e the following values of the 
parameters 
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0<.1 = 0.18 CX2 = 0.12 
Using these values, equations (5) yield 
l3 = 0.05 
s = 0.1 g 
K1 = 236 
K = 40 g • •• (6) 
~ubstituting for K1 and Kg in the second equation of (1) we get 
56 = 70.8 - 34 + 0.28 K2 + 8 
i.e K'2 = 40 
Let the values of K1 , K2 , Kg at t = 25 be denoted by 
K2(T) and Kg(T) 
Then equations (4) gives 
K1(T) = s1 Z1 t + K1 = 406 
• •• 
Kg(T) = 40 ••• (8) 
I 
Likewise equation (4) gives 
K2 (T) = (40 + 7.1 )eo" - 7.1 
= 87.7 
At t = 25, Y1 remains at 34, but from (1) 
Y2 = 122 - 34 + 24.6 + 8 = 120.6 
A~ in Chapter IV (see Sections 4.2 and 4.8) let us take the 
population propor~ions of rich to the poor aB 1 : 4. 
Taking the former as the unit of population, 
at t = 0 
• •• (9) 
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Let us consider the following rates of population increase 
(as in Appendix VIII) 
r 1 = 1.5 per cent per annum 
r 2 = 1.8 per cent per annum • • • (10) 
Then at t = 25, N1 and N2 will be 
N1 = 1.45 
N2 = 6.27 
Therefore the incomes of the rich and the poor per unit of 
population would change as follows. 
Income per unit of population at t = 0 
Income per unit of population at t = 25 
Rich 
-
34 
23.4 
Poor 
-
14 
19.2 
If the rate of increase of population of the poor is also taken 
as 1.5 per cent per annum, then the income per unit of population 
at t = 25 workS out to 20.7 instead of 19.2. It would thus appear 
that although the incomes per unit of population as between the 
rich and the poor would narrow down conSiderably, their roles 
would not be reversed over the time horizon of 25 years, and with-
in the data framework used. 
, I 
", 
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AP1)E1IDrx X 
(To Chapter 7) 
Explanatory Note No.' to Chapter 7 
In Regime I, A= 0 and r = t 
Therefore the income equation (7.2) read as 
Y1 = (X,1 K1 
Y2 =CX 2K1 + (32K2 + " 2Kg 
Y = ~':OtK g J g 
Differentiating with respect to time \,le get 
· . Y1 = CX1K1 
Y2 = 0(2X1 + f2K2 + 
Y = ¥':OtK g J g 
The Capital accumulation equations are: 
. 
K1 = 91 0(1 K1 
· K2 = s2 ~2K2 + (Sg ~3Kg-Ig) 
· K = I g g 
As in the case of Chapter 4 let us take ~ as 
Y1 
a measure of income inequality 
Then sL (~) = Y1 
dt ,¥;) 
From equations (1) 
• • 
Y2 - Y2 Y1 
Y1 
and (2) we get 
••• 
(1 ) 
••• 
(2) 
••• (3) 
" 
-
x - 2 
" . Substituting for the Ks from equation (3) we get 
Y t Y2 - Y2 Yl = oc l [32 [Kl {s202 K2 + ~g ", Kg - I gl-:S, OC1K1K2 ] 
+ ~1 02K1 (Ig - Kg ~1«1) 
= CX1.f2 [ K1 K2 (S2f2 - S1 ~ )+ Kt (S g ".,Kg -I~ J 
+ cx 1"'(2 Kt (Ig - Kg :l1o(1 ) 
According to the values of parameters in Appendix VllI 
(92(32 -s, o(1) is negative. 
Again I - K S1 "'1 <:J "(~ K - K :11 (;(1 = K ('$ 1 _ .$ ~ ) < 0 g g gJ g g g g 3 11 
The only positive term in the above expression is (s 'LX -I ) . g", g g 
Therefore if the other two terms which are negative and 
. . 
sufficiently large in magnitude, Y1 Y2 - Y2 Y1 <0 
That is, (Y2/Y1) will decline, which means that income 
inequality will increase. 
" 
. 
• 
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